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A COMPARATIVE VIEW
OF THE
CHURCHES
OF
ENGLAND AND ROME.

FOURTH EDITION, WITH AN APPENDIX,
CONTAINING SOME
EXPLANATORY NOTES
ON CHURCH AUTHORITY, THE CHARACTER OF SCHISM,
AND THE ROCK
ON WHICH OUR SAVIOUR DECLARED THAT HE
WOULD BUILD HIS CHURCH.

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A

COMPARATIVE VIEW,

&c.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CHURCHES OF ENGLAND AND ROME, IN RESPECT TO ARTICLES OF FAITH—THE LATTER FOUNDS ITS DOCTRINES ON TWO EQUAL AND INDEPENDENT AUTHORITIES, SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION—THE FORMER FOUNDS ITS DOCTRINES ON SCRIPTURE ALONE—THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO CHURCHES, IN THIS RESPECT, STATED AND EXPLAINED.

IN taking a comparative view of the Churches of England and Rome, the doctrines respectively maintained by the two Churches present themselves as the objects of primary consideration. The truth or falsehood of a religion is the truth or falsehood of its *doctrines*; for alterations may be made, both in the *ceremonies* of a Church, and in the *authority* of a Church, without affecting the *truth* of the religion which it professes. But, that we may be enabled to *judge* of the truth or falsehood of doctrines, we must previously know

B

on what *foundations* they are built. In the first place, then, we must inquire into the *fundamental* difference between the two Churches in respect to their doctrines : and, when it has been proved that the two Churches *are* fundamentally distinct ; we must, in the next place, inquire, whether the foundation, on which the Church of *Rome* has built, (independently of the foundation common to *both* Churches) is composed of solid or of sandy materials. The decision of this question will *enable* us to judge, whether the doctrines, which *distinguish* the Church of Rome from the Church of England, are true or false. When the *latter* question has been determined, which is of peculiar importance at the present juncture, and has been rendered more so by the attempts to *conceal* the differences which we are chiefly concerned to know, we may proceed to the examination of the principles on which the two Churches have acted in regard to Church-*ceremonies*. And, lastly, we may consider the principles, on which they have acted in the exercise of Church-*authority* ; a subject, that will lead to the consideration of other subjects connected with it, which are now of great practical importance.

In the first place, then, let us endeavour to prove, that the two Churches, in respect to doctrines, are *fundamentally distinct*. For this purpose, it is necessary to show, not only that they differ in many *single* articles of faith, but that

the faith of the *one* is founded on a different *basis* from the faith of the *other* : or (to change the metaphor) that the *sources*, from which the two Churches derive their articles of faith, are *not the same*. If *this* be true, there is no agreement, either in Church-authority, or in Church-ceremonies, which can remove that inherent distinction. Not, that they *do* agree in *either* of these respects, not even, as is pretended, in the exercise of *Church-authority*, as will hereafter be shown, when we have examined the sources of faith, and the doctrines which thence respectively flow.

That there is *one* source of Christian faith, which is common to the two Churches, may be readily granted : for the authority of the *Bible*, however variously *interpreted*, is admitted by Christians of every description. But if the Bible is the *sole* fountain of Christian faith to the Church of England, and *not* the sole fountain of Christian faith to the Church of Rome, the authority admitted by the latter, *in addition* to the authority of the Bible, must constitute an *essential* difference between the two Churches. Now this essential difference can be removed by no other means, than by showing, either that the Church of Rome does *not* add to the Bible an authority considered as *equal* to the Bible, or that the Church of England *agrees* in such addition with the Church of Rome. No attempt has been made to demonstrate *either* of these propo-

sitions in clear and express terms. But *some* authority (it is said) is recognised by *both* Churches, in addition to the authority of the Bible : and the bare recognition of a *second* authority is sufficient (as is further said) to place the two Churches on a level. This argument has certainly involved the present question in great confusion ; and this very confusion has enabled the advocates of the Church of Rome to draw conclusions in its favour, which they *could not* have drawn, if the proposition had been stated with precision. For the additional authority, recognised by the Church of *Rome*, is regarded as something, both *equal to*, and *independent of*, the Bible ; whereas the Church of *England* acknowledges no authority, but such as is *wholly and solely dependent* on the Bible. When we appeal to our Liturgy and Articles, which is done only in arguing with those who have previously *acknowledged* them, we do not appeal to them as documents, having validity *in themselves*, but as documents, having no other validity than what they *derive from the Bible* ; as documents, which are only so far valid as they *agree* with the Bible. On the other hand, when a Romanist appeals to *tradition*, as a rule of faith, he appeals to an authority, neither *derived from*, nor in any way *dependent on*, the Bible. He regards *tradition* as an authority, which existed even *before* the New Testament ; as an authority proceeding *equally* from Christ and his Apostles, though trans-

mitted through a *different channel*; as an authority conveying doctrines, delivered *orally* by the Apostles, and *recorded* in the works of the fathers.

That this representation of Romish tradition, and of the consequent *characteristic* difference between the two Churches, is perfectly correct, appears from the representations which have been made on that subject, by the most distinguished among the Romish writers themselves. It will be sufficient, however, to quote the explanations which have been given in the works of Cardinal Bellarmine, and in the theological lectures at the college of Maynooth. We may appeal to Bellarmine, as the most *acute*, the most *methodical*, the most *comprehensive*, and at the same time one of the most *candid*, among the controversialists of the Church of Rome. And we appeal to the theological lectures, now given in the college of Maynooth, as officially expressing (what we are highly concerned to know) the system of divinity now taught in the United Kingdom to the *clergy* of that Church¹. Further, when such authorities *agree*, as they do on the subject of *tradition*, they may be considered as expressing the *general* sentiments of that Church.

¹ The substance of the theological lectures given in the college of Maynooth, is contained in the following work:—*Tractatus de Ecclesiâ Christi, ad uſum Theologiæ Candidatorum. Accedunt duæ Appendices, de Traditione, et Conciliis generalibus. Autore L. Æ. Delahogue. Dublinii, 1809. 8vo.*

But neither the works of Bellarmine, nor the lectures of Maynooth, nor the Exposition of Bossuet (which will not be left unnoticed), are here quoted, on the subject of *tradition*, for any other purpose, than to explain *the state of the question*. For when the question has been stated and explained, which is the sole object of the *present* chapter, a *further* appeal will be made, in the following chapter, to the decrees and canons of the Council of Trent, which *officially* declare the tenets of the Church of Rome.

The explanations of *tradition*, which have been given by Cardinal Bellarmine, are contained in his treatise on ‘*The Word of God.*’ (De Verbo Dei.) The three first books of this treatise relate to the *written* Word of God (Verbum Dei *scriptum*) as contained in the Old and New Testament. But the *fourth* book, which relates wholly to *tradition*, is entitled ‘Of the *unwritten* Word of God’ (De Verbo Dei *non scripto*) ; and declares, therefore, by its very *title*, the quality of the tradition, which is the *subject* of that book. In the second chapter of this work, Bellarmine observes, that, though the term tradition, in its most *extensive* sense, may be applied to *written*, as well as to *unwritten* doctrines, it is *commonly* used in the *latter* sense². But, as he further

² Nomen traditionis generale est, et significat omnem doctrinam, sive scriptam, sive non scriptam, quæ ab uno communicatur alteri.—Tametsi vero traditionis nomen generale sit, tamen hoc ipsum nomen accommodatum est a theologis

observes, such doctrines are called *unwritten* doctrines in contradistinction to the *written* doctrines, or *Scripture*, not because such doctrines are *no where* written, but because they were not written by the *authors themselves*³. They were *written* by the Greek and Latin *fathers*⁴. Bellarmine then proceeds to describe the *kinds* of tradition. The first kind he calls *divine* tradition; which relates to doctrines delivered to the Apostles by *Christ himself*, but which, though *taught* also by the Apostles, were left by them *unrecorded*. The *second* kind he calls *apostolical* tradition; which relates to doctrines *likewise* taught by the Apostles, and likewise left *unrecorded*; yet so far differing from the former kind, that the Apostles received them not from the instructions of Christ, but from the dictates of the *Holy Spirit*⁵. Now doctrines taught by the *Apostles*, whether originally received from *Christ himself*, or afterwards suggested to them by the *Holy Spirit*, were, in either case, doctrines *apostolice* *significandum tantum doctrinam non scriptam*. Lib. iv. cap. 2.

³ Vocatur autem doctrina *non scripta*, non ea quæ nusquam scripta est, sed quæ non scripta est a *primo auctore*. Ib. ib.

⁴ A catalogue of the fathers, who are supposed to be the principal recorders of the *unwritten word* is given by Cardinal Baronius, in his ‘*Annales Ecclesiastici*,’ tom. i. p. 412—418.

⁵ *Divinæ* dicuntur, quæ acceptæ sunt ab ipso *Christo* Apostolos docente, et nusquam in divinis literis inveniuntur.—*Apostolicæ* traditiones proprie dicuntur illæ, quæ ab *Apostolis* institutæ sunt, non tamen sine assistentiâ Spiritus Sancti, et nihilominus non extant scriptæ in eorum epistolis. Ib. ib.

tological: and hence the term ‘apostolical,’ though used as an epithet descriptive of the *second* kind, is frequently applied also to tradition of the *first* kind. On the other hand, the term ‘divine,’ though used as an epithet descriptive of the *first* kind, is applied also to tradition of the *second* kind. For doctrines, suggested to the Apostles by the *Holy Spirit*, were no less *divine*, than the doctrines which they had received from Christ himself⁶. It appears, then, that *both* kinds may properly be referred to one and the same *class*: and they frequently *are* so referred. Indeed they are *always* comprehended in the term ‘*tradition*,’ when tradition is used, as at present, to denote *the unwritten Word of God*: for they are nothing less than the *constituent parts* of that unwritten word⁷.

But besides the two kinds of tradition, which thus constitute (or are *supposed* to constitute) the *unwritten Word of God*, there is a *third* kind of tradition mentioned by Bellarmine, which must be carefully distinguished from the two former, as it is *totally different* from them, both in *origin*, and in *quality*. The two former, as we have already seen, claim a *divine* origin; and, in-

⁶ Hence Bellarmine, in the same chapter, observes, “Solent tamen interdum etiam *divinæ* traditiones dici *apostolicæ*, et *apostolicæ* dicuntur *divinæ*.”

⁷ This will further appear from *another* quotation about the *unwritten Word*, where Bellarmine describes it as *consisting* of the divine and apostolical traditions. See the following note², p. 13.

deed, unless a divine origin were *ascribed* to them, they could not be *at all* considered as a part of *God's Word*. But the *third* kind of tradition is confessedly of *human* origin; and it is *described* as such by the Romish writers themselves. Nor is the *third* kind of tradition less different in *quality*, than in *origin*. The two former relate to *doctrines*, or articles of *faith*; and are received by the Church of Rome as a *rule* of faith. But the *third* kind relates merely to *Church-ceremonies*, and is called therefore the tradition of the *Church* or *ecclesiastical* tradition. Now this *ecclesiastical* tradition Bellarmine describes as consisting of certain ancient *customs* (*consuetudines quædam antiquæ*), which having *originated*, partly in the practice of the *bishops*, partly in the practice of the *people*, have gradually, and by tacit consent, acquired the force of a *law*⁸.

The same *threefold* division, which is made by Cardinal Bellarmine, is made also in the theological lectures at Maynooth, as appears from the treatise 'De Ecclesiâ Christi⁹,' where tradition is likewise divided into the three kinds of *divine*, *apostolical*, and *ecclesiastical*. But, as the explanations, which are there given on the subject of tradition, accord exactly with those of Bellar-

⁸ *Ecclesiasticæ traditiones proprie dicuntur consuetudines quædam antiquæ, vel a prelati vel a populis inchoatæ, quæ paulatim, tacito consensu populorum, vim legis obtinuerunt.*
Ib. ib.

⁹ P. 398.

mine, it is unnecessary to *repeat* them, though the coincidence itself is worthy of our notice. Supported therefore by these authorities, I will proceed to a *further* investigation of the tradition, which the Church of Rome receives as the *unwritten Word of God*, and which it regards as a rule of *faith*, equally with the *written Word*.

In this investigation we have manifestly no concern with any *other* kinds of tradition, than those which *constitute* (or are *supposed* to constitute) the unwritten Word of God. We are concerned then *wholly and solely* with what are called *divine* and *apostolical* traditions. This indeed is very clearly stated in the treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi*¹. “*Quæ nunc movetur controversia* (says the author of that treatise), *est tantum de divinis et apostolicis traditionibus.*” Whether any such traditions can be proved to *exist*, that is, whether any doctrines, recorded by the fathers, but *not* recorded in the New Testament, can be shown to be *really* of divine and apostolical origin, is a question, which will be examined *hereafter*. Our *present* object is to ascertain, what the tenets of the Church of Rome, in respect to tradition, *really are*: for till the subject of discussion is *understood*, it is useless to argue about its truth or falsehood. Now the subject of tradition, which to the Church of Rome is a rule of faith, however intelligible it

¹ Ibid.

may be *thought* by those, who have not examined it in all its bearings, is really one of the most *intricate* subjects in dogmatic theology. And it will be absolutely *impossible* to conduct with precision our present inquiry, unless this rule of faith be kept free from intermixture with any *other* kinds of tradition, than those of which it is *composed*. We must be careful then to avoid the confusion, which would *now* arise from a reference to the *thirty-fourth* article of our Church; though that article relates *expressly* to *tradition*. And it is the *more* necessary to guard against this confusion, because the danger of falling into it is so much *the greater*, as the *thirty-fourth* article is the *only* one, among the *thirty-nine*, in which the term ‘*tradition*’ occurs. But it is *evident*, that the term is *there* used in no other sense, than that which is affixed by Bellarmine to the *third* kind of tradition. *This* kind of tradition is called, as we have seen, *ecclesiastical* tradition. Now the very *title* of the *thirty-fourth* article is, ‘Of the Traditions of the Church;’ an expression evidently synonymous with *ecclesiastical* traditions. And if any doubt remained about the similarity of their meaning, that doubt would be removed by the *contents* of the article. “It is not necessary (says this article) that *traditions* and *ceremonies* be in all places one or utterly like.” Again, says this article, “Whosoever, through his private judgment, willingly and purposely doth openly break

the *traditions* and *ceremonies* of the Church, &c.” Since then in this article *traditions* and *ceremonies* are thus mentioned *together*, they must necessarily be understood as having a *similar meaning*. And this meaning exactly corresponds with the description given by Bellarmine of *ecclesiastical* tradition ; or tradition, which relates, as he says, to certain ancient *customs* (*consuetudines quædam antiquæ*). This article, therefore, was merely intended to oppose the tenet of the Church of Rome, that *customs* or *ceremonies* of the Church, sanctioned by traditional and immemorial usage, had the force of a *law*, and could not be *changed*. It is in the *sixth* article, as also in the *twentieth*, and the *twenty-first*, that our Church opposes Tradition, as a *Rule of Faith*, though the *term* ‘tradition’ is not *used* in them.

The *subject* of inquiry being now explained, let us proceed to the state of the question, as it affects the Church of Rome on the *one* hand, and the Church of England on the *other*. Now the state of the question, in reference to the two Churches, is delivered by Bellarmine in the following words. “ *We* (says Bellarmine) assert, that the necessary doctrine, whether relating to FAITH, or to MORALS, is *not* all expressly contained in Scripture ; and therefore, that beside the *written* Word of God, there is a necessity for an *unwritten* word, that is, the *divine* and *apostolical* traditions. But *they* (namely, the Protestants) teach, that *all* things necessary to FAITH

and MORALS are contained in the *Scriptures*, and therefore, that there is no need of any *unwritten Word* ²."

Having thus explained the *characteristic difference* between the Church of *Rome*, and all *Protestant* Churches, in respect to tradition as a rule of *faith*, he proceeds in a subsequent chapter to assign a *reason* (such as it is) why the Church of *Rome* acknowledges a *second* rule of faith in *tradition*. "The *total* rule of faith (he says) is the Word of God, or his revelation to the *Church*; which is divided into *two partial* rules, *SCRIPTURE* and *TRADITION*. Scripture indeed, inasmuch as it is a *rule*, has this quality, that whatever it contains is necessarily true, and to be believed; and that whatever is repugnant to it, is necessarily false, and to be rejected. Since, however, it is not a *total*, but a *partial* rule, the consequence is, that it does not comprise *all* things, and therefore, that there are *some* things relating to *FAITH*, which are *not* contained in it ³."

² Nos asserimus, in Scripturis non contineri expresse totam doctrinam necessariam, sive de FIDE, sive de MORIBUS; et proinde, præter Verbum Dei scriptum, requiri etiam Verbum Dei non scriptum, id est, divinas et apostolicas traditiones. At ipsi docent in Scripturis omnia contineri ad FIDEM et MORES necessaria, et proinde non esse opus ullo verbo non scripto. Likewise Dr. Delahogue (de Ecclesiâ Christi, p. 403,) says, "In principiis Protestantium, qui traditiones divinas et apostolicas non agnoscunt, hæc duo sunt admittenda, scripturas et necessarias esse, et sufficere ad complendam fidem. Atqui hæc duo falsissima sunt."

³ Totalis regula fidei est Verbum Dei, sive revelatio Dei

The equal authority here ascribed to *tradition* as a *rule of faith*, is ascribed to it also in the theological lectures at Maynooth. The proposition announced at the head of the chapter on this subject is, that “there are *divine* and *apostolical* traditions, which, though they were *not written*, have the force of the *written* law⁴.” I will quote therefore, at present, only one more passage on this subject, which shall be taken from the ‘Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church in matters of Controversy, by Bossuet, bishop of Meaux;’ a work, to which *very great* deference is paid by the members of the Church of Rome, and of which they have lately published an English translation. In the seventeenth chapter of this work, which is entitled, ‘Scripture and Tradition,’ Bossuet says, “Jesus Christ having laid the foundation of his Church by preaching, the *unwritten* Word was consequently the *first* rule of Christianity. And when the writings of the New Testament were *added* to it, its authority was not *forfeited* on that ac-

Ecclesiæ facta, quæ dividitur in *duas* regulas *partiales*, SCRIPTURAM ET TRADITIONEM. Et quidem Scriptura, quia est regula, inde habet, ut quicquid continet sit necessario verum et credendum, et quicquid ei repugnat sit necessario falsum et repudiandum. Quia vero non est regula totalis, sed *partialis*, inde illi accidit, quod non *omnia* mensuret, et propterea *aliquid* sit de FIDE, quod in ipsa non continetur. *Bellarminus de Verbo Dei*, lib. iv. cap. 12.

⁴ Existunt traditiones *divinæ* et *apostolicæ*, quæ, licet non scriptæ, vim legis scriptæ habent. Ib. p. 399.

count : which makes us receive, with *equal* veneration, all that has been taught by the Apostles, whether *in writing*, or by *word of mouth*." And he concludes by saying, " Our adversaries should not be surprised, if we who are so earnest in collecting all that our *fathers* have left us, do preserve the deposit of TRADITION *as carefully*, as that of the SCRIPTURES."

It appears then from the representations, which the most *distinguished* among the Romish writers have given of tradition as a *rule of faith*, that they regard it as an authority, both *independent* of Scripture, and in all respects *equal* with Scripture. Indeed, whatever can be *proved* to be the Word of God (for all *depends* on the *proof*) must *of necessity*, whether *written* or *unwritten*, whether preserved by *Scripture*, or preserved by *Tradition*, have the same divine authority.

There is one point more, which requires explanation, and that indeed a point of no less difficulty than importance. Though tradition, as a rule of faith, has been fully explained in *theory*, yet the *practical* part, or the *application* of the rule, may still be attended with various embarrassments. Nothing indeed can be more precise, as far as *theory* goes, than the statement of Bellarmine, on the respective provinces of *Scripture* and *tradition*. He *admits*, as we have already seen, that *some* things relating even to *faith* are *not* contained in Scripture ; and hence

we might infer, that *these* are the things relating to faith, which our Church has rejected, *because* they are not contained in Scripture. And so indeed we shall *find* them to be, when we have *analyzed* the decrees and canons of the Council of Trent, and compared them with the thirty-nine articles. But the line of demarcation between doctrines founded on *Scripture*, and doctrines founded on *Tradition*, was not drawn by the Council *itself*. For, the *name* at least of Scripture is often joined with the name of tradition, when the doctrine to be proved derives, in reality, no support from Scripture. It is true, that where Scripture is too *notoriously* adverse, there is an appeal to *tradition*, and none to *Scripture*. But, in other cases, the decrees of that Council which relate to doctrines, even to those which Protestants *reject*, are prefaced by an appeal as well to *Scripture*, as to *Tradition*. This *two-fold* appeal had a twofold advantage. It covered the *distinction* which might otherwise have been observed in respect to the *foundation* of doctrines. And it served to silence, if not to satisfy, the followers of Luther, who had *already* rejected *tradition* as a rule of *faith*, and of course would reject all doctrines, which were *acknowledged* to have no other support.

But, according to the principles which the Church of *Rome* maintains, the authority of *tradition* is so far from wanting any aid from *Scripture*, that the *contrary* is supposed to be the

truth. For that Church represents the *written* Word, not merely as requiring *explanation*, which in many places it certainly *does*, but as being so *ambiguous* and so *perplexed*, that *in itself* it is often *unintelligible*. On the other hand, it considers the *unwritten* Word, as containing *fully and clearly* what the *written* Word contains *imperfectly and obscurely*. To remedy, therefore, the supposed deficiencies of the *written* Word, it applies the aid of the *unwritten* Word. In this manner is *Tradition* made a rule for the *interpretation* of Scripture: and the imputed ambiguity of the *text* gives ample scope for the operation of the *comment*. Thus is Scripture brought under the *tutelage* of Tradition: and this *tutelage* is soon converted into a state of *vassalage*. For since the *comment* claims the same *divine origin* as the *text itself*, that comment, if supposed to be *full and clear*, in proportion as the text is supposed *imperfect and obscure*, has in fact an authority *superior* to that of the text. Hence tradition, which in *theory* is made a rule of faith only *equal* to Scripture, becomes *in practice* a rule of faith *paramount* to Scripture.

The *ambiguity* and *perplexity* ascribed to Scripture by the Church of Rome, for the purpose of bringing it under the *tutelage of tradition*, is too notorious to require many quotations for that purpose. Be it sufficient then to produce the evidence of Cardinal Bellarmine, who has fully stated the sentiments of his Church in the fourth

book of his treatise, 'On the Word of God.' In the fourth chapter of this book, he declares that Scripture is very often so *ambiguous* and *perplexed* (*ambigua et perplexa*), that it is *unintelligible*, unless explained by some *infallible* authority⁵. He adds, that in very many places we *cannot* be certain of its meaning, unless we call in the aid of *tradition*⁶. And he concludes with the following observation (founded partly on the authority of a former writer), that the Gospel, without *unwritten tradition*, is an empty name, or *words without sense*⁷.

The *state* of the question therefore being now explained, we may proceed in the next chapter to a *confirmation* of it, by an appeal to the Council of Trent.

⁵ Sæpissime Scriptura ambigua et perplexa est, ut nisi ab aliquo, qui errare *non possit*, explicetur, non possit intelligi.

⁶ After considering the words of Scripture in the first place, and the sense in the *second*, he adds, "Nec possumus, plurimis in locis certi esse de secundo, *nisi accedat traditio*."

⁷ Sine traditionibus non scriptis Evangelium esse purum nomen, *id est, esse tantum voces et verba sine sensu*.

CHAPTER II.

APPEAL TO THE COUNCIL OF TRENT—PREVIOUS REMARKS ON THE USE OF TERMS—PROOF FROM THE DECREES AND CANONS OF THIS COUNCIL, THAT THE CHURCH OF ROME ACKNOWLEDGES, IN SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION, TWO EQUAL AND INDEPENDENT AUTHORITIES, FOR DOCTRINES, OR RULES OF FAITH—INFLUENCE OF TRADITION, AS A RULE OF FAITH, ON THE DOCTRINES OF THE CHURCH OF ROME, EXEMPLIFIED BY THOSE DECREES AND CANONS—CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCIL ITSELF.

WE appeal to the Council of Trent, in confirmation of the statements which were made in the preceding chapter, because the decrees and canons of that Council declare *officially* the doctrines of the Church of Rome. But, before we *quote* those decrees and canons, it may be proper to make some observations on the *terms* which are there employed, in reference to our present inquiry. For a misapprehension of those terms would not only create confusion, but might defeat the very *object* of the appeal.

The *subjects* of our present inquiry are *Scripture* and *Tradition*—Scripture and Tradition, considered as two authorities for doctrines, or two rules of faith. And the design of this chapter is to show, that what Bellarmine and other Romish writers have said of Scripture and Tradition, in respect to their *equality* and *independence* as

rules of faith¹, accords with the decrees and canons of the Council of Trent. Since then the Tradition, which is *now* the subject of inquiry, is, equally with Scripture, a rule of *faith*, we must never forget, that all *other* kinds of Tradition, whether they relate to laws, or to customs, or to ceremonies, or to any thing whatever beside *faith*, are irrelevant, and *foreign* to that inquiry. We are now concerned with that tradition *alone*, from which, conjointly with Scripture, the Church of Rome deduces its articles of faith, or doctrines. But even in *this* inquiry, confined as it is to articles of faith, or doctrines, the *term* 'Tradition' may still be taken in two different senses.

Sometimes, and indeed *most* times, the term 'tradition' denotes the doctrine transmitted, the *doctrina tradita*. At other times it denotes the vehicle which *conveys* the doctrine, or the way by which the doctrine is *transmitted* (*via qua transmittitur doctrina*). But, in general, these two senses, though closely *allied*, and both of them *relating* to *doctrine*, are easily *distinguished*. Thus, when Cardinal Bellarmine, in the passage last quoted from his 'Treatise on the Word of God,' speaks of a *total* rule of faith, comprehending two *partial* rules of faith, in Scripture and Tradition, it is manifest that, as Scripture there denotes the *written doctrine*, so tradition there

¹ See the quotations in notes 3, 4, chap. 1, p. 13, 14.

denotes the *unwritten doctrine*. Indeed Bellarmine himself, in the second chapter of the same book, has expressly called this very tradition, '*doctrina non scripta* ².' In like manner we find, in the Treatise 'De Ecclesiâ Christi,' that the very first section on the subject of tradition is entitled, 'De Traditione, quatenus designat ipsam, quæ traditur, *doctrinam* ³.' Here, then, the distinction between the *doctrine*, and the *vehicle* of the doctrine, is clearly marked. But, at other times, when the term tradition is left unexplained, we must judge of its meaning from the *context*, and we shall find that, in the decrees and canons of the Council of Trent, the term tradition is generally left to explain *itself*. Its meaning, however, may be always ascertained with sufficient precision, except in some few cases, where ambiguity appears to have been *designed*.

Further, when we use the term 'Tradition' to denote, not the doctrine itself, but the *vehicle* of the doctrine, we must inquire what *qualifying* term should be joined with it, in order to *describe* the vehicle. For the bare *unqualified* term 'Tradition' may denote indeed *conveyance*; but it leaves us uninformed as to *what* conveyance. Now the *doctrina tradita*, or the doctrine left unwritten by the Apostles, is supposed to have

² Tametsi vero traditionis nomen *generale* sit, tamen hoc ipsum nomen accommodatum est a theologis ad significandam tantum *doctrinam* non scriptam. *De Verbo Dei*, lib. iv. cap. 2.

³ P. 398.

been recorded by the *fathers* of the Church, whose writings, therefore, are regarded as a *repository* of the unwritten doctrine. This *doctrina tradita* is further, indeed, supposed to have been transferred from the *works of the fathers* to the decrees of *general councils*, which are *thence* regarded as *another* repository. But since no general council was holden before the fourth century, the works of the *fathers* must always be regarded as the *primary*, if not the *principal* repository. And that they are regarded even as the *principal* repository, appears from the very appeal which is made to them in the decrees of the *councils themselves*, in the decrees even of the Council of *Trent*. Hence Cardinal Baronius, who, in the first volume of his ‘*Ecclesiastical Annals*,’ has enumerated the early fathers, whose works he considers as forming the chief repository, has concluded his catalogue with the observation, that the things decreed in the sacred *councils* were those very things which the *fathers themselves* had received unwritten from their predecessors, and had committed to writing, that they might be more accurately preserved⁴. Now the *qualifying* term, which is joined with the term Tradition, when tradition

⁴ Cæterum, quæ in sacris sunt Conciliis instituta, nec ipsa quidem recens fuerunt inventa, sed quæ et Patres ipsi a majoribus acceperunt sine scriptis, et, ut accuratius servarentur, scriptis consignarunt. Baronii Annales Ecclesiastici, tom. i. p. 418, ed. Antverpiæ, 1670, fol.

denotes the vehicle of the *doctrina tradita*, accords with the representation of Baronius. For tradition is *then* called the ancient tradition of the *fathers* (*antiqua Patrum traditio*), and so it is called by the Council of Trent.

Another observation relative to the use of *terms*, applies to Tradition, according as it is used, either in the singular or in the plural. When we speak of the divine and apostolical *traditions*, which were explained in the preceding chapter, and there shown to constitute what is considered the unwritten Word of God⁵, we evidently mean the *unwritten* divine and apostolical *doctrines*. Any *one*, therefore, of those unwritten doctrines is *a* tradition. But tradition, *without* an article, denotes the *sum total* of them. Nor is this comprehensive use of the term at all inconsistent with the nature of the *things comprehended*. For since those divine and apostolical *traditions* are so many divine and apostolical *doctrines*, they very properly constitute tradition as a rule of *faith*⁶. Now in the decrees and canons of the Council of Trent, *the traditions of the Apostles*

⁵ See the quotation in note 2, chap. i. p. 13, where Bellarmine, speaking of the unwritten Word of God, says, “*that is, the divine and apostolical traditions.*”

⁶ It has been already observed, that Bellarmine’s fourth book, which wholly relates to tradition, is *entitled*, ‘Of the unwritten Word of God’ (*De Verbo Dei non scripto*). Indeed, tradition, as a rule of *faith*, must necessarily correspond to what is called the unwritten doctrine, or unwritten Word of God.

(*traditiones apostolorum*) mean so many *single doctrines*, whereas *tradition*, in the singular, denotes the *whole* unwritten doctrine (*tota doctrina non scripta*).

Lastly, in respect to the terms ‘divine’ and ‘apostolical,’ the former of which (as was shown in the preceding chapter) is applied to the doctrines taught by Christ himself, while the latter is applied to doctrines suggested to the Apostles by the Holy Spirit; it must be observed, that though the Council of Trent has clearly distinguished between these two *kinds* of doctrine, especially in the decree which will presently demand our attention, it has not *marked* the distinction by the use of the *epithets* ‘divine’ and ‘apostolical.’ And, at other times, when it *does* use an epithet, it uses the epithet ‘apostolical’ as a *generic* term, to denote *both* kinds. Indeed, a more *appropriate* name than that of *apostolical* could not well be given them. For they relate to doctrines, which, whether delivered at first by Christ himself, or afterwards suggested by the Holy Spirit, were in either case doctrines taught by the *Apostles*⁷.

II. From these introductory observations on the use of *terms*, let us proceed to the decrees and canons themselves. The *first* among the decrees which relate to *Scripture* and *Tradition*,

⁷ In the Roman Catechism, as also in the Trent Confession of faith, *both* kinds are likewise included in the term ‘apostolical.’

was made at the *fourth* session of the Council, holden on the 8th of April, 1546, a few weeks only after the death of Luther. As this decree is of the highest importance, it will be necessary to quote the words of it at some length. “This sacred, œcumenical, and general Synod of Trent, lawfully assembled in the Holy Spirit, and presided over by the three legates of the apostolic see, having this object perpetually in view, that, errors being removed, the real purity of the Gospel may be preserved in the Church; which promised aforetime by the prophets in the holy Scriptures, our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, first promulgated by his *own mouth*, and afterwards ordained to be preached to every creature by the *Apostles*, as being a fountain both of *saving truth*, and *instruction of manners*; knowing further, that this truth and instruction is contained in the *written books* and in the *unwritten traditions*, which, having been received by the *Apostles*, either from the mouth of *Christ himself*, or from the dictates of the *Holy Spirit*, were handed down, and transmitted even to *us*; following the example of the orthodox Fathers, receives and venerates with sentiments of *equal piety and reverence* (*pari pietatis affectu ac reverentiâ*), all the books, as well of the Old as of the New Testament, since one God was the author of them both, and also the TRADITIONS, relating as well to *faith*, as to *morals*, inasmuch as, coming either from the mouth of *Christ him-*

self, or dictated by the *Holy Spirit*, they have been preserved in the Catholic Church in uninterrupted succession⁸.” Then, after enumera-

⁸ Sacrosancta, œcumenica, et generalis Tridentina Synodus, in Spiritu Sancto legitime congregata, præidentibus in eâ eisdem tribus apostolicæ sedis legatis, hoc sibi perpetuo ante oculos proponens, ut sublatis erroribus puritas ipsa Evangelii in Ecclesiâ conservetur; quod promissum ante per prophetas in Scripturis sanctis Dominus noster Jesus Christus, Dei Filius, proprio ore primum promulgavit, deinde per suos Apostolos, tanquam fontem omnis et salutaris veritatis, et morum disciplinæ, omni creaturæ prædicari jussit; perspiciciensque hanc veritatem et disciplinam contineri in LIBRIS SCRIPTIS, et SINE SCRIPTO TRADITIONIBUS, quæ ab ipsius Christi ore ab Apostolis acceptæ, aut ab ipsis Apostolis Spiritu Sancto dictante, quasi per manus traditæ, ad nos usque pervenerunt; orthodoxorum patrum exempla secuta, omnes libros tam Veteris quam Novi Testamenti, cum utriusque unus Deus sit auctor, necnon TRADITIONES ipsas, tum ad FIDEM tum ad MORES pertinentes, tanquam vel ore tenus a Christo, vel a Spiritu Sancto dictatas et continuâ successione conservatas, *pâri pietatis affectu ac reverentiâ suscipit et veneratur*. Pag. xx. ed. 1564. This original edition of the acts of the Council of Trent has the following title, “Canones et Decreta sacrosancti, œcumenici, et generalis Concilii Tridentini: sub Paulo III. Julio III. Pio IV. Pontificibus Maximis. Index Dogmatum et Reformationis. Romæ, apud Paulum Manutium Aldi F. M.D.LXIII. fol.” I have not only quoted from this original edition, published under the inspection of Pope Pius IV., but from an *attested copy* of that edition. For to the papal *Confirmatio Concilii*, which is annexed to the decrees, is added the following *written declaration*, “Nos sacri œcumenici et generalis Concilii Tridentini secretarius, et notarii infrascripti, decreta ipsius sacri Concilii, in præsentî volumine contenta, cum *originalibus* contulimus; et, quia cum eis concordantia reperimus, ideo sic in fidem *manu propriâ* subscripsimus.” Then follow the names of the secretary and the two notaries, in their proper hands.

tion of the books which constitute the *canon* of Scripture, according to the Church of Rome, and which will be a subject of *future* consideration, the decree proceeds as follows: "But if any one shall not receive, as sacred and canonical, those entire books, with all their parts, so as they are usually read in the Catholic Church, and contained in the ancient vulgate Latin edition, or shall knowingly and designedly contemn the aforesaid TRADITIONS, let him be accursed. Let all men therefore understand, in what order and method this synod, after laying the foundation of a confession of faith⁹, is about to proceed, and what *testimonies and authorities* it chiefly intends to use for the confirmation of *doctrines*, and the establishment of *morals* in the Church (in confirmandis *dogmatibus*, et instaurandis in ecclesiâ *moribus* ¹)."

This attested copy is preserved in the University library, where it is marked H. 9. 39.

⁹ This refers to the preceding decree, made at the third session which is entitled, 'Decretum de *symbolo fidei*,' and relates to the Apostles' Creed, which is there placed in the very *beginning* of their deliberations, in imitation, as is said, of the ancient fathers "qui sacratoribus Conciliis hoc scutum contra omnes hæreses in *principio* suarum actionum apponere consuevere."

¹ Si quis autem libros ipsos integros, cum omnibus suis partibus, prout in Ecclesiâ Catholicâ legi consueverunt, et in veteri Vulgatâ Latinâ editione habentur, pro sacris et canonicis non susceperit, et TRADITIONES prædictas sciens et prudens contempserit, *anathema sit*. Omnes itaque intelligant quo ordine et viâ ipsa Synodus, post jactum fidei confessionis

This decree then is *decisive* on the subject of Scripture and Tradition. We see that the Church of Rome receives both the *written* and the *unwritten* word, with sentiments of *equal* piety and reverence. We even see the *reason*, why the written and the unwritten word are received as *equal*: for their *equality* is founded on the declaration, that the *unwritten* word, no less than the *written* word, proceeded “either from the mouth of *Christ himself*, or from the dictates of the *Holy Spirit*.” Hence we further perceive the *independency* of tradition on Scripture; for they flow from the same *fountain-head*, but flow from the *commencement* of their course, through *different channels*.

Again, it is obvious that this decree includes both the *divine* and the *apostolical* traditions, though it does not express them by the *terms* ‘divine’ and ‘apostolical.’ But it has no allusion whatever to the *third* kind, or to *ecclesiastical* tradition: and for this very reason, that we are *here* concerned with no other tradition, than tradition as a rule of *faith*. We may further observe, that the traditions here described, as coming partly from the mouth of Christ, partly from the dictates of the Holy Spirit; in other words, the divine and the apostolical traditions, are *here*, as *elsewhere*, made to constitute the

fundamentum, sit progressura, et quibus potissimum testimoniis ac præsidiis, in confirmandis dogmatibus, et instaurandis in Ecclesiâ moribus, sit usura. Ib. p. xxi.

unwritten word, or tradition, as a rule of *faith*. This decree *alone* then affords sufficient confirmation of the statements which were made in the preceding chapter.

The *concluding* sentence of this decree is *still* worthy of notice: for, if *additional* proof were wanted, that Tradition is there considered as a rule of faith, no less than Scripture, this sentence would afford it. The decree concludes with the declaration, that what had been said about *Scripture* and *tradition*, had been said, that all men might understand “*what* testimonies and authorities it chiefly intends to use for the confirmation of DOCTRINES, and the establishment of MORALS in the Church².”

² As the decrees and canons of the Council of Trent *officially* declare the doctrines of the Church of Rome, no authority can be wanted for the purpose of *confirming* those decrees and canons. But, as the Roman Catechism, which is entitled, *Catechismus Romanus, ex Decreto Concilii Tridentini, et Pii V. Pontificis Maximi jussu primum editus* is another document, to which we may appeal for the purpose of ascertaining the doctrines of the Church of Rome, we may notice at least its *agreement* with the decree above quoted. Now the preface to this Catechism divides the Word of God into the *written*, and the *unwritten* word, or Scripture and tradition, in the same manner as that decree. “*Omnis doctrinæ ratio, quæ fidelibus tradenda est, VERBO DEI continetur, quod in SCRIPTURAM TRADITIONESQUE distributum est.*” And the editor, in a marginal note, thus refers to that very decree, “*De verbo Dei scripto et non scripto extat peculiare decretum sessione quartâ Concilii Tridentini.*” We may likewise quote the *Douay* Catechism; for though it has not the same official authority with the *Roman* Catechism, it is still worthy of notice, because an abstract of it was published in London in 1809, *with permission*,

III. After this formal declaration, in respect to the *two authorities*, which the Council of Trent thus proposes to employ, in confirmation of *doctrines* (in *confirmandis dogmatibus*), it follows, of course, that *these* are the authorities which are produced in the *subsequent* decrees. Hence we find, that the decree, which passed in the very next session relating to original sin, is prefaced by an appeal both to *Scripture* and *Tradition*. Again, in the *sixth* session, the decree relating to *justification* is represented as founded on the *unwritten* word, no less than on the *written* word. For the authority, to which reference is made, is *so* described, that it must at least *include* tradition. It is described as a doctrine, “*quam Sol justitiæ Christus Jesus, fidei nostræ auctor et consummator, docuit, Apostoli tradiderunt, et Catholica Ecclesia, Spiritu Sancto suggerente, perpetuo retinuit* ³.” Now this exactly accords with the description of the *doctrina tradita*. The preface to the canons of the *seventh* session has again an appeal to the *scripturarum* doctrina, and the *apostolicæ traditiones* ⁴. Now the canons of *this* session relate to the *seven sacraments*,

as stated on the title-page. Now, in the second chapter, entitled, ‘Faith expounded,’ we find the following question and answer,—“*Q. Are all these points of faith written in the Holy Bible?—A. Many are there clearly expressed; and some are only delivered by the living voice of the faithful, and are called apostolical traditions.*”

³ *Ib.* p. xxx.

⁴ *Ib.* p. l.

where the aid of tradition is certainly required ⁵. In the eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth sessions, no article of faith was taken into consideration. At length, in the *thirteenth* session, which was holden on the 11th of October, 1551, a decree was made on the *sacrament of the Lord's Supper*, entitled, 'Decretum de sanctissimo eucharistiæ sacramento.' In the preface to this decree, the Church of Rome professes to deliver the doctrine, "which the Catholic Church, instructed by our Lord Jesus Christ himself, and by his Apostles, and taught by the Holy Spirit daily suggesting to them all truth, has *always preserved*, and *will preserve* to the end of the world ⁶. This description exactly agrees with *tradition*, as a rule of faith: but *Scripture* is not mentioned there, at least not by name. Nor is it omitted without reason: for the fourth and fifth chapters of that decree relate to *transubstantiation* and the *worshipping* of the host. Now transubstantiation is there described to be "the conversion of the *whole* substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ, and of the *whole* substance of the wine into the substance of his blood ⁷."

⁵ Ib. p. li.

⁶ Doctrinam tradens, quam semper Catholica Ecclesia, ab ipso Jesu Christo Domino nostro et ejus apostolis erudita, atque a Spiritu Sancto, illi omnem veritatem indies suggerente, edocta, *retinuit*, et ad finem usque sæculi *conservabit*. Ib. p. lxxi.

⁷ Hæc Synodus declarat, per consecrationem panis et vini, conversionem fieri *totius* substantiæ panis in substantiam cor-

And the first canon annexed to this decree uses the term *corpus et sanguis una cum animá*, also the term *totus Christus* ⁸. Hence the Church of

poris Christi, Domini nostri, et *totius substantiæ vini in substantiam sanguinis ejus*. Ib. p. lxxiv.

⁸ The first canon, annexed to this decree, is as follows : Si quis negaverit in sanctissimæ eucharistiæ sacramento contineri vere, realiter, et substantialiter, corpus et sanguinem *una cum animá* et divinitate Domini nostri Jesu Christi, ac proinde *totum Christum* ; sed dixerit tantummodo esse in eo, ut *in signo vel figurá*, aut virtute, anathema sit." Ib. p. lxxvii. If any doubt remained about the *real* meaning of transubstantiation, this canon would remove it. The declaration made in the decree itself, that the *whole* substance of the bread and wine was changed into Christ's body and blood, implies, indeed, *of itself*, that, after the consecration, there can remain *nothing whatever* of the bread and wine : or the change cannot have been a *total* change, which is there positively asserted. But the canon says further, that what is there after consecration is *totus Christus*, and that Christ is not there merely under a *sign or figure* (*in signo vel figurá*). But Bossuet, in his 'Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church,' chap. ix., where he explains the doctrine of the eucharist, speaks of the body and blood of Christ as being "*wrapped up, as it were, under another appearance*:" he further observes, (p. 61,) that "*the sign, which naturally represents a thing, receives often the name of that thing, because it is, as it were, the nature of it to excite that idea*;" and he applies this observation by adding, that "*when in establishing a sign, that in itself has no sort of relation to the thing signified, for instance, a morsel of bread to signify the body of a man, it gets the name of that thing without any previous explanation*," &c. Now if, according to the decree and the canon, the change of substance is *total*, insomuch that after consecration, the "*whole Christ be there*," and not a representation of Him by a *sign or figure*, the Exposition of Bossuet is hardly reconcileable with the Council of Trent.

Rome, in conformity with this notion, requires an actual *worshipping* of the host. For the fifth chapter of this decree is entitled not merely *De veneratione* huic sanctissimo sacramento exhibendâ, but *De Cultu, et veneratione* huic sanctissimo sacramento exhibendâ. Even that *high* degree of worship, which is paid to *God himself*, is pronounced to be the worship due to the host ⁹. And the reason for thus worshipping the host is assigned in the following words: “We believe that the very *same* God is *there present*, whom the eternal Father sent into the world, and said, Let all the angels *worship* him ¹⁰.”

The *fourteenth* session relates to the doctrines of *penance* and *extreme unction*. Now for *both* of *these* doctrines appeal is made, as well to *Scripture* as to *tradition*. But we have here a proof of that *tutelage*, or rather *vassalage*, described at the end of the preceding chapter. Something *like* the doctrine to be proved, or some supposed *obscure intimation* of it, is sought in the words of *Scripture*. And then, through the light of *tradition*, this *obscure intimation* becomes at once a clear and comprehensive account of the

⁹ The words of the decree itself are, “Nullus itaque dubitandil oculus relinquitur, quin omnes Christi fideles, pro more in catholicâ ecclesiâ semper recepto *Latriæ* cultum, qui *vero Deo* debetur, huic sanctissimo sacramento in veneratione exhibeant.” Ib. p. lxxiii.

¹⁰ Illum eundem Deum præsentem in eo adesse credimus, quem Pater æternus introducens in orbem terrarum, dicit, Et adorent eum omnes Angeli Dei. Ib. p. lxxiii.

doctrine to be proved. Thus, in favour of *extreme unction* appeal is made to the fifth chapter of the Epistle of St. James, where *something* being said about anointing with oil in the name of the Lord, the decree says, of the words used by St. James, “quibus verbis (ut ex *apostolicâ traditione* per manus acceptâ Ecclesia didicit) docet materiam, formam, proprium ministerium et effectum hujus salutaris sacramenti¹¹.” Hence the oil is explained, as oil blessed by a *bishop*; the *form* to be used is explained to be “*Per istam unctionem*,” &c. Now of this *commentary* thus imposed by *tradition*, there is not a *trace* in the text: and we here see in what manner the text of Scripture is put to the torture, and made to *speak* whatever it may appear good, that *tradition* should *make* it speak. A similar mode is adopted to prove the doctrine of *penance*. The word μετανοεῖτε, used by John the Baptist, in the third chapter of St. Matthew, which signifies simply *repent*, is found by the light of *tradition* to mean ‘do *penance*.’ Hence μετανοεῖτε is so *translated* in the Rhemish Testament, which is the English version used by the Romanists in this country; and this translation is accompanied by the following note on the word ‘*penance*.’—“Which word, according to the use of the Scriptures and the *holy fathers*, does not only signify repentance and amendment of life, but

¹¹ Ib. p. xcvi.

also punishing past sins, by fasting, and such like *penitential exercises*."

Eleven more sessions were holden by this council, which continued till the year 1564, when its decrees and canons were published by papal authority. But, as the twenty-second and the twenty-fifth are those which chiefly relate to our present inquiry, (indeed some of them were mere decrees of *prorogation*) it will be sufficient to notice the decrees of the twenty-fifth, with a proper reference to the twenty-second. The decrees passed in the twenty-fifth relate to purgatory, indulgences, the relics of saints, and the invocation of saints. The decree relating to *purgatory* begins as follows : "Since the Catholic Church, instructed by the Holy Ghost out of the *sacred writings*, and the ancient *tradition of the fathers*, (*antiquâ patrum traditione*) has taught in its sacred councils, and lately in this œcumenical council, that there is a *purgatory*, and that the souls detained there are assisted by the prayers of the faithful, and especially by the acceptable sacrifice of the altar, this holy council commands the bishops to do their diligent endeavours that the sound doctrine of purgatory, as handed down by the *holy fathers, and the sacred councils*, be believed, retained, taught, and every where preached by the faithful in Christ¹²." Here it is

¹² Cum catholica ecclesia, Spiritu sancto edocta ex sacris literis et *antiquâ patrum traditione*, in sacris conciliis et novissime in hac œcumenicâ synodo docuerit, purgatorium esse,

worthy of remark, that though the decree *begins* with an appeal as well to *Scripture* as to *tradition*, yet, as if the framers of it were *conscious* that *Scripture* afforded them no support, the word *Scripture* is omitted at the *end* of the sentence, where the sound doctrine of purgatory is said to have been “handed down by the holy fathers and the sacred councils.” That the term ancient tradition of the *fathers* (*antiqua patrum traditio*) relates only to the mode of *conveyance*, and that the doctrine is still supposed to be *apostolical* tradition, appears from a comparison of it with a decree relating to the sacrifice of the *mass* where the subject of purgatory is *likewise* introduced. For in this decree it is said of the host, that “it is duly offered, according to the tradition of the *Apostles* (*juxta apostolorum traditionem*), not only for the sins, punishments, satisfactions, and other necessities of the *living*, but also for those who are *deceased* in Christ, and are not yet fully purged of their sins (*nondum ad plenum purgatis*¹³). This decree about

animasque ibi detentas fidelium suffragiis, potissimum vero acceptabili altaris sacrificio juvari, præcipit sancta synodus episcopis, ut sanam de purgatorio doctrinam, a sanctis patribus et sacris conciliis traditam, a Christi fidelibus credi, teneri, doceri, et ubique prædicari, diligenter studeant. Ib. p. cci.

¹³ Quare non solem pro fidelium vivorum peccatis, pœnis, satisfactionibus, et aliis necessitatibus, sed et pro *defunctis* in Christo, *nondum ad plenum purgatis*, rite, juxta APOSTOLORUM TRADITIONEM, offertur. Ib. p. cxli. Likewise the Roman

the sacrifice of the *mass*, and its benefit to souls in *purgatory*, is worthy of notice also in *another* respect. For no *attempt* even is made in it to couple the name of *Scripture* with the name of *tradition*.

In the decree about *indulgences*; there is again no attempt to call in the aid of *Scripture*. It rests solely on the power of the Church "*divinely handed down to it*" (*divinitus sibi tradita*¹⁴). Indeed, great caution is observed in the decree about *indulgences*: for it was the sale of these very indulgences which had first excited the indignation of Luther, and had occasioned the Reformation in Germany.

The decree about *relics* and *saints* is entitled, "*De invocatione, veneratione, et reliquiis Sanctorum, et sacris imaginibus.*" Here likewise no attempt is made to press the *Scriptures* into the service of this holy synod; for the members of it were *conscious* that the *Scriptures* were *against* them. Even *tradition* appears to be abandoned, at least *apostolical* tradition: for appeal is made to the *practice* of the Apostolical Church (*apostolicæ Ecclesiæ usum*¹⁵). Yet, in the Roman Missal (*Missale Romanum*) which was published

Catechism (p. 52, ed. 1572,) explaining the doctrine of purgatory, says, *De hujus quidem doctrinæ veritate, quam et scripturarum testimoniis, et apostolorum traditione confirmatam esse, sancta concilia declarant, &c.* And a marginal note refers not only to the Council of Florence, but to the twenty-fifth session of the Council of Trent.

¹⁴ Ib. p. ccxxxiii.

¹⁵ Ib. p. ccii.

by virtue of an order made in this very session¹⁶, there are many *collects* which have no other foundation than this decree, *de invocatione Sanctorum*. These collects, so far from resting the hope of salvation on the sole *merits and mediation of Christ*, appeal not unfrequently to the *merits and intercession of the saints*. And lest a doubt should be entertained on this subject, I will quote an *example*, which shall be the collect for St. Nicholas, whose memory is celebrated on the 6th of December. This collect, according to the words of the Roman Missal in English, published in London a few years ago, for the use of the laity, is as follows: “O God, who by innumerable miracles hast honoured blessed Nicholas the bishop, grant, we beseech thee, that by his *merits and intercession* we may be delivered from eternal flames¹⁷.” And, lest it should be supposed that the *present* members of the Church of Rome appeal *less* frequently than their ancestors to the *merits* of the *saints*, be it observed, that the collects of this Roman Missal, in *English*, sometimes introduce as well *merits* as *intercession*, where we do not find them in the original *Missale Romanum*. A memorable ex-

¹⁶ Ib. p. ccxxxiv. It is entitled, De Indice Librorum, Catechismo, Breviario, et Missali.

¹⁷ See p. 527 of “The Roman Missal for the Use of the Laity, containing the Masses appointed to be said throughout the Year.” Printed and published by P. Keating, 1806. 12mo. In the *Missale Romanum* (ed. Antverpiæ, 1680, fol.) the collect for St. Nicholas may be seen at p. 411.

ample of this may be seen in the collect for *St. Patrick* the tutelar saint of Ireland¹⁸. *Such is*

¹⁸ In the Roman Missal in English, p. 562, the collect appeals both to "*the merits and intercession*" of St. Patrick. In the Latin *Missale Romanum*, p. 455, ed. 1680, there are *three* collects for St. Patrick's day, which, as in the *English Mass Book*, is fixed for the 17th of March. The first, which is called *Oratio*, speaks of St. Patrick, but without either merits or intercession. In the second which is called *Secreta*, the name of St. Patrick is not mentioned. It is again mentioned in the third collect called *Postcommunio*, but merely with the words *intercedente beato Patritio*. In the collect for St. George, the patron of *England*, the *Missale Romanum* (p. 467) had *already* appealed, as well to merits as to intercession : and of course we find them *both* in the *English Mass Book*, p. 570. Other examples of appeal, as well to the *merits*, as to the *intercession* of the saints, may be seen in the same *Mass Book*, by consulting the Collects for St. Scholastica, St. Richard of Chichester, St. William archbishop of York, St. Fidelis, St. John a Facundo, St. Juliana, St. Thomas Becket, St. Jerome Emilian, St. Lawrence, and St. Andrew Avelline. The examples of appeal, *either* to merit or intercession, are without end. It is to be observed that I am here speaking of the *English Mass Book*, or the Missal published in London in 1806 : for the collects in the *Missale Romanum* often vary from the corresponding collects of the *English Mass Book*. Indeed, the latter has not only *collects*, but even *saints*, which are not in the former. For instance, St. Scholastica, whose memory, according to the *English Mass Book*, is celebrated on the 10th of February, is left unnoticed in the *Missale Romanum*. At least the edition, which I have now before me, has no collect for any saint on the 10th of February. Now the collect for St. Scholastica runs thus, at p. 556 of the *English Mass Book* : "O God, who to recommend to us innocence of life, was pleased to let the soul of thy blessed virgin Scholastica ascend to heaven in the shape of a dove ; grant by her merits, and prayers, that we may lead innocent lives here, and ascend to eternal joys hereafter."

the superstructure which the Church of Rome has raised on a decree of the Council of Trent, which itself is founded only on *tradition*, and moreover on *such* tradition as the council itself did not venture to pronounce *apostolical*.

IV. No further proof, then, can be wanted, that to the Church of Rome the Scriptures are *not* the sole fountain of Christian faith. And the only observations, which it may be *still* necessary to make, are such as relate to the *authority* of this council. The decrees which relate to *discipline*, have not in *all* countries been implicitly obeyed. In *France*, for instance, the rights of the Gallican Church have been *opposed* to the decrees on discipline. But the decrees relating to *doctrine*, with which alone we are *now* concerned, and which alone therefore have been quoted in this chapter, are *universally* received by those who profess the Romish faith. For the decrees on *doctrine* declare, with as much authority, the tenets of the Church of Rome, as our Thirty-nine Articles declare the tenets of the Church of England. Indeed, they declare them with still *greater* authority. Whatever doubt (says Bellarmine) *some* persons may entertain of the *personal* infallibility of the pope; whatever doubts may be entertained about the authority of councils, before their decrees have been *confirmed* by the pope; yet *all* Catholics (says Bellarmine) are agreed upon *this* point, that the pope and a general council *together*, are abso-

lutely *infallible*, when they make decrees on FAITH and MORALS (*pontificem cum generali concilio non posse errare, in condendis fidei decretis, vel generalibus præceptis morum*¹⁹). Now the Council of Trent was convoked by papal authority; three legates of the pope *presided* at the council; and it finally received the *confirmation* of the pope, entitled, *Confirmatio Concilii*, which is *annexed* to its decrees²⁰. Moreover, in every decree it is styled a *General Council*. It is styled also a “Council lawfully assembled in the Holy Spirit,” and consequently a council free from the *possibility* of error. There was *nothing* wanting therefore in *this* council to give it the character of infallibility, according to the principles of the Church of Rome. And that councils, thus general in their *convocation* and *celebration*, are really *infallible*, is no where more strongly enforced, than in the theological lectures at the college of Maynooth. For, in the treatise *de Ecclesiâ Christi*, this proposition is asserted, *Concilia, convocatione et celebratione generalia, sunt infallibilia*²¹. Nay, even in regard to *discipline*, the authority of this council, though *resisted* in France, is *maintained* in the college of Maynooth. For the concluding sentence of the treatise *de Ecclesiâ Christi* pronounces, not only that the Council of Trent is,

¹⁹ De Romano Pontifice, lib. iv. cap. 2.

²⁰ See p. cccxxvii. ²¹ De Ecclesiâ Christi, p. 166.

in respect to *doctrine*, a compendium of all preceding councils, but that also, in respect to *discipline*, it is to be received as a *manual* of the clergy²².

Lastly, there is *one* respect, in which the Council of Trent is still more important, to our *present* inquiry, than all former councils united. It is the *last* general council, assembled by the Church of Rome. Consequently, there is no *pretext* for the opinion, that its decrees and canons represent not the *present* tenets of that Church. Not that the pretext would be *valid*, even if a general council *had* been since assembled. For, according to the principles of the Church of Rome, it is not in the *power* of *one* general council to revoke what a *former* general council has decreed on *faith* and *morals*. Infallibility itself cannot declare to be *false*, what infallibility has declared to be *true*.

Having now ascertained, beyond the possibility of doubt, the tenets of the Church of Rome on *Scripture* and *tradition*, I shall proceed, in the next chapter, to ascertain the tenets of the Church of England on the same subjects, by an appeal to our *liturgy*, *articles*, and *homilies*.

²² Itaue *maximo* in pretio illud Concilium habere debent omnes Clerici, cum ratione *dogmatum* sit veluti omnium præcedentium Synodorum compendium, et ratione *discipline* merito dici possit *Manuale* Sacerdotum, vel eorum qui Sacerdotio sunt initiandi. p. 442.

CHAPTER III.

APPEAL TO THE LITURGY, ARTICLES, AND HOMILIES, IN PROOF OF THE POSITION THAT THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND REJECTS THE AUTHORITY OF TRADITION, AS A RULE OF FAITH, AND FOUNDS ITS DOCTRINES ON THE SOLE AUTHORITY OF SCRIPTURE—EFFECTS OF THAT REJECTION EXEMPLIFIED IN A REVIEW OF OUR DOCTRINAL ARTICLES.

As the tenets of the Church of Rome, on Scripture and tradition, were ascertained by an appeal to the Council of Trent, so the tenets of the Church of England, on the same subjects, must be determined by appeal to our liturgy, articles, and homilies. But the first, and principal appeal, must be made to the articles; for in the *articles* of our religion we may of course expect a declaration of the authority on which the doctrines of our Church are *founded*. Now the *sixth* article exactly corresponds with the decree, which had been made a few years before, at the fourth session of the Council of Trent, and of which a full account was given in the preceding chapter. As the Council of *Trent* had declared in that decree the authorities, by which it proposed to establish its doctrines, so the Synod of *London* declared, in the sixth article, on what authority its doctrines were founded. The Council of *Trent* had acknowledged *two* equal and indepen-

dent authorities, as foundations of *doctrines*. But our sixth article declares, that there is only *one* such authority. "Holy Scripture (says this article) containeth *all* things necessary to salvation, so that whatsoever is not read *therein*, nor may be proved *thereby*, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of *faith*, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation." This article then directly *contradicts* the decree in question. For, instead of describing the *total* rule of faith, as composed of two *partial* rules of faith, in Scripture and tradition; instead of describing tradition, or the unwritten word, as *equal* in authority with Scripture, as the written word, it gives the *whole* authority to Scripture alone. The sixth article, therefore, rejects entirely and absolutely, *tradition* as a rule of faith, though the *term* tradition is not used in it. The twentieth and twenty-first articles are *no less* decisive. The former declares, that "although the Church be a witness and keeper of Holy Writ, yet, as it ought not to decree any thing against the same, so *besides* the same ought it not to enforce *any* thing to be believed for necessity of salvation." The latter declares, that things ordained by general councils, "as necessary to salvation, have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared, that they be taken out of *Holy Scripture*." Nothing can be more pointed than *this* article, against such general councils as the Council of

Trent, where *many* things relating to faith were ordained, of which it neither *was* nor *could be* declared, that they were taken out of *Holy Scripture*.

If we examine the *Homilies*, we shall find, that Scripture is *every* where represented as the *sole* fountain of Christian faith. But it will be sufficient to quote the beginning of the *first* homily ; which I select for this very reason, that it shows how important it appeared to our Reformers, as soon as *possible* to free themselves from *tradition* as a rule of faith. The first homily, then, begins in the following manner : “Unto a Christian man there can be nothing either more necessary or profitable than the knowledge of Holy Scripture ; forasmuch as *in it* is contained *God’s true Word*, setting forth his glory, and also *man’s duty*. And there is *no* truth nor doctrine, necessary for our justification, and everlasting salvation, but that *is*, or *may be*, drawn out of *that* fountain and well of truth.” Now, if we compare this passage of the first homily with the decree made at the fourth session of the Council of Trent, we may almost conclude, that the author or authors of it had at least the *substance* of that decree in contemplation. For in contradiction of the opinion, that ‘the Word of God’ is composed of a *written* and an *unwritten* Word, this homily declares, that ‘God’s *true Word*’ must be sought in *Scripture*, or the *written* Word. Again, in contradiction of the opinion,

that there are *two* fountains or wells of truth, this homily declares, that there is *no* truth nor doctrine, necessary for our justification and everlasting salvation, but that *is*, or *may be*, drawn from the fountain or well of *Scripture*.

If further we examine our *Liturgy*, in reference to *Scripture* as the *sole* fountain of faith, we shall find it every where in unison with the articles and homilies. *Formal declarations* on this subject we must not *indeed expect* in collects and prayers. It is sufficient that they appeal to *Scripture*, and to *Scripture alone*. Thus the collect for the second Sunday in Advent begins, "Blessed Lord, who hast caused all *Holy Scriptures* to be written for our learning:" and the Epistle which is selected for that day begins, "Whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning, that we through patience and comfort of the *Scriptures* might have hope." But it is unnecessary to offer any *further* proof of a proposition which is sufficiently established by the articles alone.

II. Let us proceed, then, from *causes* to *effects*. And, as in the preceding chapter, we took a summary view of the doctrines *admitted by the Church of Rome*, in consequence of its *acknowledging* tradition as a rule of faith, let us now take a summary view of the doctrines *rejected by the Church of England*, in consequence of its *discarding* tradition as a rule of faith. These rejected doctrines are stated in the fourteenth,

the twenty-second, the twenty-fifth, the twenty-eighth, the thirtieth, and the thirty-first articles. But beside the doctrines which are stated in *these* articles, and which are *wholly* rejected, there are doctrines which, though retained by *name*, are changed in *substance*. The doctrines of *this* description are those, which are explained in the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth articles. It is true, that the five last mentioned articles were not designed to oppose the Church of Rome *alone*. But, if they oppose it *at all*, they must be examined with the rest, when we are taking a comparative view of the two Churches. The articles, therefore, relating both to the *former* and to the *latter* kind, must be examined in due order.

Of the *former* kind, the first which comes under review is the fourteenth article. This article relates to "Works of Supererogation;" that is, to the supernumerary merits of the Saints, which constituted the treasure out of which the Church of Rome was accustomed to draw its indulgences for sin. For in these *super-numerary* merits, when properly distributed by the *Church*, the sins of others were supposed to find a *compensation*. Now we have seen, that, in the decree about *indulgences*, no appeal was made to *Scripture*. The twenty-second article says, "The Romish doctrine concerning Purgatory, Pardons, Worshipping, and Adoration, as well of Images as of Reliques, and also Invoca-

tion of Saints, is a fond thing vainly invented, and grounded *upon no warranty of Scripture*, but rather repugnant to the Word of God." Here, then, we see, that these doctrines are rejected, *because* they have no "warranty of Scripture," because they have no other foundation than *tradition* as a rule of faith. Now it has been shown, in the preceding chapter, in what manner the decrees and canons of the Council of Trent, relative to *those* doctrines, appeal to the authority of *tradition*. The twenty-fifth article rejects *five* out of the *seven* Sacraments received by the Church of Rome : and it appears from the preceding chapter, that the canons which relate to the seven sacraments, are prefaced by an appeal, as well to the *Apostolicæ traditiones*, as to the *Scripturarum doctrina*.—In the twenty-eighth article transubstantiation is rejected on this very ground, that it "cannot be proved by *Holy Writ* : " And we have seen, that the decree of the Council of Trent, which relates *in particular* to transubstantiation, is prefaced by an appeal to *tradition*, but by no appeal to *Scripture*. Further says this article, "The sacrament of the Lord's Supper was not, by *Christ's* ordinance, reserved, carried about, lifted up, or *worshipped*." Now, the decree of the Council of Trent, which *commands* the worshipping of the Host, lays no claim whatever to the authority of *Scripture*. It appeals to *tradition*, and *tradition alone*.—The thirtieth article declares, that "the cup of the

Lord is not to be denied to the lay-people." Now this article opposes what is maintained in a decree which passed at the *twenty-first* session : a decree, indeed, not quoted in the *preceding* chapter, because it no more appeals to *tradition*, than it does to *Scripture*. In fact, it openly *opposes* tradition, and rests the doctrine of communicating under *one* kind on the sole authority of the *Church*. "Holy mother Church (says this decree) acknowledges its *own* authority in the administration of the *Sacraments*; and although from the *commencement* of the Christian religion the use of it under *both* kinds was *not uncommon*, yet, that custom having now widely changed through the progression of time, the Church, induced by grave and just causes, has approved, and decreed as a *law*, the custom of communicating under *one* kind¹." A more bare-

¹ Quare agnoscens sancta mater ecclesia hanc suam in administratione sacramentorum auctoritatem, licet *ab initio Christianæ religionis non infrequens utriusque speciei usus fuisset*, tamen progressu temporis latissime jam mutata illa consuetudine, gravibus et justis causis adducta, hanc consuetudinem sub alterâ specie communicandi, approbavit, et pro *lege* habendam decrevit. p. cxxx. As an excuse for refusing the cup to the laity, the Council of Trent, in the third chapter of the decree made at the twenty-first session, added the following declaration : "Insuper declarat, quamvis Redemptor noster, ut antea dictum est, in supremâ illâ cœnâ hoc sacramentum *in duabus speciebus* instituerit, et Apostolis tradiderit, tamen fatendum esse, etiam *sub alterâ tantum specie totum atque integrum Christum* verumque sacramentum sumi." p. cxxxi. Now the decree which had been made at the *thirteenth* session, relative to

faced opposition as well to tradition as to Scripture cannot easily be found.—Further says our thirty-first article, in *continuation* of the doctrine of the eucharist, “The offering of Christ *once made* is that perfect redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world, both original and actual: and there is none *other* satisfaction for sin, but that *alone*.” This article is opposed to the doctrine maintained in the decree of the twenty-second session, entitled, *Doctrina de sacrificio Missæ*, in which the daily sacrifice of the *Mass* is urged, under the name of the *unbloody sacrifice*, and as a

transubstantiation, had declared that the *whole* substance of the *bread* was changed into the substance of Christ’s *body*, and the *whole* substance of the *wine* into the substance of his *blood* (*totius substantiæ panis in substantiam corporis Christi Domini nostri, et totius substantiæ vini in substantiam sanguinis ejus*). p. lxxiii. According, then, to the decree on Transubstantiation, the bread becomes only the *body* of Christ; for it is the *wine* which becomes his *blood*. And the expression, ‘*totius substantiæ*,’ places the inference beyond all doubt: for what is *wholly* converted into *one* substance, cannot even *in part* be converted into *another*. According, then, to the decree on transubstantiation, to receive the *Host*, or the consecrated *wafer*, is literally to receive the *body* of Christ; and to receive the consecrated *wine* is literally to receive his *blood*. But it is quite *inconsistent* with that decree to say, that the receiving of the *wafer alone*, or of the *wine alone*, is the receiving of *both* body and blood. When the Council of Trent, therefore, declared at the *twenty-first* session, that the “*whole and entire* Christ” (*totus atque integer Christus*) was received under *one* kind (*sub alterâ tantum specie*) it must surely have forgotten, under Pius the Fourth, what the *thirteenth* session had decreed under Julius the Third.

sacrifice *truly propitiatory* (*sacrificium vere propitiatorium*) not only for the sins of the *living*, but also for the sins of the *dead*, who are not yet released from *purgatory*. Now it was shown in the preceding chapter, that no *attempt* even was made to establish *this* doctrine on the authority of *Scripture*, but that it was merely declared to be according to the tradition of the *Apostles* (*juxta Apostolorum traditionem*).

By this review of the doctrines discarded by the Church of England, on the principle that they are *not warranted by Scripture*, and by the comparison made at the same time with the corresponding decrees of the Council of Trent, we discover, in *those very decrees*, a confirmation of the principle to which the Church of England appeals. For in *none* of the decrees relating to *those* doctrines has the Council of Trent pretended to rest on the sole authority of *Scripture*. Where appeal is made to Scripture, appeal is made also to *tradition*. But in *most* of the decrees relating to *these* doctrines the appeal is to *tradition alone*. And in *one* of them the appeal is *neither* to Scripture *nor* to tradition. A more remarkable coincidence, and at the same time a more satisfactory vindication of our Church, cannot well be desired².

² This review serves likewise to show the falsity of the assertion, that the Church of Rome establishes no doctrines on the authority of tradition *alone*. That tradition is made to operate *in conjunction* with Scripture, is certainly true : it is

III. From the doctrines which were *wholly rejected*, let us proceed to those which were retained by *name*, but changed in *substance*. These are the doctrines which are explained in the five articles, beginning with the ninth, and ending with the thirteenth. And it is the *more* necessary to examine these five articles, as, in consequence of their having no *direct* allusion to the Church of Rome, they have been actually represented as articles in *unison* with that Church. Now, in *all* of them there is *some* difference ; and in *three* of them the difference is *material*. But in considering those articles with reference to the Church of *Rome*, we must not overlook their *other* relations ; for, if we do, the *whole* purport of them will not be understood. With this *twofold*

applied as a rule for the *interpretation* of Scripture : and we have already seen in what *manner* the text of Scripture is brought under the guidance of tradition as its comment. But the assertion that *no* doctrines are established on the *sole* authority of tradition, is confuted by those very decrees of the Council of Trent which appeal to tradition *alone*. Indeed, Cardinal Bellarmine, whose treatise ‘On the Word of God’ contains the most accurate and the most extensive information on the subjects of Scripture and tradition, acknowledges that there are *some* things relating even to *faith* which are *not* contained in Scripture, and which consequently depend on the sole authority of tradition. For, having represented Scripture and tradition as two *partial* rules of faith, he says of the former : “Quia vero non est regula totalis, sed partialis, inde illi accidit, quod *non omnia* mensuret, et propterea aliquid sit de FIDE, quod in ipsâ *non* continetur.” *De Verbo Dei*, lib. iv. cap. 12. The same assertion also is made in the *Douay Catechism*. See p. 29, note ².

reference in contemplation, let us examine them in the order as they stand.

The *ninth* article, which relates to *Original Sin*, is that which *least* differs from the Church of Rome, though a comparison of it with the decree made at the fifth session of the Council of Trent, will show that the article and the decree are not in *all* respects alike. Indeed, it was not the Church of *Rome* only that this article was designed to oppose. For since it confines itself to the declaration, that “man is *very* far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature *inclined* to evil,” it *virtually* opposes the error, that man is *so* far gone from original righteousness, as to have lost it *altogether*, and to have been become a mere mass of *depravity*: a notion which, widely differing from that of *humility*, must tend to extirpate the feelings of *morality*.—But the *tenth* article, relating to Free-will, is in *open* opposition to the Church of *Rome*. “The condition of man after the fall of Adam (says this article) is such, that he cannot turn, and prepare himself by *his own* natural strength and good works to faith and calling upon God. Wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may *have* a good will and working *with us* when we have that good will.” Now the fifth and sixth canons, made at the sixth session of the Council of Trent, declare, that man’s Free-will

was *not* so far lost by the fall of Adam. Here, then, is a direct opposition. *We* assert, that *unassisted* man can do *nothing* which is pleasing to God: the Church of Rome asserts, that *unassisted* man may at least do *some* things pleasing to God. But the errors of the Church of Rome are not the *sole* errors which this article had in contemplation. For, as it asserts, on the one hand, that *unassisted* man cannot do what is pleasing to God, so it implies, on the other hand, that *with* the divine assistance, he both *may* and *ought* to do so. Indeed, it positively declares, that for this purpose the grace of God worketh '*with us*;' and thereby signifies, that we *ourselves* must work out our salvation, the grace of God *co-operating*. It opposes, therefore, the error of *denying* a joint-agency in the work of salvation; an error which, by leaving *nothing* to be done by *man* on that account, must induce *the belief*, that his actions are things *indifferent*, and that honesty may *with safety* be discarded.

The eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth articles are *decidedly* at variance with the doctrines of the Church of *Rome*. The *thirteenth* article declares, that works, done *before* justification, cannot possibly be *good* works, but that they have rather the nature of *sin*. Now this is positively *denied* in the seventh canon made at the sixth session of the Council of Trent. Again, our twelfth article says, that *good* works

follow *after* justification ; whereas, according to the tenets of the Church of Rome, there must at least be *some* good works, which *precede* justification. For the ninth canon of the sixth session asserts, that man is *not* justified by faith *alone*. That the doctrine of the Church of Rome on this subject may be better understood, I will quote the very words of the canon. “ Si quis dixerit, *solâ fide* impium justificari, ita ut intelligat *nihil aliud* requiri, quod ad justificationis gratiam consequendam co-operetur, anathema sit.” But since the Church of Rome, while it denies justification by *faith only*, does not assert justification by *works only*, and our eleventh article is frequently so explained, as to make it *include* works, the Romanists have hence taken occasion to represent *our* doctrine of justification as virtually agreeing with *their own*. Now, since justification by *faith* is considered as a distinguishing feature of Protestantism, it is worth our while to consider, how far that representation is *correct*. And, as no advantage is gained by *evading* the force of an argument, I will first state it *in all its force*, and then—confute it.

Says the Romanist to the Protestant, ‘ When you contend, that we are *at variance* on the doctrine of justification, either your distinctions are merely *nominal*, or you are Solifidians and Antinomians.—No (says the Protestant) we are neither Solifidians nor Antinomians. For, when we say, that men are justified by *faith*, we do

not mean a *dead* faith, or a faith unproductive of *good works*. No ! the faith which *justifies*, is a *lively* faith : and a lively faith is known by its *works*, as a tree is known by its *fruits*.—Well then (says the Romanist) if your justifying faith is *known* by its works, and consequently, *without* works, is not a *justifying* faith, then works, by your *own* account, have a necessary *connexion* with justifying faith, and therefore with justification itself. Further (says the Romanist) though we maintain the necessity of *good works*, for justification, yet we as positively maintain the necessity of faith. Since then (proceeds the Romanist) *we* assert, that works are not *justifying* works, unless they are done on a *principle of faith*, while *you* assert, that faith is not a *justifying* faith, unless that faith is *productive of works*, does not justification, in *either* case, result from the *joint* operation of faith *and* works ? Where then (concludes the Romanist) is the mighty difference between us, even in *this* article, which you are accustomed to regard as a *distinguishing feature* of the Protestant cause ?

Now this argument can be confuted by no other means, than by *denying* what was *conceded* about justifying faith. For, as soon as we admit, that *justifying* faith is a *lively* faith, the inference above-deduced cannot possibly be evaded. Good works are the *natural* fruits of faith ; and therefore its *necessary* fruits, when faith is become a *lively* or *productive* faith. In

this state, we have the same union of faith and works, which the *Romanist* requires for justification. But it is a *mistake*, that according to the tenets of our Church, *justifying* faith is a *lively* faith. According to the tenets of our Church, it neither *is*, nor *can be*, such. And it is the want of *distinction* between *justifying* faith and *lively* faith, to which we may entirely ascribe the numerous inconsistencies and contradictions, in which the doctrine of justification has, within these few years, been involved. When our twelfth article asserts, that “a *lively* faith may be as evidently known, as a tree is discerned by the *fruit*,” the article alludes to works, which, as there stated, “follow *after* justification,” and consequently had no share in the *causes* of justification. Indeed the thirteenth article denies even the *possibility* of good works, *before* justification. The faith therefore, which had *previously justified*, cannot have been a *lively* or *productive* faith. For then it would have been a faith, accompanied with good works, which *before* justification, cannot even *exist*. The doctrine of justification therefore as maintained by the Church of *England*, is decidedly at variance with the doctrine of the Church of *Rome*.

If it be objected, that this vindication of the Church of England from the charge of similarity with the Church of Rome, exposes the former to the charge of Antinomianism, I answer, that, although *justification* in the sense of our articles,

(the same also of St. Paul) does not require for its attainment the performance of good works, they are indispensably necessary for the attainment of *final and everlasting salvation*. The distinction between *justification*, and final or everlasting *salvation* is declared in the very *exordium* of our first homily ; where it is said, that Holy Scripture contains all necessary instruction “for our justification *and* everlasting salvation.” Indeed our final and everlasting salvation is our happiness in a *future state*—in *that* state, where our Saviour *himself* has declared, that he will “reward every man according to his *works* ³.” But our justification takes place in the *present* life ; it takes place at our *admission* to the Christian covenant, for which nothing more is required, than repentance, whereby we forsake sin, and faith, whereby we stedfastly believe *the promises of God*. On forsaking *sin* therefore, we are justified by faith, even *before* it is a lively faith, or before it has produced works *positively good*. But though the faith, which is sufficient to *justify*, is not a lively faith, we must take care that it *becomes* so, when we *are* justified : or our justification will be of no avail. And we must guard against the fatal error, that justifying faith leads *of necessity* to good works. Good works are indeed its *natural* fruits ; but they are not its *necessary* fruits, till

³ Matt. xvi. 27.

faith is become a *lively*, or *productive* faith. And, as a *tree* may wither before it has produced its *fruits*, so faith may wither before it has produced *good works*. But if it *does* wither, and good works are *not* produced, the faith, which had *admitted* us to the Christian covenant, will fail of its intended purpose; and we shall lose *everlasting salvation*.—In this manner is the Church of England vindicated, on the one hand, from the charge of Antinomianism, while it is shown on the other hand to differ from the Church of Rome.

Here then we may close the review of our doctrinal articles; for they have been compared with the doctrines of the Church of Rome both in reference to those, in which the difference is *total*, and in reference to those, in which the difference is *partial*. Thus we have clearly seen, not only that the two Churches have built their faith upon different *foundations*, but also that the *superstructures*, respectively erected by them, have a difference corresponding with that of the *foundations themselves* ⁴.

But the question still remains to be examined, whether the Church of England had sufficient *reason* for rejecting tradition as a rule of *faith*. For if it be *true*, as the *Romanists* assert, that

⁴ A short statement of the principal doctrines, in which the Church of Rome differs from the Church of England may be seen in the *Professio Fidei Catholicæ, secundum Concilium Tridentinum, ex Bullâ Pii Papæ IV.*

divine and *apostolical* traditions, which are the *ingredients* of that rule, *do really exist*, their authority cannot be disputed. *This* question therefore, which is a very important one, shall be examined in the *next* chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION, WHETHER THE DIVINE AND APOSTOLICAL TRADITIONS WHICH ARE SUPPOSED TO CONSTITUTE THE UNWRITTEN WORD OF GOD, OR TRADITION AS A RULE OF FAITH, HAVE A REAL, OR ONLY AN IMAGINARY EXISTENCE—PREVIOUS EXPLANATORY REMARKS—PROOF THAT THERE IS NO FOUNDATION FOR THEIR ALLEGED EXISTENCE—THE REJECTION OF TRADITION, AS A RULE OF FAITH, THE VITAL PRINCIPLE OF THE REFORMATION.

As we are now preparing to examine the question, whether the Church of England had sufficient reason for rejecting the authority ascribed by the Church of Rome to tradition as a rule of faith, the examination itself will be rendered easier, and its results will be better understood, if we previously bring into one point of view whatever relates to the general question at issue between the two Churches. It is true, that the state of the question, on Scripture and tradition, as it respectively affects the two Churches, was explained in the first chapter. But as an appeal has been subsequently made to the Council of Trent on the one hand, and to our own articles of religion on the other, we are now enabled to take a more *comprehensive* view of the subject, and to state the case in all its bearings.

We have seen, that the Church of Rome divides the word of God into two parts; the *written* word, and the *unwritten* word; the former called *Scripture*, the latter called *Tradition*. Hence Bellarmine divides his treatise *De Verbo Dei* into two portions, in the former of which he considers the *Verbum Dei scriptum*, and in the latter the *Verbum Dei non scriptum*. Further, the *whole word of God* is called the *whole rule of faith*. And as the *whole word of God* consists of two parts, the *written* word, and the *unwritten* word, or *Scripture* and *tradition*, it follows, that *Scripture* and *tradition* are considered, as two *partial* rules of faith, constituting the *whole rule of faith*, or the *whole word of God*. Hence Bellarmine says, *Totalis regula fidei est verbum Dei, sive revelatio Dei Ecclesiæ facta, quæ dividitur in duas Regulas partiales, SCRIPTURAM et TRADITIONEM*¹. Again, these two *partial* rules of faith, that is, *Scripture* or the *written* word, and *tradition* or the *unwritten* word, are represented as two *equal* and *independent* rules of faith. Now the whole of this statement is confirmed by that *official* document, the decree made at the fourth session of the Council of Trent. For that decree pronounces, that both the *written* word and the

¹ See page 13, note ³ In the decree made at the fourth session of the Council of Trent, the expressions, used to denote these two rules of faith, are *Libri scripti*, and *Traditiones sine scripto*.

unwritten word must be received with sentiments of *equal* piety and reverence (*pari pietatis affectu ac reverentiâ*). And the *equality*, thus ascribed to them, is founded on the declaration, that the *unwritten* word, no less than the *written* word, proceeded either from the mouth of *Christ*, or from the dictates of the *Holy Spirit*². We see then, that the *unwritten* word, or *Tradition*, is represented as deriving its authority from the same fountain of truth with the *written* word, or *scripture*. Consequently, when *scripture* and *tradition* are considered as two rules of faith, the *latter* rule derives *no* part of its authority from the *former* rule. Tradition therefore is considered as a rule of faith both *equal to*, and *independent of* Scripture.

Further, as the *whole* word of God is divided into Scripture and tradition, so tradition *itself* is again divided into two parts; the *one* part containing doctrines which had been delivered by *Christ himself*, the *other* part containing doctrines which had been taught by the *Apostles*, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. The doctrines of the *first* kind are called *divine* traditions; the doctrines of the *second* kind are called *apostolical* traditions³. Now this very subdivision of the *unwritten* word is distinctly marked in the decree made in the fourth session of the Council of Trent,

² See the quotation in chap. ii. note ⁸.

³ See chap. i. note ⁵.

though the distinction is not there expressed by the use of those *epithets*.

Again, it must be observed, that, when we speak of the unwritten word of God, or the unwritten doctrine (as it is also called by Bellarmine), we do not mean doctrine which is *nowhere* recorded, but doctrine which was not recorded by the *authors* of that doctrine. Hence Bellarmine, in the second chapter of the fourth book of his treatise, *De Verbo Dei*, observes, *Vocatur autem doctrina non scripta, non ea quæ nusquam scripta est, sed quæ non scripta est a primo auctore*. Indeed, the *divine* and the *apostolical* traditions, or doctrines coming either from Christ or from his Apostles, but left by the *Apostles* unrecorded, are supposed to have been recorded by the *fathers* of the Church, and, in consequence of this mode of conveyance, have received the *additional* appellation of *antiqua Patrum traditio* ⁴.

There is only one more observation necessary, in order to make the state of the present question fully understood. The *tradition*, which to the Church of Rome is a rule of *faith*, being composed of the *divine* and the *apostolical* traditions, these, and these *only*, are the kinds of tradition, with which we are now concerned. Indeed, this is clearly stated by the author of the

⁴ See chap. ii. note ⁴, with the text preceding and following that note.

treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi*, who says, “*Quæ nunc movetur controversia, est tantum de divinis et apostolicis traditionibus.*” Consequently, the *characteristic difference* between the Churches of England and Rome consists in the *admission* of those divine and apostolical traditions on the part of the *latter*, and in the *rejection* of them on the part of the *former*. Hence, Bellarmine himself, in explaining the state of the present question, says, that the Church of Rome, beside the *written* word, receives an *unwritten* word ; that is, (as he himself adds) the *divine* and the *apostolical* traditions. But the Protestants, in *opposition* to the Church of Rome, believing (as Bellarmine continues in the same place) that *all* things, necessary for FAITH and MORALS, are contained in Scripture, contend that there is no necessity for an *unwritten* word ⁵. The same *characteristic difference* between the Churches of England and Rome is declared also in the theological lectures at Maynooth ; for the author of the treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi*, immediately after the passage above quoted, relative to the *divine* and *apostolical* traditions, adds, that these are the traditions, of which the authority is denied by *Protestants* ⁶.

⁵ See chap. i. note ².

⁶ Immediately after the words above quoted in the text, is added, Tales existere, quæ ipsius legis scriptæ vim habent, negant Protestantes, *De Ecclesiâ Christi*, p. 398. Since then, the most distinguished among the Romish writers themselves declare, that the rejection of the authority, ascribed by the

When the Church of England, therefore, rejected tradition as a rule of *faith* (a point fully proved in the preceding chapter), it rejected what the Church of Rome calls the *divine* and the *apostolical* traditions. The question of *fact*, then, or the question about *what things* are admitted by one Church, and rejected by the other, being now clearly determined, the next thing is to determine the question of *opinion*. Which of the two Churches is, in this respect, *mistaken*? Has the Church of Rome sufficient *evidence*, to prove, that the doctrines, *called* divine and apostolical traditions, really *are* of divine and apostolical origin? If satisfactory evidence can be produced, that they really *are* what they pretend

Church of Rome to tradition as a rule of faith, characterizes Protestants *in general*, one should hardly suppose that any writer, whether Romanist or Protestant, would *now* pretend, that this rejection does *not* characterize the Church of England. When we say, that the rejection of tradition distinguishes the Church of England from the Church of Rome, it must be *obvious* to every one who *considers* the subject, that no other tradition *can* be meant than the tradition which to the Church of Rome is a rule of *faith*. But, to prevent as much as possible the confusion which *may* arise from a misapprehension of terms, I have, in general, had the precaution to *explain* the term tradition, when I have said it was rejected by our Reformers. Thus, in my thirteenth lecture, I said, at p. 18, or p. 280, ed. 1838, "When tradition was discarded, as a rule of *faith independent of the Bible*, our Reformers of course maintained," &c. A similar explanation had been previously given at p. 11, or p. 272, ed. 1838, when the subject of tradition was first introduced. Nor has less care been taken in the *present* work, to prevent the confusion which often arises from a misapprehension of terms.

to be, the Church of England ought not to have rejected them. For, in that case, they constitute a rule of faith, having the same *divine origin* with Scripture itself. In that case, the authority claimed by the Church of Rome for tradition, or the *unwritten* word, as being equal to, and independent of, the authority of Scripture, or the *written* word, will have been shown to rest on a *solid foundation*. The whole, therefore, depends on the resolution of this single question: Do those alleged *divine* and *apostolical* traditions exist, or not? The affirmative is, of course, maintained by the Romanists; whence the first and principal proposition advanced on this subject in the treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi*, is as follows, “*Existunt traditiones divinæ et apostolicæ;*” whence the inference is immediately drawn, “*quæ licet non scriptæ, vim legis scriptæ habent*’.” It is *our* business, therefore, to inquire, whether their existence has been satisfactorily established.

II. The inquiry, which we are about to institute, will be conducted in the most *intelligible* manner, by making *Bossuet’s* chapter upon Scripture and Tradition the *basis* of that inquiry. And no *Romanist* can object to it, as *Bossuet* is universally holden by them in the highest estimation. In that chapter, which is the seventeenth in his “Exposition of the Catholic Faith,” says *Bossuet*, “Jesus Christ having laid the founda-

tion of his Church by preaching, the *unwritten* word was consequently the *first* rule of Christianity ; and when the writings of the New Testament were *added* to it, its authority was not *forfeited* on that account ; which make us receive, with *equal* veneration, all that has been taught by the Apostles, whether in *writing*, or by word of *mouth* ; which St. Paul expressly recommends to the Thessalonians.” Here no one will *deny*, that Jesus Christ laid the foundation of his Church by *preaching*. Nor can we *deny*, that the unwritten word was the *first rule* of Christianity. As nothing was recorded, at least not to our knowledge, during the life of our Saviour, the doctrines which He taught were, during *that* period, so many *divine traditions*. And divine traditions they *remained* till they were recorded in the *Gospels*. Again, as several years probably elapsed, after the *Apostles* had begun to teach under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, before they committed their doctrines to *writing*, the doctrines which they taught during *that* period were so many *apostolical traditions*. And apostolical traditions they *remained*, till they were recorded in the apostolical *epistles*. We may safely admit, therefore, that tradition, or the unwritten word, was the *first rule* of Christianity. The argument proceeds, that “when the writings of the New Testament were *added* to it, its authority was not *forfeited* on that account.” Now this argument, which is

employed also by other writers on the same subject, is supposed to *establish* the authority ascribed by the Church of Rome to the unwritten word. For, since it cannot be denied, that this was the *first rule* of Christianity, the authority which is acknowledged to have been *then* due to it, does not *immediately* appear to have been actually *cancelled* by the circumstance, that *another* authority was placed by the side of it. Yet, if we examine the argument a little *more closely*, we shall find that it carries with it its own confutation. For it *secretly implies* a point to be proved, and is therefore nothing better than a *petitio principii*. When they say, that the writings of the New Testament were *added* to the unwritten word, the very term ‘added’ implies such a difference between the things themselves, as *tacitly* affords a foundation for their future superstructure. On the supposition, that the *whole* of the then unwritten word was afterwards recorded in the New Testament, there would be an *absurdity* in saying that the New Testament was *added* to it. This *very term*, therefore, most artfully implies, that a *part* at least of God’s word, as delivered by Christ and his Apostles, was *not* recorded in the New Testament. But this is a point which the Romanists cannot take for *granted*, when they are arguing with those, who invariably *deny* it. At the very *dawn* of the Reformation, both Luther and Melancthon rejected *tradition* as a rule of faith, because they

were convinced that the *whole* of God's Word was contained in Scripture, or the *written* word.

But, if the *whole* of God's Word is contained in Scripture, as the *written* word, how happened it (as is further argued) that St. Paul himself recommended apostolical traditions to the *Thessalonians*? In a note to the passage just quoted, we are referred by Bossuet to 2 Thessalonians ii. 15, where the Apostle (in the words namely of the *Latin Vulgate*) says, *Tenete traditiones quas didicistis, sive per sermonem, sive per epistolam nostram*; and in the words of our *own* authorized version, "Hold the *traditions*, which ye have been taught, whether by *word*, or our *epistle*." This passage the Romish writers in general consider as *decisive*: and, accordingly, the note to it in the modern editions of the Rhemish Testament, exclaims, "See here, that the *unwritten traditions* of the Apostles are no less to be received than their *epistles*."

But let us inquire what St. Paul *meant* by these *traditions*, as they are called. Did he intend to include in them any portion of *those* traditions, which are ingredients in the *Romish rule of faith*? If it cannot be shown that he *did*, the passage affords no proof whatever that those things *exist*, of which it is designed to *prove* the existence. Now, if laying aside the words of a *translation*, and foregoing the advantage, which the term 'tradition' affords by its very *name*, we examine the words of the original, we shall find

that the term *παράδοσις* does not afford so easy a proof, as the *traditio* of the Vulgate. When St. Paul said to the Thessalonians *κρατεῖτε τὰς παραδόσεις*, the expression was so comprehensive, that it might signify, *generally*, “observe the *directions* which have been delivered to you.” And these directions, delivered to them partly *in writing*, partly *in person*, might have related to *discipline*, as well as to *doctrine*. The Church of Thessalonica was founded by St. Paul himself, who, of course, therefore must be supposed to have given various directions, relative both to the administration of the community at large, and to the personal conduct of individual members. And that he *really had* in contemplation the personal conduct of individual members, when he used the term, which we translate by ‘tradition,’ is evident from the explanation, which he *himself* has given of this *very term*, after an interval of only *seven verses*. For he there proceeds in the following words, “We command you, brethren, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, that ye withdraw yourselves from every brother that *walketh disorderly*, and not after the TRADITION which ye received of *us*. For yourselves know, how ye *ought* to follow us: for we behaved not ourselves *disorderly* among you; neither did we eat any man’s bread for nought: but wrought with labour and travail night and day, that we might not be chargeable to any of you; not because we have not power, but to make ourselves an

ensample unto you, to follow *us*. For even when we were *with* you, this we *commanded* you, that if any would not *work*, neither should he *eat*." From this explanation, given by the Apostle himself, we see that those *παράδοσεις*, or traditions, as they are translated, were nothing more than *directions*, which he gave to the Thessalonians, not to *walk disorderly*, not to *eat the bread of others*, but to follow *his* example, and work for their *own bread*. As soon, therefore, as the whole passage is *analysed*, we discover that it is altogether irrelevant and foreign to the purpose, for which the Romanists produce it. But nothing is more *common* with writers on the subject of *tradition*, than to avail themselves of the multifarious senses in which the term may be used. And since it may denote *any thing whatever*, which is delivered from one person to another ; since, therefore, it may be applied *as variously*, as the *things delivered* are various, the advocates of the Church of Rome can prove just whatever they please, by arguing, that as tradition is tradition, so tradition in *one* sense is tradition in *another*. In this manner the *Jewish Masora* might serve as an argument for *Romish tradition*. The term 'Masora' *itself* denotes tradition, and it contains, among other things, *various readings* to the Hebrew Bible, which, according to the account of the Jews, had been transmitted *orally* through many generations, before they were committed to writing. If then, we set aside all dis-

inction, in respect to the *quality* of the things delivered, we may obtain, even from the Masora, as good an argument for Romish tradition, as the Romanists obtain from the second Epistle to the Thessalonians.

Let us *suppose* however, that, when the Apostle used the term παραδόσεις he had *doctrines* in contemplation. And let us examine, whether, even on *that* supposition, the passage proves the point, which it is *designed* to prove, and, which if it does *not* prove, it proves nothing to the present purpose. On *that* supposition then, St. Paul had delivered *doctrines* to the Thessalonians, which are not contained in his *Epistles* to the Thessalonians. But does it *further* follow, that they are contained in *none other* of St. Paul's Epistles? His Epistles to the Thessalonians were among *the earliest*, if not the *very earliest*, which he composed. And who will undertake to prove, that doctrines, unrecorded in the two comparatively *short* Epistles to the Thessalonians, were not *afterwards* recorded, either in the Epistle to the Romans, or in the Epistles to the Corinthians, or in the Epistles to the Ephesians, the Colossians, the Philippians, or the Epistles to Timothy and Titus? Now the bare *possibility*, that they *were* afterwards recorded, is sufficient to defeat the object of the appeal. For the *present* existence of apostolical traditions must be proved, as well as their *past* existence; or the claims of the Church

of Rome will not be established. And, for *that* purpose, it is necessary to show, not merely that St. Paul alluded to doctrines, unrecorded when he wrote to the *Thessalonians*, but that he alluded to doctrines left unrecorded in his *subsequent* Epistles. For, if he recorded them *any* where, they are not *at present* apostolical traditions. And what they *were*, when he wrote to the *Thessalonians*, is a question foreign to the purpose. There is also *another* possibility, which is sufficient to destroy the inference. They may have been afterwards recorded in *other* Apostolical Epistles; or they may have been doctrines taught by *Christ Himself*, and recorded in *the Gospels*. In either case they are *at present* constituent parts of the *written word*; and consequently they afford no argument for the *present* existence of an *unwritten word*.

Having shown in what manner the bare *possibility* that doctrines, unrecorded at *one* time, were recorded at *another*; is sufficient to defeat the appeal in question, we may proceed to consider the extreme *improbability*, that an all-wise Providence, imparting a new revelation to mankind, would suffer any *doctrine*, or article of *faith*, to be transmitted to posterity by so precarious a vehicle as that of *oral tradition*. It is not with *doctrines*, as it is with *ceremonies*, or even with the usages of *civil law*. The daily practice of the *Church*, or the daily practice of *courts of justice*, may preserve unaltered, through

a succession of ages, the forms, which are apparent to the *external* senses. But articles of *faith*, which are objects only of the *inward* sense, must *unavoidably*, when transmitted only from *mouth* to *mouth*, undergo, in a *very short period*, material alterations. It is therefore in the highest degree improbable, that *any* doctrine, coming from Christ and his Apostles, should have been left unrecorded in the *New Testament*, and confided to the *future* record of the *fathers*.

But, were the *existence* of these apostolical traditions⁸ subject to no doubt, they must be useless to *us*, unless we have some means of *knowing* them when we *find* them. Now, if we were searching for a few single *pearls*, dispersed in a *vast heap of rubbish*, the task, though *arduous*, would not be *desperate*. For, if perchance we found a place, where one of them lay buried, the *form*, and the *colour* of the object, which we were seeking, would enable us to distinguish it from the surrounding mass. But when we are searching for *apostolical traditions* in the works of the *fathers*, there is nothing in those traditions, which particularly *marks* their

⁸ As the term 'apostolical' is used frequently as a *generic* term to include the doctrines received by the Apostles, as well from Christ as from the Holy Spirit, Bossuet himself speaks in general terms of traditions coming from the *Apostles*; and the term apostolical is here, and in the following paragraphs, taken in the same extensive sense.

apostolical origin. And when we take into consideration the *magnitude* of the mass, in which we have to search, it is sufficient to deter us from even making the *attempt*. For if we select only *one Greek* father, and *one Latin* father, Chrysostom and Jerom, *their works alone*, in their best editions, amount to *four-and-twenty folio volumes*.

But, (say the Romanists) the fathers *themselves* have afforded a criterion, by which apostolical traditions may be known. Now it cannot be denied, that the fathers have, in various passages, *spoken* of traditions, as coming from the Apostles. These passages were, soon after the reformation, collected with great industry: they were published all together in an early edition of the Rhemish Testament; and they form a treasure, from which examples have been quoted ever since. But if we carefully *examine* these passages, we shall find, that they do not always relate to *doctrines*, with which alone we are *at present* concerned. Some of them are mere allusions to *customs* or *ceremonies*, supposed to have been observed since the time of the Apostles. And the passages, which *do* relate to doctrines, relate, for the *most* part, to doctrines contained in the *New Testament*⁹. In *such* cases therefore the fathers spake of tra-

⁹ See Dr. Fulke's edition of the Rhemish Testament, with remarks on the Rhemish annotators, especially in the second Epistle to the Thessalonians.

dition, not in the confined sense of an *unwritten* doctrine, but in its most *extensive* sense, which includes, as well *written*, as *unwritten* doctrines. Indeed Bellarmine himself says, *Nomen Traditionis generale est, et significat omnem doctrinam, sive scriptam, sive non scriptam*¹⁰. On the other hand, if among the doctrines, so quoted, there be *any* which are *not* contained in the New Testament, the mere circumstance, that they were *called* apostolical traditions, shows nothing more, than, that the writer, who quoted them, *supposed* them to be such. But, when we are concerned with the proof of a *fact*, it is not mere *opinion* which can satisfy us. We must have *evidence* of its truth; and no one can bear *evidence* of what was said or done by another, unless what was said or done has come within his *own observation*. He gives merely a *report*, when he states what was said by another, a hundred years before he himself was *born*. And if the saying, thus reported, has been trusted, during all that period, to *oral tradition*, the hundreds of mouths, through which it had passed, before it came to the ears of the reporter, must have so *changed* it, that the *original* saying, and the *reported* saying, would be two different things. But what is the interval of *one* century, or even of *two* centuries in comparison of *that* interval, which elapsed between

¹⁰ De Verbo Dei, Lib. IV. cap. 2.

the *apostolic* age, and the age or ages, when *such* doctrines were first recorded, as those of transubstantiation, the worshipping of the host, the propitiatory sacrifice of the mass, the communion under one kind, the grant of indulgences, the praying of souls out of purgatory, the invocation of saints, and the remission of sin through their intercession and merits? Were *these* doctrines recorded by any father of the four first centuries? And as for writers of the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries, they had no other sources of information, than such as are equally open to writers of the *present* day.

When we descend therefore to *particulars*, and examine *severally* the doctrines, which the Church of *Rome* has dignified with the appellation of *apostolical* traditions, we perceive at once, that the pretensions of that Church are devoid of foundation. Indeed Bossuet himself was aware of the consequences resulting from *minute* examination. He wisely therefore deals in generals. And knowing the impracticability of *tracing* the traditions of his Church to the place from which they are *said* to come, he has ingeniously converted the very *uncertainty* of their origin into an argument for their *apostolical* origin. He says, “A most certain mark, that a doctrine comes from the Apostles, is, when all Christian Churches embrace it, without its being in the power of any one to show *where* it had a beginning.” Now of the doctrines,

recorded in the New Testament, we *know* the beginning: and this very knowledge is a sufficient reason for our *receiving* them. But when Bossuet says of the apostolical traditions, that it is not in the power of any one to show, where *they* had a beginning, our very *ignorance* about *where* they had a beginning, is a sufficient reason for our refusing to receive them, as doctrines having an *apostolical* beginning. Nor can this uncertainty be removed by his *other* criterion, namely, that “*all* Christian Churches *embrace*” them: for the argument is here applied to the reception of those very things, which all Protestant Churches, without exception, *reject*. When Bossuet, in the next sentence, argues to the impossibility, “that a doctrine, received from the *very commencement* of the Church, could ever come from any other source, than from that of the Apostles,” he *varies* from the argument, which he had founded on the *uncertainty* of origin. But it was merely for the sake of giving some *colour* to that argument, that the *additional* observation was made about doctrines received from the *very commencement* of Christianity. For the learned Bishop of Meaux was certainly not ignorant, that the Council of Trent had, in the doctrine of the *Eucharist*, decreed as a law, what the council itself acknowledged to be *in opposition* to the doctrine received from the *commencement* of

Christianity¹¹. And, if he had applied his observation to various *other* doctrines, of which the Council of Trent made no such acknowledgment, but for which it *pretended* to have the authority of apostolical tradition, he would have been utterly unable to trace such doctrines to the *Apostles*. Even were it possible, to trace them to the Apostolic age, there would still be wanting the additional proof, that they came from the *Apostles*. We know, that heresies crept into the Church even in *their* days; and that the apostolic epistles were designed, in many places, to point out such heresies, and to declare what was the *genuine* apostolical doctrine. If then those doctrines, for which there is no foundation in Scripture, could be traced to the very age of the Apostles, the only alteration in the inference would respect the *date* of the heresy. When Bossuet therefore concludes, by commending the endeavours of the Church of Rome to collect all that the *fathers* have left us, and to preserve “the deposit of *tradition* as carefully as that of the *Scriptures*,” he commends the preservation of a deposit, on which there is *no reliance*.

But in the theological lectures at Maynooth we find another criterion, by which apostolical traditions may be known. This criterion is the

¹¹ See chap. iii. note 1.

unanimity of the fathers in regard to any particular doctrine. The proposition is delivered in the following words, “*Unanimis patrum, ad doctrinam aliquam asserendam, consensio certissimum est veritatis argumentum*”¹².” But unfortunately *this* criterion is wholly inapplicable to the cases, where the application is *wanted*. For though the fathers, in general, maintain the doctrines, which the Church of England has in *common* with the Church of Rome, such for instance as the doctrines of the Trinity, and the Atonement, yet the doctrines, in which the Church of England *differs* from the Church of Rome, are precisely the doctrines, in which the fathers are *not* unanimous. Indeed the doctrines, maintained by the *early* fathers, are quite *at variance* with the doctrines, which *distinguish* the Church of Rome.

There is one more argument for the apostolical traditions, which I have reserved for the last, because, on the principles of the Church of *Rome*, it is quite unanswerable. We are told, that not merely the works of the fathers, but that the decrees of *general councils* form a repository of those traditions. Indeed, the theological lectures at Maynooth place *this* repository in the foremost rank. We are not referred to the works of the fathers in the *first* instance, and to the decrees of councils in the *second* instance, as

¹² De Ecclesiâ Christi, p. 416.

having *borrowed* from the works of the fathers. The decrees of councils there take *precedence*. For the repositories of tradition are thus stated in the following sentence: “*Traditionis nomine intelligitur doctrina, in libris canonicis non scripta, quamvis in conciliorum canonibus, et sanctorum patrum operibus legatur*¹³.” This precedence is attended with incalculable advantage. For since general councils are declared in the same lectures to be absolutely *infallible* in points of faith¹⁴, it follows, of course, that whatever doctrine *such* authority has pronounced an *apostolical* tradition, must be *received* as apostolical. But it is quite superfluous for an *infallible* council, acting under the immediate guidance of the Holy Spirit, to take the trouble of searching for apostolical traditions in *the works of the fathers*. The *easiest*, and indeed the most *consistent* mode would be, to use in *every* decree the language which was holden by the Council of Trent in a decree on the eucharist, and to proclaim that, “Holy mother Church acknowledges its *own* authority¹⁵.” But as no *Protestant* can ascribe infallibility to *any* Church, and least of all to a Church which has exhibited so many proofs of *error*, the admission of doctrines by the Council of Trent, under the *name* of apostolical traditions, must be considered as *insufficient* evidence that the doctrines so received had an *apostolical origin*.

¹³ P. 398.¹⁴ P. 166.¹⁵ See chap. iii. note 1.

Upon the whole, then, we may safely infer, that there is no *foundation whatever* for the alleged existence of those divine and apostolical traditions, which are made to constitute an *unwritten* word or tradition as a rule of *faith*. The Church of England, therefore, acted wisely in *rejecting* that rule. And when we further consider the *consequences* of that rejection, when we consider the load of superstition from which we were freed by the *means* of that rejection, we may well assert, that the rejection of tradition as a rule of faith was *the vital principle of the reformation*.

CHAPTER V.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CHURCHES OF ENGLAND AND ROME IN RESPECT TO THE *CANON OF SCRIPTURE*—THE LATTER ADMITS, AS CANONICAL, VARIOUS BOOKS AND PARTS OF BOOKS IN THE OLD TESTAMENT, WHICH THE FORMER CONSIDERS AS APOCRYPHAL—HISTORY OF THE CANON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, AS CONTAINED IN THE SEPTUAGINT AND THE VULGATE—THE CANON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, WHICH WAS SANCTIONED BY OUR SAVIOUR, THE SOLE CANON TO BE RECEIVED BY CHRISTIANS—PROOF THAT THIS CANON IS THE CANON OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND—ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CANON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, ADOPTED BY THE CHURCH OF ROME, RECEIVED THE SANCTION NEITHER OF CHRIST NOR OF HIS APOSTLES.

THE fundamental difference between the Churches of England and Rome, in respect to *tradition* as a rule of faith, having been fully explained, let us now consider the difference between them in respect to *Scripture itself*. And, as Scripture is to *both* Churches a foundation of faith, though not the *sole* foundation to the Church of Rome, it necessarily follows, that whatever difference subsists between them, in regard to the *canon* of Scripture, is again a *fundamental* difference.

When it is said that the Bible is a common authority to Christians of every denomination,

the assertion must be understood with certain limitations : for not *every* part of the Bible which is received by *one* Church, is received by *another*. But, since we are at present concerned only with the Churches of England and Rome, it is unnecessary to inquire into the canon, either of the Greek Church, or of the Syrian Church, or of the Armenian Church, or any other Church, or Churches, than those to which the inquiry now relates. And, as we compared our sixth article with the fourth session of the Council of Trent, to ascertain the difference on the subject of *tradition*, we must again compare them, to determine the difference between the two Churches, in regard to the *canon of Scripture*.

Our sixth article does not *enumerate* the books of which the *New Testament* is composed ; but says only, “ All the books of the New Testament, as they are *commonly* received, we do receive, and account them *canonical*.” Now, the books of the New Testament, which are *commonly* received, are the books which are printed not only in our authorized *version*, but also in the editions of the *Greek Testament*. The same books also constitute the New Testament, as printed in the *Latin Vulgate*; and they are *enumerated* in the decree made at the fourth session of the Council of Trent, in which they are called *libri sacri et canonici*. In respect, therefore, to the books which constitute the New Testament,

that is, in respect to the *canon* of the New Testament, the Churches of England and Rome agree.

But there is a material difference between them in regard to the canon of the *Old Testament*. The canonical books of the Old Testament are, according to the sixth article, The five books of Moses; the books of Joshua, Judges, and Ruth; the two books of Samuel, the two of Kings, and the two of Chronicles; the first and second books of Esdras, commonly called Ezra, and Nehemiah; the books of Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Solomon's Song; the four greater, and twelve lesser Prophets. These are the only books of the Old Testament which the Church of England receives as *canonical*, or to which it appeals for the purpose of establishing "*any doctrine*." The *other* books, which are comprehended under the general name of *Apocrypha*, the Church of England does *not* apply (as is stated in the same article) "to establish *any doctrine*." These are, the third and fourth books of Esdras, or the first and second *apocryphal* books of Esdras; the book of Tobias (or Tobit); the book of Judith; the rest of the book of Esther; the book of Wisdom, of Jesus the Son of Sirach, or Ecclesiasticus, and of Baruch; the Song of the Three Children, the Story of Susannah, of Bel and the Dragon, and the Prayer of Manasses; the first book of Maccabees, and the second book of Maccabees.

Now these books, and parts of books, which we not only *separate* from the other books of the Old Testament, but altogether *omit* in the small editions of the Bible, are received as *sacred and canonical* by the Church of Rome, with the exception of the third and fourth books of Esdras, and the prayer of Manasses.

That the Church of Rome, with the aforesaid exceptions, receives those books, and *parts* of books, as sacred and canonical, appears from the catalogue, which is given in the decree made at the fourth session of the Council of Trent ¹. For

¹ Immediately after the words, *pari pietatis affectu ac reverentiâ suscipit et veneratur*, which close the quotation in note ⁸, to the second chapter, the decree proceeds as follows: "Sacrorum vero librorum indicem huic decreto adscribendum censuit; ne cui dubitatio suboriri possit, quinam sint, qui ab ipsâ synodo suscipiuntur. Sunt vero infrascripti. Testamenti Veteris, quinque Moysi, id est, Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numeri, Deuteronomium, Josue, Judicum, Ruth, quatuor Regum, duo Paralipomenon, Esdræ primus, et secundus qui dicitur Neemias, *Tnobias*, *Judith*, Hester, Job, Psalterium Davidicum centum quinquaginta psalmorem, Parabolæ, Ecclesiastes, Canticum canticorum, *Sapientia*, *Ecclesiasticus*, Isaias, Hieremias cum *Baruch*, Ezechiel, Daniel, duodecim prophetæ minores, id est, Osea, Joel, Amos, Abdias, Jonas, Micheas, Naum, Abacuch, Sophonias, Aggæus, Zacharias, Malachias, *duo Machabæorum primus et secundus*. Testamenti Novi quatuor Evangelia, secundum Matthæum, Marcum, et Joannem, Actus Apostolorum a Luca evangelistâ conscripti. Quatuordecim Epistolæ Pauli Apostoli, ad Romanos, duæ ad Corinthos, ad Galatas, ad Ephesios, ad Philipenses, ad Colossenses, duæ ad Thessalonicenses, duæ ad Timotheum, ad Titum, ad Philemonem, ad Hebræos, Petri Apostoli duæ, Joannis Apostoli tres, Jacobi Apostoli una,

in that catalogue the books of Tobit, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Baruch, and the first and second books of Maccabees, are mentioned *by name*, in addition to those which are in the canon of *both* churches. And though this decree does not mention *by name*, either that part of Esther which is placed in our Apocrypha, or the Song of the Three Children, or the Story of Susanna, or that of Bel and the Dragon, yet it certainly *includes* those portions of our Apocrypha. For that part of Esther which we place in our *Apocrypha* is, according to the Latin Vulgate, (which the Council of Trent in the very same session declared the *authentic* edition of the Scriptures²;) a constituent part of the *canonical*

Judæ Apostoli una, et Apocalypsis Joannis Apostoli. Si quis autem *libros ipsos integros, cum omnibus suis partibus, prout in Ecclesiâ Catholicâ legi consueverunt, et in veteri vulgatâ latinâ editione habentur* pro SACRIS et CANONICIS non susceperit, et traditiones prædictas sciens et prudens contempserit, anathema sit.”

² Insuper eadem sacrosancta synodus considerans, non parum utilitatis accedere posse Ecclesiæ Dei, si ex omnibus Latinis editionibus, quæ circumferuntur, sacrorum librorum quænam pro AUTHENTICA habenda sit, innotescat, statuit et declarat, ut hæc ipsa *vetus et vulgata editio*, quæ longo tot sæculorum usu in ipsâ Ecclesiâ probata est, in *publicis lectionibus, disputationibus, prædicationibus, et expositionibus* pro AUTHENTICA habeatur; et ut nemo illam rejicere quovis prætextu audeat vel præsumat. p. xxi. In this manner did the Council of Trent elevate a *mere translation* to the rank of the *original* Scriptures. Indeed the *Hebrew Bible*, the *true* original of the Old Testament, would not have suited the *purpose* of that Council.

book of Esther. And the *other* three portions are, according to the same vulgate, constituent parts of the book of *Daniel*. But to remove all doubt, whether in the books of Esther and Daniel, the *apocryphal* parts of them were meant to be included, the Council of Trent has declared in the very same decree, that it receives the books of the Old Testament *entire with all their parts*, as they are contained in the *Latin Vulgate* (“*Libros ipsos integros, cum omnibus suis partibus, prout in ecclesiâ catholicâ legi consueverunt, et in veteri vulgatâ Latinâ editione habentur*”). The whole, therefore, of our Apocrypha, with the exception of the third and fourth books of Esdras, and the Prayer of Manasses, the Council of Trent has placed among the sacred and canonical writings of the Old Testament. Indeed, it not only *includes* them under the general appellation of books sacred and canonical, but it *further* declares, that all their canonical books are to be received with sentiments of *equal* piety and reverence (*pâri pietatis affectu ac reverentiâ*).

It is true, that many of the Romish writers, among others Bellarmine himself, have divided the books of the Old Testament into two separate classes, of which the *first* class contains the books which *both* Churches receive as canonical, while the books, received as canonical by the Church of *Rome*, and not by the Church of *England*, are referred to a *second* class. It is further

true that *some* writers have given to the books of the former class the title of libri *proto*-canonici, and to the books of the latter class, the title of libri *deutero*-canonici. Hence it has been inferred, that they considered the books of the latter class as *canonical* indeed, but as canonical in an *inferior degree*. Now, if a book, considered by the Church of England as apocryphal, is received by the Church of Rome as being in *any* respect canonical, the two Churches are still at variance. But it is really absurd to talk of a *medium* between canonical and uncanonical, or of *degrees* of canonicity. Let us ask, what the Church of England *understands* by a canonical book. This question is answered in the sixth article. It is a book to which we may appeal in confirmation of *doctrines*. It belongs to the *canon*, or to the *rule* of faith. And the very same explanation is given in the corresponding decree of the Council of Trent, namely, that which passed at the fourth session. For, after an enumeration of the books called sacred and canonical (sacri et canonici) the decree concludes with the observation, that the authorities above stated are those which the council proposes to use in confirmation of *doctrines* (in confirmandis *dogmatibus*). Every book, therefore, must either *be* or *not be*, acknowledged as a work of authority for the establishment of doctrines. Between its absolute rejection, and its absolute admission, there is no medium. When the question relates to the

establishment of *doctrines*, a book must have *full* authority for that purpose, or its authority is worth *nothing*. And hence the Council of Trent, very consistently, ascribed *equal* authority to them all. No writer, therefore, belonging to the Church of *Rome*, could represent their authority as *unequal*, without impugning that decree of the Council of Trent. We might be certain, then, without further examination, that the inference deduced from the terms *proto-canonikus* and *deutero-canonikus*, was devoid of foundation.

But, that nothing may be omitted on a subject of such importance, let us examine what the Romish writers *themselves* have said in regard to this twofold division. And, for this purpose, let us again have recourse to Bellarmine, who is far the most methodical and comprehensive, on *this*, as on all *other* subjects of Romish theology. In the *first* book of his treatise on ‘The Word of God,’ where he examines the difference between the canon of the Protestants and the canon of the Church of Rome, he divides, in his fourth chapter, the books of the Old Testament into two classes. In the *first* class he places those books, which are *universally* allowed to be canonical, or “of whose authority (in the words of our sixth article) there was never any *doubt* in the Church.” In the *second* class he places those books of the Old Testament which are received as canonical by the Church of Rome,

but *not* received as such by Protestants³. It is likewise true, that Bellarmine calls the books of the former class *libri primi ordinis*, and the books of the latter class *libri secundi ordinis*. But it is *not* true, that the terms *primus ordo*, and *secundus ordo*, here imply an *inequality*, in respect to their *canonical authority*. The division was made solely with a view to *perspicuity*; it was made for the sole purpose of distinguishing those books which were the subjects of *controversy*, from those on which all parties were *agreed*. And so far was Bellarmine from making any thing like *concession*, in regard to the books of the second class, that his very object is to *defend* their canonical authority in opposition to the Protestants. He examines the authority of the disputed books, one after the other; and he concludes by pronouncing them truly canonical. For instance, in his ninth chapter, speaking of those parts of Daniel, which we place in the Apocrypha, (namely, the Song of the Three Children, the Story of Susanna, and that of Bel and the Dragon,) he says, “it is *certain* that all these parts of Daniel are *truly canonical* (*certum est has omnes partes Danielis vere esse canonicas*”). And, in his tenth chapter, speaking of Tobit, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and the two

³ He has also a *third* class, which it is unnecessary to notice here, because it includes such books as the Church of Rome itself *rejects*.

books of the Maccabees, he not only says, that the Church of Rome holds them to be *sacred* and *canonical* (pro sacris et canonicis habet), but he adds, that they are *so* sacred as to be of *infallible* truth (hos libros *ita* esse sacros, ut sint *infallibilis* veritatis). A stronger expression he could not have used, if he had been speaking of Moses and the prophets. There is no foundation then whatever for the opinion, that, when the books, received as canonical by the Church of Rome, are divided into two classes, the division implies an inferiority of the latter to the former.

Nor must we forget, that, as this division is made in controversy with *Protestants*, for the purpose only of distinguishing the *subjects* of controversy, so the Church of Rome, on *all other occasions*, has carefully *abstained* from making any distinction *whatever*. Though the Apocrypha, or books of the second class are, in *Protestant* Bibles, detached from the books of the first class, and placed together by themselves, yet no such separation is either made, or *allowed* to be made, in Bibles which are used by members of the Church of Rome. Nor is any such separation observable in that *catalogue* of canonical writings, which is officially given by the Council of Trent. For the books belonging to one class are there *intermixed* with the books belonging to the other ; so that all distinction between them

is utterly *done away* ⁴. The books of *Tobit* and *Judith* are there named between the books of *Nehemiah* and *Esther*; the books of *Wisdom* and *Ecclesiasticus*, between *Solomon's Song* and *Isaiah*; *Baruch* is annexed to *Jeremiah*; nor is *any* part of our Apocrypha enumerated *after* the books which we receive as canonical, except the two books of Maccabees, which have the last place assigned to them, for no other reason than because they record events of so much *later date*. If we examine the editions of the Latin Vulgate, which have been printed *since* the time of the Council of Trent, and printed by *papal authority*, we shall find an arrangement which perfectly accords with the above-named catalogue. Nor do the *preceding* editions differ in any *other* respect, than, that many, if not most of them, contain also the third and fourth books of Esdras, with the Prayer of Manasses ⁵.

The *Douay* translation of the Old Testament has again the same arrangement as the modern editions of the Latin Vulgate, from which indeed

⁴ See the preceding note ¹.

⁵ The third and fourth books of Esdras, with the Prayer of Manasses, are printed also by Sabatier, in his *Biblia Sacra*, published at Rheims in 1743, in three volumes, folio. But, in consequence of their rejection by the Council of Trent, they are printed in *this* edition at the end, and under the title *Libri Apocryphi*. See vol. iii. p. 1038, &c. The *other* apocryphal books are intermixed with the canonical books in the manner above described.

(and not from the Hebrew) the translation was made ⁶. This translation was published by the *English College* at Douay, in 1609; and with the Rhemish translation of the New Testament, first printed in 1582, it forms the English Bible, which alone is used by the Romanists of this country. In 1805, a new edition of this English Bible, with notes by Bishop Chaloner, was printed at Edinburgh, in five volumes, octavo. And, in this edition, as in the Latin Vulgate, the books of Tobit and Judith are placed immediately after the second book of Esdras, or Nehemiah; then follows the book of Esther, including both the *canonical* and the *apocryphal* part of it. Between Solomon's Song and Isaiah are placed the books of Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus; the book of Baruch immediately follows the Lamentations of Jeremiah; the Song of the Three Children is inserted in the *third* chapter of Daniel, while the Story of Susannah makes the *thirteenth*, and that of Bel and the Dragon the *fourteenth* chapter of Daniel. Immediately after the book of Malachi are placed the two books of the Maccabees. But lest it should be supposed that they are thus *excluded* from the canon, we find a note at the beginning of the first book, in which they are expressly declared to be a *part* of the canon.

There is only one more observation necessary, in order to make the *state* of the question under-

⁶ An English translation of the *Hebrew* Bible would not indeed be consistent with the decree quoted above in note ².

stood. Among the apocryphal books of the Old Testament, there are several which are read in the public service of our Church ; especially the books of Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus, from which *two books alone* nearly thrice as many lessons are taken, as from all the other apocryphal books put together. Now these books undoubtedly contain very excellent moral instructions : and our sixth article declares, that when apocryphal books are read in the Church, they are read “for example of life and instruction of manners’.” But there is a wide difference between reading a book for instruction of manners, and reading it to establish *doctrines*, or articles of *faith*. Indeed, the sixth article expressly declares, that they are *not* read for the purpose of establishing any *doctrine*. And the bare *act* of reading them in the Church cannot possibly imply that they have *canonical* authority ; or the rubric in the communion service, which enjoins the reading either of a homily or of a sermon, after the Nicene Creed, must be supposed to imply that such homily or sermon has *likewise* canonical authority.

II. The *difference* between the two Churches, in respect to the canon of Scripture being now

⁷ The observation of Jerom, to whom this article refers, applies *in particular* to the books of Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus ; for, in reference to these two books, he says : “Hæc duo volumina legit ad edificationem plebis, non ad auctoritatem ecclesiasticorum dogmatum confirmandam.” *Hieronyni Opp.* tom. i. p. 939, ed. Benedict.

fully understood, let us next inquire into the *principles*, on which they have respectively acted in their *determination* of the canon. For this inquiry will enable us to ascertain which of them has determined *rightly*. That the Council of Trent assumed the privilege of raising to the rank of *canonical* authority what was generally acknowledged to have *no* such authority, is a charge, which cannot be made without injustice. The power of declaring canonical a book, which has never laid *claim* to that title, is a power not exercised even by the Church of Rome. In *this* respect, it acts like *other* Churches: it sits in judgment on *existing claims*, and determines, whether they are valid, or not. But, as the Church of Rome has decided one way, and the Church of England another, we must *inquire* into the claims of those books, which the former receives, and the latter rejects.

That books of the Old Testament, which *we* call apocryphal, were pronounced canonical by the Council of *Trent*, is a decision by no means *peculiar* to that council. Even the third Council of Carthage, which was holden before the close of the *fourth* century, has given a catalogue of the canonical writings of the Old Testament, in which the books of Tobit and Judith, with two books of the Maccabees are *expressly* mentioned as belonging to the *scripturæ canonicæ*⁹.

⁹ The forty-seventh canon of this council, which was holden in the year 397, under the presidency of Aurelius, bishop of

And the expression, used in that catalogue, of the *five* books of Solomon (*quinque libri Salomonis*), must have been designed to include both the book of Wisdom and that of Ecclesiasticus; the other *three* being the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Solomon's Song¹. Indeed the Council of Trent declared no other books to be sacred and canonical, than such as had existed from the earliest ages of Christianity, not only in the *Latin* version of the Old Testament, but even in the ancient *Greek* version, which is

Carthage, is as follows: "Item placuit, ut præter scripturas *canonicas* nihil in Ecclesiâ legatur, sub nomine *divinarum* scripturarum. Sunt autem *canonicæ* scripturæ: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numeri, Deuteronomium, Jesus Nave, Judicum, Ruth, Regnorum libri quatuor, Paralipomenon libri duo, Job, Psalterium Davidicum, Salomonis libri *quinque*, libri duodecim prophetarum, Isaias, Jeremias, Ezechiel, Daniel, Tobias, Judith, Esther, Esdræ libri duo, *Machabæorum libri duo*. Novi autem Testamenti, Evangeliorum libri quatuor, Actuum Apostolorum liber unus, Pauli apostoli epistolæ tredecim, ejusdem ad Hebræos una, Petri Apostoli duæ, Joannis Apostoli tres, Judæ Apostoli una, et Jacobi una, Apocalypsis Joannis liber unus." *Libbei et Cossartii Concilia*, tom. ii. p. 1177.

¹ The seemingly strange expression of *quinque libri Salomonis* is explained by Augustine, who was himself present at the council. In his treatise, *De Doctrinâ Christianâ* (Lib. ii. cap. 8), after having mentioned the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Solomon's Song, as *libri tres Salomonis*, he immediately adds, *illi duo libri, unus qui Sapientia, et alius qui Ecclesiasticus* inscribitur, de quodam similitudine *Salomonis* dicuntur. Since then *Ecclesiasticus*, as well as the book of *Wisdom*, was then called in the *Latin* Church after the name of *Solomon*, we can account for the expression *quinque libri Salomonis*.

known by the name of the Septuagint. The *intermixture* also of canonical and apocryphal books is observed in the *Greek* version, as well as in the *Latin*. It is true, that in the modern *printed* editions, especially in editions printed by *Protestants*, the two kinds are *separated*. But in the *manuscripts* of the Septuagint, there is the same intermixture of canonical and apocryphal books as in the manuscripts of the *Latin* version². Now this agreement between the *Greek* and the *Latin* versions of the Old Testament, arose from the circumstance, that the *old Latin* version was nothing more than a translation of the *Greek* version. Indeed the Hebrew original was quite inaccessible to *Latin* translators in Europe and Africa, during the three first centuries. In those ages, the Jews themselves, who inhabited Greece, Italy, and Africa, read the Old Testament in the Greek version. Thus the *Greek* Bible became to the *Latin* Christians a kind of *original*, from which they derived their *own* translations of the Scriptures.

But if the *Jews* in those ages, and in those countries, read the Old Testament in the Greek

² Though the manuscripts of the Septuagint have the same intermixture of canonical and apocryphal books, as those of the Latin version, yet in the *particular* arrangement of *single* books there are sometimes variations. For the same apocryphal part, has not always in *one* manuscript exactly the same place, which it has in *another*.

version, and, except the most *learned* among them, understood not the Hebrew original, they were still *acquainted* with the difference, which subsisted between the former and the latter. They knew, that the *Greek* Bible contained various books, and parts of books, which were *not* contained in the *Hebrew* Bible: and to writings of *this* description, they consequently ascribed less authority. They knew also, that the writings which the Greek Bible, or the Septuagint, contained *in addition* to the writings of the Hebrew Bible, were most of them Greek in their very *origin*: and that, if any of them ever *had* existed in Hebrew, the Greek translation of them was all that they themselves possessed³.

³ The book of Ecclesiasticus, as appears from chap. l. 27, was written by "Jesus the son of Sirach of *Jerusalem*;" and was consequently written, not in Greek, but in an *oriental* language. This oriental language is, in the prologue of his grandson (who translated it into Greek in the time of Evergetes king of Egypt, about 133 A.C.) called the *Hebrew* language: in the words of the Greek the things of that book are said to have been Ἑβραϊστὶ λεγόμενα. But a book written by a native of Jerusalem four hundred years after the Babylonish captivity, and written for the purpose of general instruction, could not have been written in the *ancient* Hebrew, or the Hebrew of the Old Testament. For *that* language had long *ceased* to be the vernacular language of the Jews; the descendants of those, who were carried captive to Chaldæa, having returned to Judæa with the language of their conquerors. Hence arose the Chaldee Targums or paraphrases, which were read even in the Synagogues. But though the language spoken by the Jews

These writings, whether Greek *originals*, or Greek *translations*, though antecedent to the

of Judæa, during several centuries before the birth of Christ was in reality *Chaldee*, or, as it is sometimes called, *Syro-Chaldee*, it still went by the name of *Hebrew*, the two languages being closely allied, and their connexion being made still closer by the circumstance, that after the captivity the Hebrew Bible was written with *Chaldee characters*. Hence St. Paul, when he addressed the Jews of Jerusalem in their native language, is said to have spoken in the *Hebrew dialect* (τῇ Ἑβραϊδὶ διαλέκτῳ), Acts xxii. 2. In the same kind of Hebrew therefore, that is, in Chaldee, must Jesus, the son of Sirach, have written. Again, when it is said, that the first book of the *Maccabees* was written in Hebrew, we must understand the term in the same sense: for *some* of the events, recorded in that book, happened within an hundred and fifty years of the birth of Christ. Those two books then, Ecclesiasticus and the first of the *Maccabees*, were originally *Chaldee*; but the Jews of Jerusalem did not *preserve* the originals. Two more books, namely Tobit and Judith, are said to have been written in Chaldee. Jerom in his preface to Tobit calls it *librum Chaldaeo sermone conscriptum* (tom. i. p. 1158. ed. Benedict.): and in his preface to Judith he calls also *that book liber Chaldaeo sermone conscriptus* (Ib. p. 1170). But the Chaldee copies of Tobit and Judith, of which Jerom speaks, may at least have been nothing more than mere translations from the *Greek*. And that they were so is not improbable, since Origen, who lived more than an hundred and fifty years before Jerom, declares, that he had inquired among the Jews themselves, (namely, those of Judæa) about the books of Tobit and Judith, and had learnt that those books did not then *exist* among them. Ἑβραῖοι τῷ Τωβία οὐ χρῶνται, οὐδὲ τῇ Ἰουδιθ, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχουσιν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐν ἀποκρύφοις Ἑβραϊστί, ὥς ἀπ' αὐτῶν μαθόντες ἐγνώκαμεν. Ep. ad Africanum, cap. 13. tom. i. p. 26. ed. Benedict. And we know that in *modern* times the book of Tobit has been translated into Hebrew, as appears from the editions of Fagius and Münster.—That the book of *Baruch* had an

birth of Christ, were, all of them, written within a period, which could not have extended to more than *two centuries* before that event. At

oriental origin, must be mere *conjecture*, for Jerom, in his Preface to Jeremiah, says, *Librum autem Baruch, notarii ejus, qui apud Hebræos nec legitur nec habetur, prætermisimus*, (tom. i. p. 554. ed. Benedict.)—Of the book of Wisdom says Jerom, “*apud Hebræos nusquam est; quia et ipse stylus Græcam eloquentiam redolet.*” (Ib. p. 938.)—That no other book of Esdras, than the *two first*, called Ezra and Nehemiah, had either a Hebrew or a Chaldee origin, appears from Jerom’s Preface to Ezra and Nehemiah. He uses even the strong expression, “*nec apocryphorum tertii et quarti somniis delectetur.*” (Ib. p. 1106.)—Of the book of Daniel says Jerom, “*apud Hebræos, nec Susannæ habes historiam, nec hymnum trium puerorum, nec Belis draconisque fabulas.*” (Ib. p. 990.) Indeed the story of Susanna betrays its Greek origin by the play on the words *σχῖνον* and *σχίσει* in ver. 55, and on the words *πρίνον* and *πρίσαι* in ver. 59.—That the additions made in the Septuagint to the book of *Esther* had any other than a *Greek* origin, is in the highest degree improbable. Jerom, in his Preface to the book of *Esther* addresses his readers in the following terms, “*Tenentes Esther Hebraicum librum per singula verba nostram translationem aspiciate; ut possitis agnoscere me nihil etiam augmentasse addendo, sed fidei testimonio simpliciter, sicut in Hebræo habetur, historiam Hebraicam Latinae linguæ tradidisse.*” (Ib. 1138.) Origen also (Ep. ad Africanum, cap. 3.) mentions several of those additions by *name*, and describes them as *πλείονα παρ’ ἡμῶν κείμενα ἢ παρ’ Ἑβραίοις*. Now, if the additional parts of *Esther* ever *had* existed in Hebrew, the Jews of Palestine would surely have *retained* them. Of the prayer of Manasses no one ever conjectured that it had an *oriental* origin: and some writers have (mistakenly indeed) imagined that it existed not even in *Greek*. See Fabricii Bib. Græca, tom. iii. p. 733. ed. Harles. Lastly, in respect to the second book of the Maccabees, says Jerom, “*Secundus Græcus est; quod ex ipsâ quoque phrasi probari potest.*” (tom. i. p. 322.)

what *particular* time each of them was written it would be difficult at present to determine: but it is probable, that their insertion in the *Septuagint* took place in the same gradual manner, as the books themselves appeared and were approved. Their insertion may be ascribed to the Greek Jews, resident at Alexandria and other parts of Egypt, who were desirous of preserving every document, which had any relation to their history and religion. In the choice of the *places*, which they assigned to these writings in the *Septuagint*, they were directed partly by the *subjects* of those writings, partly by their relation to *other* writings, and partly by the *periods*, in which the recorded transactions were supposed to have happened. Thus the additions, which had been made to the book of Esther, they incorporated in the book itself: and in the book of Daniel they incorporated the Song of the Three Children, the Story of Susanna, and that of Bel and the Dragon, as these additions appeared to be *connected* with the book of Daniel. For a similar reason, the book ascribed to Baruch became an appendage to the book of Jeremiah. The *Greek* Esdras appeared properly connected with the translation of the *Hebrew* Esdras. Again, as the book of Wisdom bore the name of *Solomon*, it was placed after the *Song* of Solomon: and the Wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach, or the book of Ecclesiasticus, was placed after the

Wisdom of Solomon, in consequence of both books having a similar subject. The books of Tobit and Judith were placed before the book of Esther. And, as the books of the Maccabees recorded the *most* recent events, they had the *last* place assigned to them in the Septuagint.—How long before the birth of Christ these *additional* writings (which afterwards acquired the name of *apocryphal* writings) had obtained a place in the manuscripts of the Septuagint we do not exactly know; but the time, when they were *generally* written as parts of the Greek Bible, could not have commenced *long* before the birth of Christ. Now it cannot be denied, that the insertion of these *additional* writings among the books translated from the *Hebrew* Scriptures, shows how highly they were esteemed by the Greek Jews of Egypt, to whom the insertion may be ascribed. Yet it does not appear, that even the *Egyptian* Jews ascribed to them that *canonical* authority, which they ascribed to the books translated from the *Hebrew Bible*. This at least is certain, that Philo, who was himself an Egyptian Jew, and who lived in the first century, ascribed canonical authority to no other books, than those, which were contained in the *Hebrew Bible*, and which alone were acknowledged by the Jews of Palestine⁴.

⁴ Though Philo of Alexandria must have been *acquainted* with such books as the Wisdom of Solomon, the Wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach, and other apocryphal books of the

Such was the state of things when the Greek Bible was adopted by the early *Latin* Church, as a kind of *original* for the Old Testament. And, as the Latin translator, or translators were unable to discriminate between books originally *Greek*, and books originally *Hebrew*, they translated them in the mass, and received them with *equal veneration* (*pari pietatis affectu ac reverentiâ*). Hence the celebrated St. Augustine, bishop of Hippo, whose reading was chiefly confined to books in his *native* language, regarded all the books of the *Latin* version as books of *canonical* authority. In his treatise *De Doctrinâ Christianâ*, he has stated what he calls the ‘whole canon of Scripture’ (*Totus Canon Scripturarum*): and in this canon he expressly names the books of Tobit, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and two books of Maccabees⁵. No notice

Old Testament, he has never *quoted* them, at least not for the purpose of establishing any position whatever. This is asserted by Mr. Hornemann in his *Observationes ad illustrationem doctrinæ de Canone Veteris Testamenti ex Philone*. Now Mr. Hornemann, who was formerly a pupil of Michaelis at Goettingen, declares in this tract, that he had carefully examined the whole of Philo’s works, for the purpose of determining this very question.

⁵ *Totus autem canon Scripturarum, in quo istam considerationem versandam dicimus, his libris continetur; quinque Moyseos, id est Genesi, Exodo, Levitico, Numeris, Deuteronomio; et uno libro Jesu Nave; uno Judicum, uno libello, qui appellatur Ruth, qui magis ad Regnorum principium videtur pertinere: deinde quatuor Regnorum, et duobus Paralipomenon, non consequentibus, sed quasi a latere adjunctis simulque pergentibus. Hæc est historia, quæ sibimet annexa*

indeed is taken in this canon, either of the *apocryphal* parts of Esther and Daniel, or of the book of Baruch. But, as in the Latin version, the two former were *constituent* parts of Esther and Daniel, and Baruch was an appendage to Jeremiah, the very circumstance of his mentioning those books without an observation, shows that he received those books *entire* (libros ipsos *integros*, cum omnibus suis partibus⁶).

At length, in the beginning of the *fifth* century, a *new* Latin translation of the Old Testament tempora continet, atque ordinem rerum. Sunt aliæ tanquam ex diverso ordine, quæ neque huic ordini, neque inter se connectuntur : sicut est Job, et Tobias, et Esther, et Judith, et Machabæorum libro duo, et Esdræ duo, qui magis subsequi videntur ordinatam illam historiam usque ad Regnorum et Paralipomenon terminatam. Deinde Prophetæ ; in quibus David unus liber Psalmorum, et Salomonis tres, Proverbiorum, Cantica Canticorum, et Ecclesiastes. Nam illi duo libri, unus qui *Sapientia*, et alius qui *Ecclesiasticus* inscribitur, de quadam similitudine *Salomonis* dicuntur ; nam Jesus Sirach eos conscripsisse, constantissime perhibetur ; qui tamen, quoniam in auctoritatem recipi meruerunt, *inter propheticos numerandi sunt*. Augustini Opp. tom. iii. p. I. p. 23. ed. Benedict. He then mentions, by name, each of the sixteen prophetic books ; and concludes with the observation, his quadraginta quatuor libris *Testamenti Veteris terminatur auctoritas*.—His canon of the *New Testament*, which is subjoined to his canon of the *Old Testament*, is exactly the same with our own.

⁶ Though we are not at present concerned with the canon of the *Greek Church*, it will not be superfluous to observe, that the *Greek* fathers did not make such mistakes in regard to the canonical writings of the Old Testament, as the *Latin* fathers. But even the *Greek* fathers were sometimes led into mistakes by the use of the Septuagint, and its *intermixture* of apocryphal with canonical books. Modern writers on the

was published by Jerom⁷. And *this* translation was made, not like the *old* Latin translation, from the Greek *version*, but from the *Hebrew original*. From *that* period, the difference between the *Latin* canon and the *Hebrew* canon became generally known; and Jerom himself has clearly explained it in his *Prologus galeatus*⁸. He has there *enumerated* the books contained in the Hebrew Bible, “that we may know, that whatever is *beside* them, should be placed among the *Apocrypha*⁹.” But, though Jerom was by

canon of the Old Testament have frequently attempted to explain the mistakes both of the Greek and of the Latin fathers, by contending, that when they ascribe canonical authority to an *apocryphal* book, they do it only to a certain *degree*, or under certain *limitations*. Now a book is either *canonical*, or it is *not* canonical: there is no such thing as a medium. Indeed such explanations are mere subterfuges, founded on the false notion, that the canon of the Old Testament must be regulated by the *opinions* of the *fathers*. It must be regulated *wholly and solely* by the answer to the question: *what* books were contained in those Hebrew Scriptures which received the *sanction of our Saviour*?

⁷ It was begun before the end of the fourth century, but not finished till after the year 405. See Martianay's second Prolegomenon to the *Divina Bibliotheca Hieronymi*.

⁸ The *Prologus galeatus* was so called, because it was considered as a sort of *helmet*, at the head of Jerom's translation of the Hebrew Bible. Indeed Jerom himself calls it *galeatum principium* omnibus libris, quos de Hebræo vertimus in Latinum. It is called also *Præfatio Hieronymi de omnibus libris Veteris Testamenti*, and is printed under that name in the Benedictine edition of Jerom's works, vol. i. p. 318—322.

⁹ Ut scire valeamus, quicquid *extra* hos est, inter 'Απόκρυφα esse ponendum. Ib. p. 322.

far the most *learned* among the Latin fathers, his opinion on the canon of Scripture did not prevail in the Church of *Rome*. The books, which he had termed *apocryphal*, were not only *retained* in the Latin version, but retained *intermixed*, as before, with the books confessedly canonical. Thus the canon of *Augustine* continued to be the canon of the *ruling* party. But, as there were not wanting persons, especially among the *learned*, who, from time to time, recommended the canon of *Jerom*, it was necessary for the Council of Trent to *decide* between the contending parties. And, as Luther, on the one hand, decided in favour of *Jerom*¹, the Council of Trent, on the other hand, decided in favour of *Augustine*. Hence also we discover (what is not generally known) the *reason* why the Council of Trent *omitted* the third and fourth books of Esdras, with the Prayer of Manasses. They were omitted in the catalogue of *Augustine*².

¹ The books, and parts of books, of which Jerom had said that they should be placed “inter ἀπόκρυφα,” were separated in Luther’s German translation from the books contained in the Hebrew Bible, and placed together by themselves, under the title “Apocrypha; that is, books which are not to be considered as equal to *Holy Scripture*, and yet are useful, and good to read.”

² If it be asked why Augustine *himself* omitted them, an answer may easily be given. The *fourth* book of Esdras, or the *second apocryphal* book of Esdras, is neither contained in the *present* copies of the Septuagint, nor is it known to have *ever* occupied a place in it; though it once probably existed *elsewhere* in Greek. (See Fabricii Bib. Græca, tom. iii. p. 744.

III. The preceding narrative, which explains the manner in which the *apocryphal* parts of the

ed. Harles.) Since then the old Latin version was a translation of the Septuagint, the fourth book of Esdras could have had no place in the *early* copies of it ; and a long time probably elapsed before it *obtained* admission there. Canonical authority, therefore, could not be ascribed to a book which was known to be wanting, as well in the *Greek*, as in the *Hebrew* ; though it has a place in existing manuscripts of the Vulgate (as appears from Sabatier, Bib. sacra, tom. iii. p. 1038), and has a place also in many *printed* editions of it.—The *third* book of Esdras is certainly a part of the Septuagint, and has a place in the principal editions of it, with the exception of the Complutensian edition, and those which are *copies* of that edition. (Fabricii B. G. tom. iii. p. 744.) In the manuscripts of the Septuagint it is commonly placed *before* the translation of the Hebrew Ezra ; and so it is placed in the *Roman* edition of the Septuagint. In the London Polyglot it is *detached* from the canonical Ezra, and placed in the fourth volume with the *other* apocryphal books. But as the *Complutensian* edition, which was printed from manuscripts, does not contain the *Greek* text of this book, though it contained the *Latin* text, we may infer, that the Greek text was not in their *manuscripts*. And if the MSS. of the Septuagint do not *generally* contain the third book of Esdras, it *may* at least have been wanting in *that* manuscript from which the old Latin version was first made, and thus have remained *untranslated* ; which will account both for the omission of it by Augustine, and for the strong expression applied, as well to the *third* as to the *fourth* book, by Jerom. Luther also omitted not only the *fourth*, but even the *third* book in his translation of the Apocrypha ; induced perhaps by the additional motive, that the *Greek* text of the third book was *unknown* to him. Nor are any *Lessons* from these books appointed to be read in our *own* Church. Those editions of the Latin Vulgate which *contain* these books have them after the first and second books. But so prevalent was the notion, that the *third*, as well as the *fourth* book existed only in the Latin, that in several

Old Testament were gradually inserted in the Septuagint, and thence transferred to the Latin version, is sufficient to show their want of *canonical* authority. The Church of Rome indeed has dignified the *Latin* canon with the title of

editions of the Vulgate printed in the *sixteenth* century, the third book of Esdras is prefaced with the observation, *Hic et sequens*, Esdræ liber non alio extant sermone, quam *Latino*. This observation is retained even in the Basil edition of 1581. —The Prayer of Manasses is again not *generally* contained in the manuscripts of the Septuagint, which will account as well for Jerom's *silence* about it, as for Augustine's *omission* of it. It is contained, however, in the Codex Alexandrinus among some hymns annexed to the Psalms ; and it is printed in the London Polyglot. Those editions of the Vulgate which contain this Prayer, have it usually at the end of the Chronicles : and it is so placed in *manuscripts* of the Vulgate. (Sabatier, *Biblia sacra*, tom. iii. p. 1038.)

No notice has been taken in this chapter of the *third* book of the *Maccabees*, because it is equally omitted in the English and Latin Bibles, between which the comparison has been made. But it is certainly a part of the *Septuagint*, and is usually printed with the first and second books. It is contained also in the most ancient manuscripts *now* extant. But it could not have had a place in the Septuagint when the old Latin version was made. Indeed it *never* obtained a place in the Latin version ; and it appears to have been totally *unknown* to the Latin Fathers. Even Jerom, though he speaks of every *other* part of the apocryphal writings, has no where even *alluded* to the third book of Maccabees. At whatever time therefore the book was written, it could not have found its way into the manuscripts of the Septuagint, till *after* his time. Indeed, the very circumstance of its having the *last* place assigned to it, though the events which it records are *antecedent* to those of the first book, implies, that it was a *late* addition.

“The Canon of the *Church*³,” while it has attempted to degrade the *Hebrew* canon, by calling it “The Canon of the *Scribes and Pharisees*⁴.” But they should know, that this canon, call it what they will, was the canon and the *sole* canon of our Saviour Jesus Christ. Nor was any *other* canon of the Old Testament acknowledged by the *Apostles*, though the Church of Rome *pretends* that the Latin canon was received from *apostolical tradition*.

The writings of the Old Testament which received the *sanction of our Saviour*, are the writings, and the *only* writings of the *Old Testament*, which can be admitted into the canon of Scripture by those who bear the name of *Christian*. But the Scriptures which HE sanctioned, were the very Scriptures which are *now* contained in the Hebrew Bible, and which constitute (in the Old Testament) *the canon of the Church of Eng-*

³ This title was given to it by *Augustine*, who distinguished the canon of the *Church* from the canon of the *Jews*. In his treatise, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. xviii. cap. 26, speaking of the two books of the Maccabees, which the Jews, in their controversies with the Latin Christians, would of course not allow to be canonical, he says, “*Machabæorum libri, quos non JUDÆI, sed ECCLESIA pro canonicis habet, &c.*” Tom. vii. p. 519. ed. Benedict.

⁴ Bishop Chaloner, in the note prefixed to the first book of the Maccabees, says of those two books, “They are received by the *Church*, who, in settling her canon of the Scriptures, chose rather to be directed by the *tradition* she had received from the *Apostles* of Christ, than by that of the *Scribes and Pharisees*.”

land. When our Saviour appeared to the Apostles after his resurrection, He said to them, "These are the words which I spake unto you while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled, which were written in THE LAW OF MOSES, and in THE PROPHETS, and in THE PSALMS, concerning me." Now, it is well known, that the Jews divide the books of the Hebrew Bible into three classes. The *first* class contains the five books which compose THE LAW OF MOSES. The *second* class contains the books of THE PROPHETS, including not only the books which *we* call by that name, but various *historical* books, proceeding from writers to whom the Jews gave likewise the title of prophet; such as the books of Joshua, the Judges, Samuel, &c. The *third* class contains the books which in Hebrew are called *Chetubim*, in Greek *Hagiographa*; among which books THE PSALMS occupy the *first* place in the Hebrew Bible⁵, and hence have given name to the *whole* class. When our Saviour, therefore, spake of the Old Testament as composed of three parts, the LAW OF MOSES,

⁵ See, for instance, the edition of Van der Hooght, than which there is none more correct. It is true, that there are *some* Hebrew manuscripts, in which *Job* occupies the first place of the Chetubim. But the majority place the *Psalms* first. We may fairly presume, therefore, that the Psalms occupied the first place among the Chetubim in the time of our Saviour. Indeed, the very circumstance of his designating the third class by the name of the *Psalms* implies it.

the PROPHETS, and the PSALMS, He gave an exact description of the *Hebrew Bible*. It is true, that our Saviour did not *enumerate* the books of each class: but it may be easily shown, that the three classes comprehended the *present* books of the Hebrew Bible, and *no more*. For the *first* class was devoted exclusively to the writings of *Moses*: and the *second* class admitted only the writings of those whom the Jews denominated THE PROPHETS. Neither the first nor the second class, therefore, ever *could* have contained the productions of later writers, whom the Jews could not *possibly* regard in the same light as their ancient *prophets*. Nor could even the *third* class have contained any of those books which we call Apocrypha. For *most* of them were Greek in their very *origin*, and consequently were *incapable* of admission into the *Hebrew* canon. And with respect to the *few* among them which may have been written in *that kind* of Hebrew which was spoken in *latter times* by the Jews of Palestine, it would have been quite inconsistent with the veneration of the Jews for their *ancient* Hebrew Scriptures, to have admitted *whole books* written in Chaldee, though they did not exclude the works either of Ezra or of Daniel on account of some *parts* of them being Chaldee.

But let us examine more *particularly* the books of which the Hebrew Scriptures are composed. We have already seen, that Jerom,

who translated the Hebrew Bible into Latin, has, in his *Prologus galeatus*, given a description of the books which *composed* the Hebrew Bible ⁶. He has also divided them into *three classes*. In the *first* class he places, as was done by the Jews in general, the five books of Moses, which he mentions by name, and adds, “Hi sunt quinque libri Moysi, quas proprie Thorah, id est, LEGEM appellant.” He then proceeds to the *second* class, and says, “*Secundum* PROPHETARUM ordinem appellant.” Of the *third* class, he says, “*Tertius* ordo HAGIOGRAPHIA possidet.” He enumerates also the several books of which each class is composed: and they constitute the *very books* which are *now* contained in our Hebrew Bibles. It is true, that a difference of opinion prevailed among the Jews in regard to the question, whether certain books should be placed in the *second*, or placed in the *third* class. Hence the book of Ruth and the Lamentations of Jeremiah are, in the edition of Van der Hooght, placed among the *Hagiographa*; whereas in Jerom’s *Prologus galeatus* the book of Ruth is annexed to the book of Judges, and the Lamentations are included in the prophecy of Jeremiah. They are placed, therefore, in the *second* class, or among the books of THE PROPHETS. But Jerom himself observes in the same prologue, that even at *that* time the book of Ruth and the Lamen-

⁶ See the preceding note⁸, p. 107.

tations were sometimes placed among the *Hagiographa*⁷. In other respects, the edition of Van der Hooght has the same book in *each* class, with the catalogue of Jerom. But it is of less consequence to know what books were contained in *each* class, than it is to know what books were contained in the *three classes together*: for all three classes received the *equal* sanction of our Saviour. Indeed we shall find, that a much greater difference subsisted among the Jews, in regard to the component parts of the second and third classes⁸, than is observable between Jerom's catalogue and Van der Hooght's edition. But, as there was *no* difference of opinion on the question of the *whole* number of books which constituted *both* classes, the arrangement of the *individual* books is, for the reason already assigned, a matter of inferior moment to *Christians*.

From what has been already stated, it appears that the Canon of the Old Testament, adopted by the Church of England, contains precisely the *same books* as, according to Jerom's description, were *then* contained in the Hebrew Bible. It is true, that the *Prologus galeatus* does not determine the questions, whether the additional

⁷ Quanquam nonnulli *Ruth* et *Cinoth* inter Hagiographa scriptitent.

⁸ In regard to the component parts of the *first* class, it is obvious that there *could not* be a difference of opinion. The five books of Moses belonging to it *exclusively*.

parts of Esther and Daniel were then in the Hebrew Bible, or whether Baruch was in the Hebrew Bible, as an appendage to Jeremiah, But that the Hebrew Bible was even *then* as free from those additions as at present, appears from the quotations which have been already given from *other* parts of Jerom's works⁹. Since, then, the Hebrew Scriptures have been *proved* to be the same at present, as they were in the time of Jerom, we can have no reason to doubt their agreement with the Hebrew Scriptures in the time of our Saviour. The copy which was used by Jerom, he obtained in *Palestine*, where he passed many years in the latter part of the fourth century.

But we can go still *higher*, and produce a catalogue of the Hebrew Scriptures from the *second* century. For Melito, who was bishop of Sardis about the year 170, travelled into the East, for the very purpose of inquiring among the Jews what were the books which composed the Hebrew Scriptures¹; and the catalogue communicated by Melito, in a letter to his brother Onesimus, is preserved in the Ecclesiastical

⁹ See the quotations relating to Esther, Jeremiah, and Daniel, in note ³, p. 100.

¹ If it be asked, why it was necessary to travel into the *East* for this purpose, the answer is obvious. The *Greek* Jews, as well as the Greek Christians, used the *Septuagint*; and therefore he had no other means of knowing the contents of the *Hebrew* Bible, than by going into a country where alone it was *then* used.

History of Eusebius. The catalogue is arranged in the following order : " Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, four books of the Kings², two books of the Chronicles, David's Psalms, Solomon's Proverbs or Wisdom³, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, Job. The prophets, Isaiah, Jeremiah, twelve in one book, Daniel, Ezekiel, and Esdras⁴." Now, as Melito was a *Greek* bishop, it is no wonder that the books are not arranged in this catalogue after the *Jewish* manner. Nor has he exactly observed even the order of the *Septuagint*, unless there were manuscripts of the *Septuagint* which at *that* time had

² Including the two of Samuel, as in the *Septuagint*.

³ As it appears from this expression that Solomon's *Proverbs* were likewise called Solomon's *Wisdom*, we can more easily account for the title of the apocryphal book, which was considered as *another* Wisdom of Solomon. For no one will suppose that the apocryphal book *itself*, which was Greek in its very *origin*, was admitted by the Oriental Jews into their *Hebrew* Scriptures.

⁴ The words of Melito, in his Epistle to Onesimus, are as follows : 'Ανελθὼν οὖν εἰς τὴν Ἀνατολήν, καὶ ἕως τοῦ τόπου γεγόμενος, ἔνθα ἐκηρύχθη καὶ ἐπράχθη, καὶ ἀκριβῶς μαθὼν τὰ τῆς Παλαιᾶς Διαθήκης βιβλία, ὑποτάξας ἔπεμψά σοι ὧν ἐστὶ τὰ ὀνόματα. Μωϋσέως πέντε· Γένεσις, Ἐξοδος, Λευιτικόν, Ἀριθμοί, Δευτερονόμιον, Ἰησοῦς Ναυῆ, Κριταί, Ῥούθ, Βασιλειῶν τέσσαρα, Παραλιπομένων δύο, Ψαλμῶν Δαβίδ, Σολομῶνος Παροιμίαι, ἡ καὶ Σοφία, Ἐκκλησιαστής, Ἄσμα ἁσμάτων, Ἰώβ. Προφητῶν, Ἡσαίου, Ἱερεμίου, τῶν δώδεκα ἐν μονοβίβλῳ, Δανιήλ, Ἰεζεκιήλ, Ἐσδρας. Ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὰς ἐκλογὰς ἐποίησάμην. Eusebii Hist. Eccles. lib. iv. cap. 26, tom. i. p. 191. ed. Reading.

a different order from those which are *now* extant. But the *books themselves*, not the mode of *arranging* them, are the objects of our present inquiry. And on *this* head there is only one difficulty attending the catalogue of Melito. That *Esdras* includes also *Nehemiah*, cannot well be doubted. For the Jews made only *one* book of Ezra and Nehemiah : and hence Jerom himself has included *both* of them under the name of *Esdras*. In his Prologus galeatus, he describes the eighth and ninth books of the Hagiographa in the following manner : “ Octavus, *Esdras* ; qui et ipse similiter apud Græcos et Latinos in *duos* Libros divisus est. Nonus, *Esther*.” The only difficulty, therefore, attending Melito’s catalogue, relates to the book of *Esther*. But as this book occupies the *last* place among the Hebrew Scriptures, not only in *Jerom’s* catalogue, but also in the catalogue given by *Origen*, who wrote in the *third* century⁵, the omission of Esther may be ascribed to a mere *oversight*, unless Esther as well as Nehemiah may be supposed to be included under Esdras. That the Hebrew Scriptures, seen by Melito, did *not* contain the book of Esther, is incredible. For it is not only contained in the catalogue of Origen and Jerom, but is the book on which was founded the feast of *Purim* ; a feast so im-

⁵ Origen’s catalogue of the Scriptures is preserved by Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. lib. vi. cap. 25.

portant to the Jews, that the celebration of it continues to this very day.

We now proceed to a testimony which is more important than any of the preceding, the testimony of *Josephus*, who was himself a *Jewish Priest*, and moreover a contemporary of the *Apostles*⁶. But, to understand the testimony of *Josephus*, it is necessary to know the peculiar manner in which the Jews *connected* the several books of the Hebrew Bible. We have already seen, that they referred the books of the Hebrew Bible to *three classes*; that the first class *always* contained the five books of Moses; but that the second and third classes did *not* always contain the same books. On the other hand, when the two classes were *taken together*, the books which they included upon the whole were invariably the same. Now, the number of books which constituted *both* classes amounted to *seventeen*. For it appears, from *Jerom's Prologus galeatus*, that they reckoned the books of Judges and Ruth as *one* book, as also the two books of Samuel, the two of Kings, and the two of Chronicles. Further, they reckoned Ezra and Nehemiah as *one* book; and the Lamentations of Jeremiah they considered only as a *part* of

⁶ *Josephus* was born at Jerusalem, about the year 37, of the Christian era: and therefore though much *younger* than the Apostles, must still have been contemporary with *many* of them, especially with St. Paul, St. Peter, and St. John.

Jeremiah⁷. Of the twelve minor prophets they again made only *one* book. On the other hand, the books of Joshua, Esther, Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Solomon's Song, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and Daniel, were reckoned as so many *single* books. Upon the whole, then, *seventeen* books constituted the second and third classes, which, with the *five* books constituting the *first* class, brought the whole number to *twenty-two*, the number of letters in the Hebrew alphabet⁸.

Now, says Josephus, in his treatise against Apion⁹, "We have not thousands of books dis-

⁷ *Some* Jews indeed, when Jerom wrote his Prologus galeatus, had begun to *separate* as well the Lamentations from the prophecy of Jeremiah, as Ruth from the book of Judges: and they are now separated in the Hebrew Bibles. But it is evident, that *Josephus* reckoned as *Jerom* did, and as did the great majority of the Jews at *that* time. For Jerom says only *Nonnulli* Ruth et Cinoth inter Hagiographa scriptitant.

⁸ Though the reduction to 22 was probably made for the very purpose of bringing the books of the Hebrew Bible to an equality in number with the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, the coincidence was *afterwards* considered as something mysterious. Hence Jerom, in his Prologus galeatus, says, *Viginti duo Volumina supputantur, quibus, quasi Literis, et exordiis in Dei doctrinâ, tenera adhuc et lactens viri justî eruditur infantia.*

⁹ Lib. i. cap. 8. tom. ii. p. 441. ed. Havercamp. The same passage is quoted also by Eusebius, (Hist. Eccles. lib. iii. cap. 10.) of which the following is a copy. Οὐ μυριάδες οὖν εἰσὶ βιβλίων παρ' ἡμῖν ἀσυμφώνων καὶ μαχομένων δύο δὲ

cordant, and contradicting each other ; but we have only *twenty-two*, which comprehend the history of all former ages, and are justly regarded as divine. *Five* of them proceed from Moses ; they include as well the laws, as the account of the creation of man, extending to the time of his (Moses's) death. This period comprehends nearly three thousand years. From the death of Moses to that of Artaxerxes, who was king of Persia after Xerxes, the prophets, who succeeded Moses, committed to writing, in *thirteen* books, what was done in their days. The remaining *four* books contain hymns to God, and instructions of life for man."—If we compare this passage of Josephus with Jerom's Prologus galeatus, we shall find, 1st, That they agree in having *three classes* ; 2ndly, in making the *whole* number of books amount to *twenty-two* ; 3rdly, in describing the books of the first class, as amounting to *five* ; 4thly, in describing the books belonging to the second and third classes, as amounting together to *seventeen*. But they differ

μόνα πρὸς τοῖς εἴκοσι βιβλία, τοῦ παντὸς ἔχοντα χρόνον τὴν ἀναγραφὴν, τὰ δικαίως θεῖα πεπιστευμένα. Καὶ τούτων πέντε μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ Μωϋσέως, ἃ τοὺς τε Νόμους περιέχει, καὶ τὴν τῆς ἀνθρωπογονίας παράδοσιν, μέχρι τῆς αὐτοῦ τελευτῆς· οὗτος ὁ χρόνος ἀπολείπει τρισχιλίων ὀλίγον ἐτῶν. Ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Μωϋσέως τελευτῆς μέχρι τῆς Ἀρταξέρξου, τοῦ μετὰ Ξέρξην Περσῶν βασιλέως, οἱ μετὰ Μωϋσῆν προφῆται τὰ κατ' αὐτοὺς πραχθέντα συνέγραψαν ἐν τρισὶ καὶ δέκα βιβλίοις. Αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τέσσαρες ὕμνους εἰς τὸν Θεόν, καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὕποθήκας τοῦ βίου παρέχουσι. Tom. i. p. 103. ed. Reading.

in regard to the *repartition* of the seventeen. By comparing, however, the two accounts we shall easily ascertain the books which composed the canon of Josephus. In the third class he places only *four* books, which, from his description of them, appear evidently to have been the Psalms, the Proverbs, the Preacher or Ecclesiastes, and Solomon's Song. These four books are placed also in *Jerom's* third class; but then he has *five other* books in the third class, namely, Job, Daniel, Chronicles, Esdras, and Esther. These five books, therefore, must have been in the *second* class of Josephus; for he agrees with Jerom in the *whole* number, and likewise in regard to the *first* class. If then we add those five books to the books contained in *Jerom's* second class, it will appear that the second class of Josephus must have contained the books of Joshua, Judges, with Ruth, Samuel, Kings, Chronicles, Esdras, Esther, Job, Isaiah, Jeremiah with the Lamentations, Ezekiel, Daniel, and the book of the twelve minor prophets. And thus we have exactly *thirteen* books, which Josephus expressly says was the number of his second class. The books, therefore, which constituted the Hebrew Bible of *Josephus*, were the books which constituted the Hebrew Bible of *Jerom*, that is, the books which constitute the Hebrew Bible at this present day.

It is worthy of remark, that Josephus determines the period when the Hebrew canon was

closed, or the period after which *no books* were further admitted into it, by the reign of Artaxerxes, successor of Xerxes, that is, Artaxerxes Longimanus. For it was during *his* reign that the book of Esther was written; whereas the very *oldest* among the apocryphal books must have been written long *after* that period. Indeed Josephus himself, in reference to those very books, with which he was not unacquainted, immediately after the passage above quoted, proceeds in the following manner: "From the time of Artaxerxes to the present time all things indeed have been committed to writing: but these writings are not thought worthy of equal credit with those which preceded them, on account of there not being that *regular succession of prophets*¹." We learn, then, from the testimony of Josephus, not only that the Hebrew Scriptures, in the time of Christ and his Apostles, were composed of those very books of which they are *now* composed, but that all *later* writings, such as those which constitute our Apocrypha, were excluded, because the authors of them had not the prophetic spirit, or divine inspiration.

Upon the whole, then, we may conclude, that the canon of the Old Testament, which is adopted by the Church of England, is the canon

¹ Ἀπὸ δὲ Ἀρταξέρξου μέχρι τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς χρόνου, γέγραπται μὲν ἕκαστα· πίστεως δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίας ἡξίωται τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν, διὰ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι τὴν τῶν Προφητῶν ἀκριβῆ διαδοχὴν. Tom. ii. p. 441.

which received the sanction of our Saviour. But the canon adopted by the Church of Rome was sanctioned neither by Christ, nor by his Apostles. They *call* it indeed a canon received by apostolical *tradition*. But it is a canon which was founded, from the very beginning, on a *glaring mistake*. The Greek Bible, with its numerous interpolations, being, from ignorance of Hebrew, regarded in the light of an *original*, canonical and apocryphal writings, were admitted *indiscriminately*, and finally ratified by the Council of Trent, as writings to be received *pari pietatis affectu ac reverentiâ*.

CHAPTER VI.

REMARKS ON THE ADDITIONAL INFLUENCE, WHICH THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO CHURCHES, IN REGARD TO THE CANON OF SCRIPTURE, MUST HAVE HAD ON THEIR RESPECTIVE DOCTRINES—INFLUENCE OF TRADITION ON THE SENSE OF SCRIPTURE, WHEN APPLIED AS A RULE FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF IT—THE SENSE OF SCRIPTURE FURTHER AFFECTED BY THE LATIN TRANSLATION, TO WHICH ALONE THE CHURCH OF ROME ALLOWS AN APPEAL IN CONTROVERSIES OF FAITH—STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINES WHICH DISTINGUISH THE CHURCH OF ROME, AS GIVEN IN THE TRENT CONFESSION OF FAITH.

It appears, from the preceding chapter, that the Church of Rome has placed in the canon of the Old Testament the books of Judith, Tobit, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, with the first and second of the Maccabees, beside Baruch as an appendage to Jeremiah, and various additions to the books of Esther and Daniel. These books, and parts of books, were pronounced ‘sacred and canonical’ by the Council of Trent, and declared *equal* in authority to the other books of the Old Testament.

Since then so large an addition to the *written word*, beside the whole of the *unwritten word*, is employed by the Church of Rome in establishing

doctrines ¹, while the Church of England rejects the unwritten word altogether, and never uses the Apocrypha “to establish any *doctrine* ²,” we need not wonder that their articles of faith are widely different. In the second and third chapters, which relate to Scripture and tradition, we traced the causes to the effects, and show^y_md the influence of tradition on the doctrines of the Church of Rome by a reference to numerous examples. That the difference between the two Churches, in regard also to the canon of Scripture, must have had an *additional* influence on their respective doctrines, can hardly be doubted. When six whole books, beside parts of other books, are received as authority for doctrines by *one* Church, but *not* received as such by the other, it is hardly possible that such a *cause* of difference should exist, without producing a correspondent *effect*. But, though the Council of Trent, by distinguishing *tradition* from Scripture, has enabled us to judge of the doctrines which receive their chief support from the former, it has not enabled us to distinguish the support which is afforded by the *apocryphal* writings of the Old Testament, from the support which is afforded by the *canonical* writings. For, when the decrees of the Council of Trent are pre-

¹ In *confirmandis dogmatibus*, as expressed by the Council of Trent. See the decree quoted in chap. ii. note ¹, p. 27.

² Art. VI.

faced by an appeal to Scripture as well as to tradition, the appeal is made in such *general terms*, as to leave the question undecided, whether the *canonical*, or the *apocryphal*, parts of Scripture were the subjects of reference.

We have no other means therefore of determining whether their appeals to Scripture had reference to the Apocrypha, or not, than by consulting the principal writers of that Church, who have made *particular* reference, where the reference of the council itself was only *general*. It would be tedious, and indeed unnecessary, to search for every example of this kind, which might be found among the Romish writers; and therefore nothing more shall be attempted than to give an instance or two from the works of Bellarmine.

It appears, from the second chapter, that the Council of Trent professed to derive the doctrine of purgatory both “from the sacred writings, and the ancient tradition of the fathers ³.” Now Bellarmine has written a particular treatise on the subject of purgatory, which is contained in the second part of his controversies on the Christian Faith ⁴. And in this treatise he brings proofs of the doctrine from the fourth chapter of the book of *Tobit*; the second, the fourteenth, and the eighteenth chapters of *Ecclesiasticus*;

³ Ex sacris literis, et antiquâ Patrum traditione. See chap. ii. note ¹², p. 35.

⁴ Col. 699—822. ed. Ingolstadt, 1601. fol.

and the twelfth chapter of the second book of *Maccabees*⁵.—The treatise on Purgatory is followed by three other treatises, the first relating to “The Beatitude and Canonization of the Saints;” the second to “The Relics and Images of Saints;” the third to “The Worship of Images and Saints⁶.” And *here* again Bellarmine has recourse to the authority of the same three books, *Tobit*, *Ecclesiasticus*, and the second of the *Maccabees*⁷. These few examples are sufficient to show the utility of the Apocrypha to the Church of Rome: for hence we see that it supplies them with passages in support of doctrines where *scriptural* support is chiefly wanted⁸.

⁵ See Col. 703. 707. 775.

⁶ De beatudine et canonizatione Sanctorum, Col. 824—921. De Reliquiis, et Imaginibus Sanctorum, Col. 1028. De Cultu Imaginum, et de Cultu Sanctorum, Col. 1030—1127.

⁷ See, for instance, Col. 841, where the eleventh chapter of *Ecclesiasticus* is quoted; Col. 891, where the twelfth chapter of *Tobit* is quoted; Col. 895, where the fifteenth chapter of the second book of *Maccabees* is quoted, &c.

⁸ The book of *Wisdom* is quoted by Bellarmine in favour of the monastic life, and the celibacy of the clergy. See the treatise *De Clericis*, lib. i. cap. 21; and the treatise *De Monachis*, lib. ii. cap. 9. 31. And in the fourth chapter of the *first* book of *Maccabees*, as well as in the last chapter of *Judith*, Bellarmine has discovered passages which favour the supremacy of the pope. See his treatise *De Romano Pontifice*, lib. iv. cap. 17. But I mention these examples only in a note, because they relate not to doctrines.—Another observation, which may likewise be made in a *note*, relates to an application of the Apocrypha, which would be attended with

Nor is the augmentation of Scripture, by the means of the apocryphal writings, the *only* additional cause of a difference in doctrines. For as tradition serves the *double* purpose of furnishing doctrines which are not contained in Scripture, and of explaining those which Scripture either *does* contain, or is *supposed* to contain, the application of it in its *interpretative* capacity must again have material influence on the doctrines themselves. When *tradition* is applied as a rule for the interpretation of Scripture, its effects are widely different from those of any *other* rule. When we interpret the Hebrew Bible, or the Greek Testament, by those *grammatical* and *critical* rules, which are applied to all other works of antiquity, we consider the words of the text, as signs to the reader of what was thought by the writer; and the process of interpretation has no other object than to *draw out* of the words the sense, which the author himself intended to *place* in them. This is literally *exegesis*, or an *extraction* of the sense, which the words *really contain*. But when a Romanist applies *tradition*, and applies it to the interpretation of

real use. But then those books must be read in the *Greek*, not in the Latin Vulgate. Being written in the same *Hebrew* kind of Greek as the New Testament, the expressions used in the former may be often applied, with advantage, to the explanation of correspondent expressions in the latter. And various works have been written for the purpose of *explaining* the application. But it would be foreign to our inquiry to say more upon *this* subject.

the Latin Vulgate, (declared authentic by the Council of Trent,) the relation of the text to the rule of interpretation has no analogy whatever to that of the former case. When doctrines, contained, or supposed to be contained, in the *written* word, are explained by the aid of the *unwritten* word, the rule of interpretation is supposed to possess the same *divine* origin as the text itself. For Tradition, as a rule of faith, is *composed* of those traditions, which are called *divine* and *apostolical*. That those traditions are divine and apostolical merely in the *imagination of the Romanists*, is a fact which has been fully established in the fourth chapter. But, if they themselves *believe* that such traditions exist⁹, the effect produced upon their *doctrines* must be the same as if divine and apostolical traditions existed *in reality*. Now, as soon as a man can persuade himself that there *is* such a thing now extant as an *unwritten word of God*, and can further persuade himself, in any given instance, that this unwritten word contains a *complete* revelation of a doctrine, which the written word has revealed *imperfectly*¹, the former becomes a

⁹ *Existunt traditiones divinæ et apostolicæ, quæ, licet non scriptæ, vim legis scriptæ habent. De Ecclesiâ Christi, p. 399.*

¹ That tradition is considered as a *revelation to the Church*, as well as Scripture itself, appears from what Cardinal Bellarmine says in his treatise on 'The Word of God.' *Totalis regula fidei est Verbum Dei, sive Revelatio Dei Ecclesiæ facta,*

rule for the *interpretation* of the latter, which produces the same effect as if the doctrine were completely revealed in *Scripture alone*. Hence Cardinal Hosius asserts, and very *consistently* asserts, that “if any one has the interpretation of the Church of Rome, though he neither knows nor understands, whether and how it *agrees with the words of Scripture*, he still has *the word itself of God* ².”

Lastly, among the causes which distinguish the two Churches in matters of faith, may be reckoned the exclusive acknowledgment of the Latin Vulgate on the part of the Church of Rome, “in public lectures, disputations, sermons, and *expositions* ³.” But it is the glory of *Protestants*, that, in the exposition of Scripture, they enjoy the liberty of appealing to the *inspired originals*. For here lies the *grand* distinction

quæ dividitur in *duas* regulas partiales, SCRIPTURAM et TRADITIONEM. *De Verbo Dei*, lib. iv. cap. 12.

² Si quis habet interpretationem Romanæ Ecclesiæ, etiamsi nec scit, nec intelligit, an et quomodo *cum Scripturæ verbis conveniat*, is tamen habet *ipsissimum Verbum Dei*. This passage I give on the authority of Gerhard, who, in his *Loci Theologici*, tom. i. p. 44 (ed. Cotta), has quoted it from the works of Cardinal Hosius.

³ In the second decree, made at the fourth session of the Council of Trent, which is entitled *Decretum de editione et usu sacrorum librorum*, this council “statuit et declarat, ut hæc ipsa vetus et vulgata editio, quæ longo tot sæculorum usu in ipsa Ecclesia probata est, in publicis lectionibus, disputationibus, prædicationibus et *expositionibus* pro authentica habeatur, et ut nemo illam rejicere *quotis prætextu audeat vel præsumat*.” p. 21.

between the Churches of England and Rome, in regard to the *use* of Scripture. The reading of Scripture, in an *authorised version*, is not prohibited even to the *Laity*, by any decree or canon of the Council of *Trent*. And even the impediments, which from *other* quarters, had been thrown in the way of reading the Bible, (such for instance as the requiring of a *licence* for that purpose,) have been gradually diminished, if not wholly removed, as appears from the present distribution of Bibles among the Romanists themselves. It is true, that they allow not the use of a *Protestant* translation, especially in the *Old Testament*, of which it has a *different canon*. But, as the Church of England could not consistently encourage the distribution of the *Douay* Bible, even though distributed without note or comment, so the Church of Rome could not consistently encourage the distribution of *our* authorised version, though the text *alone* were distributed. If the Romanists in this country are permitted to read the Scriptures in an English version, such as their *own* Church approves, we cannot say, that the difference between the Protestants and the Romanists of this country consists in the *admission* of an authorised version by one party, and the *non-admission* of an authorised version by the other. With respect therefore to the *use* of the holy Scriptures, the grand difference between the two Churches relates to

the *inspired originals*. If the Church of Rome can establish a doctrine by its authorised version, the Latin Vulgate, no appeal is *allowed*, either to the Hebrew in the Old Testament, or to the Greek in the New. Let no one (says the Council of Trent) presume to reject the decision of the Latin Vulgate, *under any pretence whatever*⁴. But the Church of England allows its ministers to appeal, in expositions of Scripture, from a translation to the original. Our sixth article, which corresponds to what was decreed at the fourth session of the Council of Trent, speaks of holy Scripture *in general terms*; it imposes no restraint, and allows therefore by its very silence an appeal to the inspired originals. Indeed this very article distinctly marks the preference, which was shown by our reformers to the Hebrew Bible. Previous to the Reformation, the authorised version in this country was the Latin Vulgate: yet our reformers rejected the apocryphal writings of the Old Testament for this very reason, that they were not contained in the Hebrew. And though our present English translation is “appointed to be read in churches,” this does not imply, that the same character attaches to it, which, according to the Council of Trent, attaches to the Latin Vulgate. For those, who do not understand the originals, it was necessary to provide a translation: and indeed it would have been absurd, if any other

⁴ See the latter part of the preceding note.

than an *English* Bible had been “appointed to be read in *Churches*.” But, wherever our translation is inaccurate, (and no translation can be exempt from errors,) we may on all occasions appeal to the words of the original. The consequence of such appeals has been already illustrated in this very work⁵: and I have given another example in my eighteenth lecture⁶. Each of these examples is worthy of particular notice: for the one affects the subject of *tradition*, the other the *interpretation* of Scripture⁷.

Since then the Churches of England and Rome are *fundamentally distinct* in so many different respects, and distinct even in the things, which are the foundations of *faith*, we need not wonder that the creed of the latter materially differs from the creed of the former.

⁵ See what was said on the terms *πάραδοσις* and *traditio*, in chap. iv.

⁶ See p. 365—367. Ed. 1838.

⁷ Though I have stated the practice of appealing from an authorised version to the inspired originals, as that which chiefly distinguishes the Church of England from the Church of Rome, in respect to the *use* of Scripture, it must be observed that the observation does not apply to *all* Protestants. For there are *some* Protestant expounders, to whom an authorised version both *has*, and *must* have, the same high authority, which the Church of *Rome* ascribes to its authorised version. Nor is this the *only* resemblance: for *both* parties pretend to expound under the influence of the *Spirit*. But according to the tenets of the Church of *England*, we aspire not to *supernatural* aid; we are contented to interpret the inspired originals by the aid of reason and learning.

Without further remarks therefore on the doctrines themselves, we may conclude the present chapter with the summary statement of the articles, which *distinguish* the two Churches, as it is given in "The profession of the Catholic faith, according to the Council of Trent." This council had decreed in the twenty-fourth session, that all beneficed clergymen should, under pain of forfeiting their benefice, make a public profession of their faith⁸. Accordingly Pope Pius IV., under whose pontificate the decree was made, published a *profession of faith* according to the doctrines maintained by the Council of Trent, with the following title: *Professio fidei catholicæ secundum Concilium Tridentinum ex bullâ Pii Papæ IV.* Consequently this is the authorised *Profession of faith*, to which all beneficed clergymen belonging to the Church of Rome are bound to subscribe, not only by the bull of Pius IV., but by a decree of the *Council of Trent*. Indeed the words of that

⁸ Provisi etiam de beneficiis quibuscunque, curam animarum habentibus, teneantur a die adeptæ possessionis, ad minus intra duos menses, in manibus ipsius Episcopi, vel eo impedito coram generali ejus Vicario, seu Officiali, *orthodoxæ suæ fidei publicam facere professionem, et in Romanæ ecclesiæ obedientiâ se permansuros spondeant, ac jurent.* Provisi autem de Canonicatibus et dignitatibus in ecclesiis cathedralibus non solum coram Episcopo, seu ejus Officiali, sed etiam in Capitulo idem facere teneantur. Alioquin prædicti omnes provisores, ut supra, fructus non faciant suos, nec illis possessio suffragetur. P. cxc.

decree are quoted in the bull itself⁹. This profession of faith begins with the Apostles' creed; which is succeeded by the twelve following articles¹.

“1. I most firmly admit and receive the apostolical and ecclesiastical traditions², and all other observances and constitutions of the Church³.

⁹ Cum itaque juxta Concilii Tridentini dispositionem omnes, quos deinceps, &c. . . . *publicam orthodoxæ fidei professionem facere, seque in Romanæ Ecclesiæ obedientiâ permansuros spondere et jurare teneantur*, Nos volentes, &c.

¹ The Trent profession of faith, with the Pope's accompanying bull, may, among many other places, be seen in the *Sylloge Confessionum*, published at Oxford in 1804.

² Though Bellarmine, and the author of the treatise, *De Ecclesiâ Christi*, speak of three kinds, namely, *divine*, apostolical, and ecclesiastical traditions, we have already seen, that the term ‘apostolical’ is frequently used, as a generic term, and includes also the *divine* traditions. Of the traditions which are called *ecclesiastical*, more will be said in the next chapter.

³ The Latin original of this creed, of which a translation is given in the text, is as follows:

“Apostolicas et Ecclesiasticas traditiones, reliquasque ejusdem Ecclesiæ observationes et constitutiones firmissime admitto, et amplector.

“Item sacram Scripturam juxta eum sensum, quem tenuit et tenet sancta mater Ecclesia, cujus est judicare de vero sensu et interpretatione sacrarum Scripturarum, admitto, nec eam unquam nisi juxta unanimem consensum Patrum accipiam, et interpretabor.

“Profiteor quoque septem esse vere et proprie Sacramenta novæ legis, a Jesu Christo, Domino nostro, instituta, atque ad salutem humani generis, licet non omnia singulis necessaria,

“ 2. I admit also the sacred Scriptures according to that sense which holy mother Church, to whom it appertains to judge of the true meaning

scilicet Baptismum, Confirmationem, Eucharistiam, Pœnitentiam, Extremam unctionem, Ordinem, et Matrimonium, illaque gratium conferre, et ex his Baptismum, Confirmationem, et Ordinem, sine sacrilegio reiterari non posse.

“ Receptos quoque et approbatos Ecclesiæ Catholicæ ritus, in supradictorum omnium Sacramentorum solemnī administratione, recipio, et admitto.

“ Omnia et singula, quæ de peccato originali, et de justificatione, in Sacrosanctâ Tridentinâ Synodo definita et declarata fuerunt, amplector, et recipio.

“ Profiteor pariter in Missâ offerri Deo verum, proprium, et propitiatorium sacrificium, pro vivis, et defunctis, atque in sanctissimo Eucharistiæ sacramento esse, vere, realiter, et substantialiter, corpus et sanguinem, una cum animâ, et divinitate Domini nostri Jesu Christi, fierique conversionem totius substantiæ panis in corpus, et totius substantiæ vini in sanguinem, quam conversionem Catholica Ecclesia Transubstantiationem appellat.

“ Fateor etiam sub alterâ tantum specie, totum atque integrum Christum, verumque Sacramentum sumi.

“ Constanter teneo purgatorium esse, animasque ibi detentas fidelium suffragiis juvari.

“ Similiter et Sanctos, una cum Christo regnantes, venerandos atque invocandos esse, eosque orationes Deo pro nobis offerre atque eorum reliquias esse venerandas.

“ Firmissime assero imagines Christi, ac Dei-paræ semper virginis, nec non aliorum Sanctorum, habendas et retinendas esse, atque eis debitum honorem ac venerationem impertinendam.

“ Indulgentiarum etiam potestatem a Christo in Ecclesiâ relictam fuisse, illarumque usum Christiano populo maxime salutarem esse, affirmo.

“ Sanctam Catholicam, et Apostolicam Romanam Ecclesiam, omnium Ecclesiarum matrem et magistram agnosco, Ro-

and interpretation of the sacred Scriptures, hath holden and still holds: nor will I ever receive and interpret them, otherwise than according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers.

“3. I profess, likewise, that there are truly and properly seven sacraments of the new law, instituted by our Lord Jesus Christ, and necessary for the salvation of mankind, though not all of them to every one; namely, Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Orders, and Matrimony; and that they confer grace; and that, of these sacraments, Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders cannot be repeated without sacrilege. I receive also and admit the received and approved rites of the

manoque Pontifici, B. Petri Apostolorum principis successori, ac Jesu Christi Vicario, veram obedientiam spondeo ac juro.

“Cætera item omnia a sacris canonibus, et œcumenicis conciliis, ac præcipue a sacrosanctâ Tridentinâ Synodo tradita, definita, et declarata, indubitanter recipio, atque profiteor, simulque contraria omnia, atque hæreses quascumque ab Ecclesiâ damnatas, rejectas, et anathematizatas, ego pariter damno, rejicio, et anathematizo.

“Hanc veram Catholicam Fidem, extra quam nemo salvus esse potest, quam in præsentī sponte profiteor, et veraciter teneo, eandem integram et inviolatam, usque ad extremum vitæ spiritum, constantissime (Deo adjuvante) retinere, et confiteri, atque a meis subditis, vel illis, quorum cura ad me in munere meo spectabit, teneri, doceri, et prædicari, quantum in me erit, curaturum.

“Ego idem N. spondeo, voveo, ac juro: sic me Deus adjuvet, et hæc sancta Dei Evangelia.”

Catholic Church, in the solemn administration of all the aforesaid sacraments.

“ 4. I embrace and receive all things, and every thing, which have been defined and declared by the holy Council of Trent, concerning original sin and justification.

“ 5. Further, I profess that in the Mass is offered unto God a true, proper, and propitiatory sacrifice, for the living and the dead ; and that in the most holy sacrament of the Eucharist there is really, truly, and substantially the body and blood, together with the soul and divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ ; and that a conversion is made of the whole substance of the bread into his body, and of the whole substance of the wine into his blood ; which conversion the Catholic Church calls Transubstantiation.

“ 6. I confess also, that under one kind only is received the whole and entire Christ, and the true sacrament.

“ 7. I strenuously maintain, that there is a Purgatory, and that the souls detained there are assisted by the prayers of the faithful.

“ 8. Likewise, that the Saints, who reign together with Christ, are to be venerated and invoked ; and that they offer prayers for us to God ; and that their relics are to be venerated.

“ 9. I most firmly declare, that the images of

Christ, and of the ever-Virgin, mother of God, as also of the other Saints, are to be had and retained; and that due honour and veneration are to be shown to them.

“10. I affirm also, that the power of indulgences was left by Christ in his Church; and that the use of them is very salutary to Christian people.

“11. I acknowledge the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of Rome to be the mother and mistress of all Churches: and I promise and swear true obedience to the Roman Pontiff, successor of the prince of the Apostles St. Peter, and the Vicegerent of Jesus Christ.

“12. Further I do, without doubt, receive and profess all things which have been delivered, defined, and declared by the sacred canons, and œcumenical councils, especially by the holy Council of Trent; and all things contrary thereunto, and all heresies of whatsoever kind, which have been condemned, rejected, and anathematized by the Church, I in like manner condemn, reject, and anathematize.

“This true Catholic faith, out of which no one can be saved, which by these presents I profess and verily hold, I *N. N.* do promise, vow, and swear, most firmly to keep, and confess (by God's help) entire and inviolate, to the last breath of my life; and that I will take

care, as far as in me lies, that the same be holden, kept, and preached by all, who are subject to my controul, or who are connected with my charge.

“So help me God, and these the holy Gospels of God.”

CHAPTER VII.

OF CHURCH-CEREMONIES, AND THE TRADITION WHICH IS CALLED *ECCLESIASTICAL*.—EXPLANATION OF OUR THIRTY-FOURTH ARTICLE.—DEFENCE OF THE *PRINCIPLES* ON WHICH THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND HAS ACTED IN REGARD TO *CEREMONIES*.—CONSEQUENCES OF CONFOUNDING THE TRADITION OF *CEREMONIES* WITH THE TRADITION OF *DOCTRINES*.—ADDITIONAL REMARKS ON THE MISAPPREHENSION OF TERMS IN REGARD TO TRADITION IN *GENERAL*.

Our inquiries into the subject of tradition have been hitherto confined to tradition as a rule of *faith*. This tradition, as we have already seen, is sometimes called the *unwritten Word of God*¹; at other times it is called the *unwritten doctrine*². At other times again it is called the *traditionary doctrine*³. We have further seen, that the unwritten word, or tradition as a rule of faith, is compounded of the *divine* and the *apostolical* traditions⁴. We have seen also, that, beside

¹ *Verbum Dei non scriptum*. Bellarmine's fourth book on "The Word of God," which relates wholly to tradition, is entitled *De Verbo Dei non scripto*.

² *Doctrina non scripta*. It is so called by Bellarmine. See above, chap. i. notes ², ³.

³ *Doctrina tradita*. It is so called in the theological Lectures given at Maynooth. See the treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi*, p. 397, 398.

⁴ See chap. i. note ², p. 13.

the divine and apostolical traditions, which constitute Tradition as a rule of *faith*, there is a *third* kind, stated both by Bellarmine, and by the author of the treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi*, which is called *ecclesiastical* tradition, or the tradition of the *Church* ⁵. The two *former* kinds having been fully considered in the four first chapters, our attention must now be directed to the *third* kind.

As our *sixth* article, with the *twentieth* and *twenty-first*, relate to the *two former* kinds, so our *thirty-fourth* article has reference to the *third* kind. An inquiry, therefore, into the principles on which the Church of England has acted, in regard to *ceremonies*, must commence with an examination of that article.

ARTICLE XXXIV.

OF THE TRADITIONS OF THE CHURCH.

It is not necessary that traditions and ceremonies be in all places one, and utterly like; for at all times they have been diverse, and may be changed according to the diversities of countries, times, and men's manners, so that nothing be ordained against God's Word. Whosoever through his private judgment, willingly and purposely, doth openly break the traditions and ceremonies of the Church, which be not repugnant to the Word of God, and

⁵ Ibid p. 7, 8, with note ⁸.

be ordained and approved by common authority, ought to be rebuked openly, (that others may fear to do the like,) as he that offendeth against the common order of the Church, and hurteth the authority of the magistrate, and woundeth the consciences of weak brethren.

Every particular, or national Church hath authority to ordain, change, and abolish, ceremonies or rites of the Church, ordained only by man's authority, so that all things be done to edifying.

From this article it appears, that our Church considers the tradition of *ceremonies* in a very different light from that in which it views the tradition of *doctrines*. It was shown in the first section of the fourth chapter, that *all doctrines whatever*, which have no other foundation than that of *tradition*, are rejected by our Church; and it is this very rejection which constitutes the vital principle of the Reformation. It is the vital principle of the Reformation to admit no *doctrine*, or article of *faith*, unless it can be proved by *Holy Scripture*. But the case is widely different with respect to mere *ceremonies*, in which the Church of England only requires "that nothing be ordained *against* God's Word⁶." On the

⁶ This remark applies only so far as they have reference to *Scripture*. For if a ceremony has nothing *else* to recommend it than the bare negative quality, that it is *not forbidden* in *Scripture*, such ceremony is a useless burden. It should

other hand, though the Church of England requires not for mere *ceremonies* the positive authority of *Scripture*, it would be a very false inference, that our Church therefore yielded, in this respect, to the authority of *tradition*. Even in regard to *ceremonies* our Church rejects the *authority* of tradition; and in this very rejection it *again* opposes the Church of Rome. For it is a principle with that Church, that even *ceremonies* which have been handed down by tradition have thereby acquired *the force of a law*⁷. But says our thirty-fourth article, “it is *not* necessary that traditions and ceremonies be in all places one, and utterly like: for at all times they have been diverse, and may be *changed* according to the diversities of countries, times, and men’s manners, so that nothing be ordained *against God’s Word*.” And in the last sentence the article asserts, that “every particular or national Church hath authority to *ordain, change, and abolish*, ceremonies or rites of the Church, ordained only by man’s authority, so that *all things be done to edifying*.”

There are two principles, therefore, on which the Church of England has acted in regard to have further the *positive* quality, that it tends to *edifying*: and this very quality is required at the *end* of the thirty-fourth article.

⁷ Hence Bellarmine (De Verbo Dei, lib. iv. cap. 2.) says, “*Ecclesiasticæ traditiones proprie dicuntur consuetudines quædam antiquæ, vel a prælatis vel a populis inchoatæ, quæ paulatim, tacito consensu populorum, vim legis obtinuerunt.*”

rites and ceremonies. The one has reference to *Scripture*, and requires that nothing be done which is *repugnant* to it. The other principle is of a *positive* kind, and requires that all ceremonies received by the Church should be such as tend to *edification*. The authority of *tradition*, therefore, is left entirely out of the question. For if a ceremony does *not* tend to edification, it is *rejected*, even though *supported by tradition*: and if a ceremony *does* tend to edification, that ceremony may be *admitted*, even though *not* supported by tradition. It is true, that, according to this very article, those persons ought to be *rebuked* who “openly *break* the traditions and ceremonies of the Church.” But it is not *because* such ceremonies are traditions, that men are to be rebuked for breaking them. The article itself assigns a *totally different* reason. Such a person (says that article) is to be rebuked “as he that offendeth against the *common order of the Church*, and hurteth the *authority of the magistrate, &c.*” The ceremonies which are supposed to be broken, are such as, in the words of this very article, have been “ordained and approved by *common authority*.” It is, therefore, the authority of the *Church*, and not the authority of *tradition*, which gives sanction to those ceremonies of which the Church forbids the *violation*. And not only in *this* article, but also in the *twentieth* article, the Church of England *claims* the “power to decree rites or cere-

monies." Indeed, all societies whatever, whether they be civil, or whether they be religious, must possess the power of making regulations for the conduct of their members; or it would be impossible to preserve any *order* in the public assemblies. But whether those regulations be ancient or modern, they receive their *sanction* from the circumstance, that (in the words of the thirty-fourth article) they are "ordained and approved by *common authority*."

There can be no doubt, then, about the *principles* on which the Church of England has acted in regard to *ceremonies*. As *doctrines* are not admitted on the sole authority of tradition, so *ceremonies* are not admitted on the sole authority of tradition. But the *things themselves*, which are handed down by tradition, stand on a different footing. In other words, the *doctrina tradita* stands on a different footing from the *cæremonia tradita*. A *doctrina tradita*, if supported by tradition *alone*, is rejected by our Church without further inquiry⁸. But a *cæremonia tradita* may, according to the principles of our Church, be either admitted or rejected, as circumstances require. The Christian religion is a revelation of *doctrines*, not, like the Jewish, a revelation of *ceremonies*. Though we necessarily look, therefore, to Scripture for authority in doctrines, we cannot *expect* the authority of

⁸ The reasons for such rejection have been fully explained in the fourth chapter.

Scripture for every single ceremony which is used in the celebration of divine worship. As far, then, as *Scripture* is concerned with Church ceremonies, we have only to take care, that nothing be ordained which is *inconsistent* with it. If, then, a ceremony handed down by tradition is but *consistent* with Scripture, and at the same time tends to *edification*, such ceremony is admissible according to the principles of our Church. But if such a ceremony were adopted, it would not be *because* it was received from tradition, but because it possessed the requisite qualities, consistency with Scripture, and a tendency to edification. For as, on the one hand, it could not be received *without* those qualities, however ancient the tradition in its favour might be, so, on the other hand, it would be admissible, *with* those qualities, even if *no* tradition could be alleged in its favour. The authority of tradition, therefore, decides alone *neither* way.

But if the Church of England refuses to recognize *tradition* as sufficient authority for the admission of rites and ceremonies, it does not go into the opposite extreme of requiring for them the authority of *Scripture*. Christianity was not, like Judaism, intended for a *single* nation : but was meant for *all mankind*. Though Moses, therefore, prescribed, with the most minute exactness, the ceremonies of the *Jewish* Church, we find no such restrictions imposed upon Chris-

tians, either by our Saviour, or by his Apostles. Even St. Paul, who had more occasion than any other Apostle to give directions about the management of particular Churches, has manifestly left the *detail* of the arrangements to be determined by the Churches themselves, according to their respective situations and circumstances. When, in reference to public worship, he directed the Corinthians, that "all things be done unto edifying," and again, that "all things be done decently and in order"⁹, these *general* directions of course implied, that the *particular* regulations in regard to public worship were left to themselves, only keeping in view, that such regulations must tend to order and edification. But the very things which in *one* community may contribute to order and edification, may in *another* community produce effects of a very different description. Nor is it always *practicable* to use in one country the ceremonies which are used in another. Even in the *some* country, and among the same *people*, an alteration of manners, habits, and circumstances may require a correspondent alteration in the mode of public worship. Thus the Jews themselves had religious institutions *after* the Babylonish captivity, which existed not *before* the captivity. Their *synagogue* worship, which was attended by Christ himself, comprehended various ceremonies which had not been

⁹ 1 Cor. xiv. 26. 40.

prescribed by the Levitical law. But if the *Jews* adopted ceremonies not appointed by Scripture, and Christ himself conformed to them, we may surely be allowed as *Christians* to adopt ceremonies not prescribed in Scripture, provided they are *consistent* with Scripture, and at the same time tend to *edification*.

Nor indeed is it *possible* to find authority in Scripture for every single regulation which a religious society may find expedient to introduce. And those very persons who *object* to the admission of ceremonies not prescribed in Scripture, show by *their own* practice that they object to what cannot be avoided. However simple their forms of worship may be, there are *some* forms which are indispensable, and yet are nowhere prescribed in Scripture. Men cannot assemble to worship God, unless the *time* of assembling, as well as the *place* of assembly, is previously fixed. And when they *are* assembled, there must be some authority to determine both the *offices themselves*, and the *order* in which the offices shall be performed. Even if the offices are confined to the most *simple* acts of worship, yet, as the three forms of praying, preaching, and singing are adopted by Protestant dissenters as well as by Protestant churchmen, the former, as well as the latter, must determine by some common authority, whether praying shall precede preaching, or preaching shall precede praying; whether the singing shall go before, or follow

after both ; whether they shall sing from a hymn book, or from the Psalms of David ; if from the former, *what* hymn book shall be used ; if from the latter, *what version* shall be used ; with many other questions, which must be previously determined by some authority, or the place of worship will become a place of confusion. But surely no one will pretend that questions of this kind can be determined by a reference to *Scripture*.

Nothing further, then, can be wanted, to vindicate the *principles* maintained in our thirty-fourth article ; namely, that every particular or national Church hath authority to ordain rites and ceremonies, provided they are not *contrary* to Scripture, and provided they tend to *edification*. Nor is the *practice* of our Church, in regard to ceremonies, by any means inconsistent with its *principles*. It preserves a due medium between the Church of Rome on the one hand, and Protestant Dissenters on the other. If the service of the Church be loaded with very *numerous* and very *splendid* ceremonies, the object of *edification*, which we should always have in view, will be lost in the very means of attaining it. For the *means* will be mistaken for the *ends* ; and men will stop where they ought only to begin. On the other hand, if *too little* is prescribed for the service of the Church, devotion will either want sufficient incitement ; or, if it is incited only by the exertions of the *preacher*, it

may be so incited as to convert *pure devotion* into *fanatical rapture*. But the service of the Church of England, conducted by that admirable formulary, the Book of Common Prayer¹, is no less calculated to repress the extravagancies of fanaticism, than to remove the errors of superstition. It is said indeed by those whose ceremonies are fewer than our own, that our Liturgy has not *sufficiently* removed the superstitions of the Church of Rome; but when the ceremonies to which objections have been made are properly explained, they appear as free from superstition as the ceremonies of those who object to them².

¹ I here take for granted, that the service of the Church is performed with *due solemnity*. For if it be hurried over, as a task that *must* be performed, before singing and preaching begin, and the singing and preaching be considered as the *principal* part of divine worship, the design of the Liturgy will be defeated, and the service of the *Church* will be assimilated with the service of the *Conventicle*.

² The ceremonies of our Church, to which the principal objections have been made, are those of kneeling at the altar, the making the sign of the cross at baptism, and the use of the ring in the marriage service. Now if kneeling at the altar implied the worshipping of the *consecrated elements*, the practice would be undoubtedly superstitious: for it would then resemble the worship which the Church of Rome requires for the Host. But since this worship is founded on the belief, that as soon as the wafer is consecrated, Christ himself is *corporeally*, as well as spiritually before them, and this corporeal presence is wholly *rejected* by our Church, the kneeling in the *one* case has no similarity to the kneeling in the other. That the simple elements of bread and wine, *detached* from the

II. These *general* remarks on the ceremonies adopted by the Church of England, must suffice

corporeal presence, are objects of adoration, was never pretended even by the Church of Rome. Consequently, there can be no ground for the imputation, that our kneeling at the altar implies a *worshipping* of the bread and wine. It is an act of *reverence*, due to the Founder of that holy Sacrament, at whose very name St. Paul declares (Phil. ii. 10) that every knee should bow. Surely, then, it is not superstitious to kneel during that most solemn act of devotion, when we partake of the bread and wine in remembrance that Christ *died for us*. Nor is it superstition to prefer at the altar our prayers and thanksgivings to Christ himself, who from his *divine* nature must be *spiritually*, though not corporeally, omnipresent. If it is not superstitious, therefore, to pray to Him on our knees in *one* place, it cannot be superstitious to pray to Him on our knees in *another*. Unless, then, it is superstitious to pray *at all* on our knees, it is not superstitious to pray on our knees at the altar. But no one can maintain the *former* position, without the impiety of imputing superstition to *Christ himself*. For Christ himself, in the very night on which He had instituted that holy sacrament, "*kneeled down and prayed.*" (Luke xxii. 41.) Indeed, the act of kneeling is so congenial with those feelings of humility, which cannot fail to be excited in us, when we address ourselves to God, that it was common both to the *Prophets* of the Old Testament, and to the *Apostles* of the New. (2 Chron. vi. 13. Ezra ix. 5. Daniel vi. 10. Acts ix. 40 ; xx. 36.) Nor are we superstitious at the sacrament of *Baptism*, when we use the sign of the *Cross*. In the figurative language of Scripture, we are told by Christ himself, that we must take up our *Cross* and follow *Him*. (Matt. xvi. 24.) In the same figurative language, we are told also by St. Paul, that the preaching of *Christianity* is the preaching of the *Cross*; that the enemies of *Christianity* are the enemies of the *Cross*; that persecution for *Christianity* is persecution for the *Cross*; and that our glory in *Christianity* is our glory in the *Cross*. (1 Cor. i. 18. Phil. iii. 18. Gal. vi. 12. 14.) Since, then, both Christ himself and his Apostle St. Paul, have

for the present occasion, as we cannot enter into a *particular* comparison of its ceremonies with the ceremonies of the Church of *Rome*. A comparison of our articles with the decrees and canons of the Council of Trent enabled us to enter, with the greatest minuteness, into the subject of *doctrines*. But our twenty-fourth article, which relates to “speaking in the congregation in such a tongue as the people understandeth,” is the only article relating to mere *ceremonies*, which is directed against any *particular* practice of the

represented the Cross as the very *badge* of Christianity, it is surely an appropriate ceremony, when persons are admitted into *fellowship* with Christ, as they are at *baptism*, to express by the *sign* of the Cross, that the badge of Christianity is conferred on the persons so admitted. If *this* is superstitious, it is superstitious, when we are admitted to an order of mere *human* institution, to receive the *badge* of that order. Nay, it is superstitious, in an act of reconciliation, to give the *right hand of fellowship*.—Lastly, with respect to the use of the ring in marriage, it is simply a *token of honour*, of which we find various examples in *Scripture itself*. When Pharaoh proposed to confer a mark of honour on Joseph, he “took off his *ring* from his hand, and put it upon *Joseph’s* hand.” (Gen. xli. 42.) In like manner, Ahasuerus “took his *ring* from his hand and gave it to Haman;” and when Mordecai had found favour in his sight, “the king took off his ring, which he had taken from Haman, and gave it to Mordecai.” (Esther iii. 10; viii. 2.) Again, in the parable of the prodigal son, the father ordered on his return, as a token of regard and favour, a *ring* to be put upon his hand. (Luke xv. 22.) We have, therefore, the authority of *Scripture* for using a ring as a *token of honour*. And that nothing more was meant in the marriage service, is evident from the form of words with which the giving of the ring is accompanied.

Church of Rome. The thirty-fourth article, as we have seen, is quite *general*, and explains only the *principles*, on which the Church of England has acted in regard to ceremonies. Equally general is that part of the preface to our Liturgy, which is entitled, "Of Ceremonies, why some should be abolished, others retained." Indeed, if we entered into a particular detail of the *ceremonies* employed by the Church of Rome, it would require a volume of itself, and swell the examination of that single subject to a size altogether disproportioned to its relative importance.

The remaining part of this chapter, therefore, shall be directed to an inquiry of much greater moment, namely, an inquiry into the consequences of confounding the tradition of *doctrines* with the tradition of *ceremonies*, as also with *other* traditions, from which it is not always distinguished. For it is entirely owing to such confusion, that the Church of England is often represented as *similar* to the Church of Rome, when, in fact, it is totally different. If men confound the tradition of *ceremonies* with the tradition of *doctrines*, they may argue from our thirty-fourth article, that our sixth article must be *false*. For, as our sixth article rejects all *doctrines*, which are not founded on the authority of *Scripture*, and our thirty-fourth article does *not* reject all *ceremonies*, which have no other foundation than *tradition*, the advocates of the

Church of Rome need only overlook the difference between these two *kinds* of tradition, and it immediately follows, that, as tradition is tradition, so the admission of it in *one* sense is the admission of it in *another*. But if tradition is *not* rejected by our Church, they reasonably infer, that the rejection of tradition cannot constitute the *vital principle of Protestantism*. Now it is a direct *contradiction* of our sixth article to say, that the Church of England does not reject tradition as a rule of *faith*; and it is obvious, that no *other* tradition can be meant, when we speak of the rejection of it, as the vital principle of Protestantism³. Nor is a *confusion* of terms sufficient for the purpose, without the aid of a correspondent *omission*; namely, of the word “authority.” For the Church of England rejects the *authority* of tradition, as well in regard to *ceremonies*, as in regard to *doctrines*⁴. Whether

³ See chap. iv. note 6.

⁴ This position has been fully proved in the preceding section of this chapter.—I take this opportunity of noticing a very extraordinary misapplication of what I said about tradition in my letter to Mr. Gandolphy. Speaking of the difference between the Romanists and the Protestants, in regard to the *foundations* of their faith, I observed, at p. 11, “The one party appealed to the *Bible* and *tradition*: the other party rejected the *authority of tradition*, and appealed to the *Bible alone*.” And again, at p. 16, I said, “You will not be able to bring satisfactory evidence, that we have inherited from the *Apostles* any other *doctrines* than those which are recorded in their genuine writings, as contained in the *New Testament*. Hence it was, that our reformers *rejected* the authority of tra-

ceremonies be ancient or modern, the Church of England receives, or rejects them, entirely at its own *discretion*. We should be careful then to avoid the confusion, which must necessarily arise, if we mistake the source from which ceremonies are derived, for *the principle on which they are received*.

The term “*Traditio Ecclesiæ*,” is further applied by the Church of Rome to the ceremony, or ceremonies, of *ordination*; and the term is so used in the decree relating to the *sacramentum ordinis*, made at the twenty-third session of the

dition; and this very rejection is that which constitutes the vital principle of the Reformation.” When I said, therefore, that our reformers “*rejected the authority of tradition and appealed to the Bible alone*,” it was manifest that no other tradition either was, or even *could be* meant, than the tradition which to the Church of Rome is a rule of *faith*. For there is no other tradition, of which the authority is *capable* of being compared with the authority of Scripture; whereas the authority of this tradition is *always* compared with the authority of Scripture. For the latter is called the *written* word, the former the *unwritten* word; and both of them, in the Church of Rome, have *equal* authority. No reader, therefore, who *reflected* on what he read, could possibly imagine that I was speaking of a tradition of *ceremonies*, and attempt to confute the assertion by an appeal to the *thirty-fourth* article. But though the tradition of *doctrines*, and not the tradition of *ceremonies*, was at that time the subject of inquiry, the assertion which I there made is still *applicable* to the tradition also of ceremonies, unless the word “*authority*,” which I used in *both* of those passages, be *suppressed* when the assertion is repeated. As I notice this twofold misapplication, merely to prevent a recurrence of such errors, it is sufficient to state them without mentioning names.

Council of Trent. But then, it is to be observed, that this very decree, in addition to the orders of priest and deacon, enumerates the five orders of Sub-deacon, Acolyte, Exorcist, Lector, and Ostiary ; for the lowest of which the clerical tonsure is required. It must be further observed, that the appeal to *tradition* is confined to the five last-mentioned orders ; and that the authority of *Scripture* is quoted for the orders of *priest* and *deacon*⁵. Since then the five lower orders are *rejected* by the Church of England, and only the two higher orders are *retained*, the advocates of the Church of Rome, when they contend that *our* orders depend upon tradition as well as *theirs*, make use of an argument which directly *contradicts* what the Council of Trent has *admitted*.

Again, it has been asserted, that the institution of the Christian Sabbath, or the keeping the *first* day of the week holy, instead of the

⁵ In the second chapter of this decree is the following passage : “ Non solum de Sacerdotibus, sed et de Diaconis *sacræ literæ* apertam mentionem faciunt ; ut quæ maxime in illorum ordinatione attendenda sunt, gravissimis verbis docent. Et in ipso *Ecclesiæ initio* sequentium ordinum nomina. Subdiaconi scilicet, Acolyti, Exorcistæ, Lectores, et Ostiarii in usu fuisse cognoscuntur.” P. cliv. And the seventeenth chapter of this decree accordingly provides, “ ut sanctorum ordinum a diaconatu ad *ostiariatum* functiones ab Apostolorum temporibus in Ecclesiâ laudabiliter receptæ, et plurimis in locis aliquamdiu intermissæ, in usum juxta sacros canones revocentur.” P. clxv.

seventh, is founded on *tradition*. And the author of the treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi* has quoted it as one of the *apostolical* traditions. The institution, therefore, of the Christian Sabbath is represented as having its foundation in tradition as a rule of *faith*, that is the *unwritten word of God*. Now one should really suppose, from this representation, that the institution had no foundation in the *written* word. But it is evident, from Acts xx. 7. and 1 Cor. xvi. 1, 2. that the practice of the primitive Christians to assemble, for the purpose of worship, on the *first day* of the week, in commemoration of Christ's resurrection, had the *sanction of St. Paul himself*. And since this is recorded in the *written* word, what necessity is there for an appeal to the *unwritten word*?

Another example is given by *Bellarmino*, which has been repeated by every advocate of the Church of Rome to the present time. This example is *infant baptism*, which *Bellarmino* represents as an *apostolical tradition*⁶. Indeed, the Council of Trent has itself appealed to apostolical tradition for the baptism of infants⁷. Now, from this example it is argued, either that the Church of England, notwithstanding its profes-

⁶ Parvulos baptizandos, vocatur *traditio apostolica* non scripta. *De Verbo Dei*, lib. iv. cap. 2.

⁷ *Ex traditione Apostolorum* etiam parvuli, qui nihil peccatorum in semet-ipsis adhuc committere potuerunt, ideo in remissionem peccatorum veraciter baptizantur, ut in eis regeneratione mundetur, quod generatione contraxerunt. P. xxiv.

sions in the sixth article, does *not* reject tradition as a rule of faith; or that it acts with *inconsistency*, in retaining the sacrament of baptism under the same form as the Church of Rome. But both these charges are at once refuted by our twenty-seventh article. For this article is so far from resting the practice of infant baptism on the authority of *tradition*, that it places that practice on a totally different footing. "The baptism of young children (says this article) is in any wise to be retained in the Church, as *most agreeable with the institution of Christ* ⁸." Where then is the *inconsistency* of our Church in respect to infant baptism? Or how does this example prove that the Church of England *acknowledges* the authority of tradition?

But there is *another* point of view from which this example may be examined. When Bellarmine represents infant baptism as an *apostolical* tradition, he represents it, according to his own principles, as a *doctrine*. For the apostolical traditions are ingredients in what he himself calls *doctrina non scripta* ⁹. Indeed, there is *one* respect in which a sacrament *must* be included

⁸ In what *respects* the practice of infant baptism is "most agreeable with the institution of Christ," it would be foreign to our *present* purpose to inquire: nor can it be necessary, as the agreement has been already shown by those who have professedly written on this subject.

⁹ See note ², to this chapter. The term *doctrina tradita* has a similar meaning.

under doctrines; namely, when we consider it in reference to its inward and *spiritual grace*. Hence the Council of Trent, when it appealed to the tradition of the Apostles (*traditio apostolorum*) in favour of infant baptism, spake in express terms of the *efficacy* of that sacrament, which is necessarily a matter of *doctrine*¹. But as a sacrament has likewise an outward and *visible sign*, the administration of it may in *this* respect be considered as a *ceremony* of the Church. Since then the Church of England uses its own *discretion* in regard to *ceremonies*, though it invariably rejects *doctrines*, which are founded only on tradition, we may very consistently take into consideration that the ceremony of baptizing infants has prevailed from the earliest ages of Christianity. And having adopted the practice on the *ground* of its being “most agreeable with the institution of Christ,” we may, in perfect conformity with the principles of our Church, consider the antiquity of the practice as an *additional* reason for our adopting it. For the tradition of *ceremonies* is a very different thing from the tradition of *doctrines*. The tradition of the latter is *oral* tradition, and going from mouth to mouth must be perpetually subject to alteration. But the tradition of the former is *ocular* tradition, and may be preserved unaltered through a succession of ages, though never committed to writing. It is, however, of no import-

¹ See the preceding Note ⁷, p. 150.

ance on the present occasion, whether the distinction between the *doctrinal* and the *ceremonial* part of the sacrament be considered, or not. For the Church of England, in its own *official* declaration on the adoption of infant baptism, has left the argument of tradition entirely out of the question. It has assigned a *totally different* reason, and therefore cannot be charged with an *acknowledgment* of the authority ascribed to tradition by the Church of Rome².

If we further inquired into all the *other* examples, in which the term tradition either has been, or might be, employed, for the purpose of proving a similarity between the Churches of England and Rome, the inquiry would hardly ever terminate. For the term "Tradition" may be applied to *any thing whatever* which is communicated from one person to another. Unless therefore we distinguish the tradition of *doctrines*, or tradition as a rule of *faith*, from all other kinds of tradition, there will be no *end* of the confusion, which must arise from arguments about *tradition*. And since it has been fully proved in the first, the third, and the fourth, chapters of this work, that the tradition, of which the rejection constitutes the characteristic difference between the Churches of England and Rome, is *that* tradition, which to the Church of

² The Confession of Augsburg appeals *likewise* to the authority of Scripture, and not to the authority of tradition, for infant-baptism. See the ninth article of that Confession.

Rome is a rule of *faith*, we may be certain, without previous examination, that, whenever an instance can be alleged, in which the two Churches *agree* about tradition, that the term is used in *some other sense*. It will be sufficient therefore to notice two or three examples, on which the advocates of the Church of Rome lay the greatest stress.

It is said, that if our Church rejects the authority of tradition, it rejects what is necessary to prove the *authenticity of the New Testament*. And on this occasion there is frequently quoted the well-known saying of Augustine, "Ego Evangelio non crederem, nisi me commoveret Ecclesiæ auctoritas." Now, according to our twentieth article, the Church is "a witness and keeper of holy writ." Suppose then, that this declaration be applied to St. Paul's Epistles, for instance. When we are about to establish their *authenticity*, we trace the quotations from them in ecclesiastical writers, from the present age upwards till we come to writers so near to the time when St. Paul lived, that the Epistles, ascribed to him, could not have been *falsely* ascribed, without their *knowing* it. In this sense the Church is a keeper and a witness of holy writ: and to the evidence for authenticity, which we thus obtain, the title of "tradition" is sometimes applied, because the evidence has been *handed down* to us from the earliest ages. But this is a tradition of *testi-*

mony, and has no connexion whatever with a tradition of *doctrine*. And it is so far from distinguishing the Church of Rome, or indeed *any Church whatever*, that it is applied to establish the authenticity of ancient writings *in general*³. It is moreover a kind of tradition, which is applied to the *written word*, whereas tradition, as a rule of faith, applies exclusively to the *unwritten word*.

Another argument for the similarity of the two Churches has been drawn from a confusion of the *Interpretatio tradita* with the *Doctrina tradita*. The interpreters of the *Bible*, like all *other* interpreters, copy occasionally from the works of their predecessors. The commentators of the *eighteenth* century have drawn from commentators of the *seventeenth* century; those of the *seventeenth* from those of the *sixteenth*; those again of the *sixteenth* from those of the *fifteenth*; and so on to the *most ancient* commentators. The consequence is, that if we

³ If we undertake to prove the authenticity of the Epistles ascribed to Cicero, or to Pliny, we must use a similar process to that which is employed in establishing the authenticity of the Epistles ascribed to St. Paul. The latter indeed are *inspired*, whereas the former are *not*. But this makes no difference, when we are concerned only with the question, whether a work is written by the author to whom it is ascribed. For the *inspiration* of the sacred writings is a fact, to which no Church, whether ancient, or modern, can bear *witness*. It is a fact of which no *human* observation can take cognizance. It lies beyond the *reach* of human evidence; it can be proved only by *divine* testimony, and consequently by *Scripture alone*.

compare a collection of *ancient* commentaries, such as may be seen in a *Catena Patrum*, with a collection of *modern* commentaries, such as may be seen in *Pole's Synopsis*, we shall find that the expositions of many passages are common to *both* collections. These expositions therefore, having been *handed down* from commentator to commentator, are considered as a sort of *tradition*. But in order to distinguish the tradition of *interpretations* from the tradition of *doctrines*, writers on systematic theology have given the name of *traditio hermeneutica* to the former, and the name of *traditio dogmatica* to the latter⁴. The same distinction is made by Bishop Burnet in his Exposition of the Sixth Article. He there says, "We on the contrary assert, that the Scriptures are a *complete rule of faith*, and that the whole Christian religion is contained in them, and *no where else*. And, although we make great use of *tradition*, especially that, which is most ancient and nearest to the source, for a clear *understanding* of the Scriptures, yet as to matters of *faith*, we *reject* all oral tradition, as an incompetent mean of conveying down *doctrines* to us, and we refuse to receive any *doctrine*, that is not either expressly contained in Scripture, or clearly proved from it⁵." But if, *suppressing* the distinction which is here made between the *traditio herme-*

⁴ See *Doederlein, Institutio Theologi Christiani*, tom. i. p. 181—187.

⁵ Page 72. ed. 1699. fol.

neutica and the *traditio dogmatica*, men argue, as if the admission of the *one* implied the admission of the *other*, they may argue to an agreement between the Churches of England and Rome. But even *then* their argument is inconclusive. For when the Church of *Rome* employs tradition for the interpretation of Scripture, it employs it as something which has the *same authority* with Scripture, and consequently as an authority from which it has not the power to depart. But when the Church of *England* receives interpretations, which have been handed down from the early ages of Christianity, it receives them at *its own discretion*, and not as a matter of *obligation*. It considers them as conveying merely *the opinions of the commentators themselves*, in regard to the sense of the passages explained; and not as transmitting any thing *divine* or *apostolical*. The interpretations, which have received the sanction of *antiquity*, are so far indeed entitled to our *respect*. But we *deny*, that the interpretations even of the most *ancient* fathers afford a criterion, by which the interpretations of our Church are to be *tried*. Indeed no one, who was acquainted with the fanciful interpretations of Justin Martyr, the forced interpretations of Irenæus, or the allegorical interpretations of Origen, would conclude, that interpretations were necessarily to be recommended, because they originated in the second and third centuries.

There is only one more instance, of which it can be necessary to take any notice ; and that is the strange comparison of the *English Liturgy* with *Romish tradition*. If our liturgy be compared with *any* thing belonging to the Church of Rome, it must be compared with the *Roman missal*, from which it was partly derived. But with *tradition*, in whatever sense the term be taken, it has no similarity whatever. It is true, that our liturgy and articles form a kind of *regula fidei*, when this term is used to denote a *summary of doctrines*, or *formulary of faith* ; in which sense the term is used by the most *ancient* writers of the Latin Church ⁶. But when this

⁶ *Regula fidei* is then synonymous with *summa fidei*, hence *Tertullian* applies it to a summary, or formulary of faith, which contains nearly the same articles, as are contained in the formulary, called the Apostles' Creed. In his treatise *De præscriptione Hæreticorum*, cap. 13, *Tertullian* describes it in the following words : “ *Regula est autem fidei*, ut jam hinc quid defendamus profiteamur, illa scilicet quâ creditur ; unum omnino Deum esse, nec alium præter mundi conditorem, qui universa de nihilo produxerit, per Verbum suum primo omnium demissum ; id Verbum filium ejus appellatum, in nomine Dei varie visum a patriarchis, in prophetis semper auditum, postremo delatum, ex Spiritu Patris Dei et virtute, in Virginem Mariam, carnem factum in utero ejus, et ex eâ natum egisse Jesum Christum : exinde prædicasse novam legem, et novam promissionem regni cœlorum ; virtutes fecisse ; fixum cruci ; tertiâ die resurrexisse ; in cœlos ereptum sedisse ad dexteram Patris ; misisse vicariam vim Spiritus Sancti, qui credentes agat ; venturum cum claritate, ad sumendos sanctos in vitæ æternæ et promissorum cœlestium fructum, et ad profanos adjudicandos igni perpetuo, factâ utriusque partis resurrectione, cum carnis restitutione.”

term is applied by the modern Romanists to *tradition*, it is applied in a *totally different* sense⁷. For it *then* denotes not merely a rule, by which the doctrines of one Church are *distinguished* from those of another, and which are founded solely on *Scripture*, but a rule by which the very *truth* of doctrines is supposed to be established, and established *independently* of *Scripture*. When we appeal to the *liturgy* and *articles*, we appeal to them as a rule to determine, what the doctrines of our Church really *are*: and we appeal to *Scripture*, when we intend to prove that those doctrines are *true*. But when a Romanist appeals to *tradition* as a rule of faith, he appeals to it in *proof* of the doctrines which he learns from tradition; he receives them on its *sole authority*, which he considers as equal, in all respects, to the authority of *Scripture*. The latter he calls the *written word of God*; the

Tertulliani Op. p. 235. ed. Rigaltii. We see then, that Tertullian gives the title of *Regula Fidei* to the *Articles of Faith*, which were then received by the Latin Church; and which contained nothing *in addition* to the articles founded on *Scripture*. It is true, that Tertullian objected to the perversions, which the heretics at that time made of *Scripture*. But his *own* appeals were so frequent, that the *Index Scripturarum sacrarum, ut citantur a Tertulliano*, occupies in the edition of Rigaltius, forty-nine folio pages.

⁷ Hence the celebrated Lutheran divine, Dr. John Gerhard, who was professor of Divinity at Jena, about sixty years after Luther's death, says, "Requirat Stapletonus REGULAM FIDEI. Requirimus eandem et nos; sed *sensu plane diverso*: ὁμοία μὲν λαλοῦμεν, ἀνόμοια δὲ φρονοῦμεν." *Loci Theologi*, tom. i. p. 55. *ed. Cotta.*

former he calls the *unwritten word of God*; and consequently receives them *pari pietatis affectu ac reverentiâ* ⁸. But it is still objected, that, if we accompany the Bible with our liturgy and articles, we tacitly at least acknowledge the *insufficiency of Scripture*. We thereby admit (say our adversaries, as well as the Church of Rome,) that “true religion cannot be found by the *Bible alone*.” How then, I would ask, did our *reformers* find it? It could not have been by the aid of the liturgy and articles; for the liturgy and articles were the *result* of their researches in holy Scripture. Yet they *did* find it, and find it moreover at a time when the Church of Rome had *lost* it. And the *reason*, why they found it, was that they discarded *tradition* as a rule of faith, and interpreted Scripture by the aid of *reason and learning*. If the Romanist objects, that our reformers did *not* find true religion, his objection is foreign to the purpose. For in the argument, which is *now* before us, we are concerned only with the *prin-*

⁸ See the second section of chap. ii. See also the second section of chap. iii., where the doctrines were described, which are founded solely on tradition. Indeed the most distinguished among the Romish writers themselves, though they seem unwilling to *separate* the articles of faith, which are founded on Scripture, from those which are *not* founded on Scripture, acknowledge that many articles of the latter kind are admitted by the Church of Rome. Thus says Bellarmine: “Quod autem *multa sint credenda*, quæ non sunt in *Scripturis*, supra copiose ostendimus.” *De Verbo Dei*, lib. iv. cap. 12.

ciples, on which the researches of our reformers were *conducted*. Should it be further objected, that if our *reformers* found true religion in the Bible alone, yet in our *present* endeavours to find it we employ the liturgy and articles, I would answer, in the first place, that there is no *necessity* for our finding again, what has been found *already*. In the second place I would answer, that though there is no need of *finding* what has been found *already*, it is quite consistent with the principles of our Church, that they, whose literary attainments *qualify* them for the undertaking, should *compare* those articles of faith with the source from which they were drawn, and see that they are *justly* derived from Scripture. Thirdly, I would answer, that it is perfectly consistent both with the principles and the practice of our reformers, who *provided* us with the liturgy and articles, to accompany the *Bible* with them, not as authorities for the *proof* of its doctrines, but as useful and important *expositions* of it; as expositions, which may serve to guard the illiterate and unwary reader, who has a Bible *without note or comment*, from being seduced by those ignorant and self-sufficient *expounders* of Scripture, with which the country now swarms. But whether *these*, or any *other* expositions of Scripture be employed by the Church of England, they have no resemblance whatever to the expositions, which the Church of Rome derives from its

tradition. In vain therefore do our adversaries apply this appellation to the liturgy and articles of our Church. In vain do they pretend, that unless the Bible is left to be its *own* interpreter, or unless the Bible be read without note or comment, there is a departure from Protestantism, and an approximation to the Church of Rome. That the Bible can be understood without comments and other helps, is an assertion, which none but a *fanatic* would make. But if the *means*, which are employed to discover the sense of Scripture, have no resemblance *in themselves*, we cannot *create* a resemblance by the mere imposition of a *name*. If a *name*, without regard to its *meaning*, were permitted to decide, we could as easily prove, that the *Romish* Church was a *Jewish* Church, as the Romanists can prove, that *our* Church is a *Romish* Church. For the *Jews* acknowledge the authority of *tradition*, as well as the authority of *Scripture*⁹.

⁹ The confusion, which has lately taken place on the subjects of Scripture and tradition, may be chiefly ascribed to the want of *clear definitions*: for no man can write perspicuously on a subject, unless he has perspicuously *defined* it. When Bellarmine defines Scripture and tradition by calling the former *Verbum Dei Scriptum*, and by calling the latter *Verbum Dei non Scriptum*, he shows that he *himself* understands the subject, and he makes it understood by his readers. But neither an author, nor his readers, will receive much light from arguments about tradition, if no better definition be given of it, than that which is given by Mr. Gandolphy at p. 8, of his second letter, namely, “the word unwritten in the

Scriptures." Whoever sets out with such a definition as this, will not only be in the dark, as to what he himself intends to prove, but, having to do with a term, which is applicable to an infinity of subjects, must (for the very reason, that the connexion between the term and the *real* subject of inquiry is not distinctly marked) connect it with subjects which are *foreign* to the inquiry. No author, whether *Romanist*, or *Protestant*, should write about Scripture and tradition, till he has studied the works of *Bellarmino*.

CHAPTER VIII.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CHURCHES OF ENGLAND AND ROME IN THE EXERCISE OF CHURCH AUTHORITY—THE OBJECTIONS TO THE FIRST SENTENCE OF OUR TWENTIETH ARTICLE STATED, AND EXAMINED ; ESPECIALLY IN REFERENCE TO THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OF FAITH—PROOF THAT THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND CARRIES ITS AUTHORITY NO FURTHER THAN IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR ITS OWN PRESERVATION ; AND MOREOVER, THAT THIS AUTHORITY IS EXERCISED ON THE SAME PRINCIPLE, AND CARRIED ONLY TO THE SAME EXTENT AS PROTESTANTS IN GENERAL, THE DISSENTERS THEMSELVES NOT EXCEPTED.

THE subjects of Scripture and Tradition having been fully examined, in regard both to causes and consequences, we are now led to an inquiry of no less moment than any of the preceding, especially when considered in its *practical* application, namely, the exercise of *Church-authority*. That the Churches of England and Rome are materially different also on *this* subject is a proposition, which may appear more difficult to be established, than their difference in Scripture and Tradition, in doctrines and ceremonies. Indeed, the exercise of Church-authority is a subject on which our adversaries have more closely pressed us than on any other.

It has been frequently repeated, and is repeated to this very day, that while the Church

of Rome on the one hand, and Protestant Dissenters on the other, are *true* to the principles which they profess on the subject of spiritual jurisdiction, the Church of England, placed as it were in the middle between the two parties, preserves the consistency of *neither*. When the Church of *Rome* exerts authority over the conscience of man, and requires implicit obedience to its decisions in matters of faith, its principles and its practice are consistent. For it does not even *pretend* to allow the right of *private* judgment in religious concerns. On the other hand, it is said, the *Protestant Dissenters*, true to the principles which induced our ancestors to *separate* from the Church of Rome, not only *contend* that all men have a right to exercise their *own* judgment in controversies of faith, but *exemplify* also the maxim by their general practice. The Church of England *alone* therefore is charged with inconsistency. It is charged with *professing* indeed the Christian liberty restored by the Reformation, but with *practising* the spiritual tyranny exercised by the Church of Rome. Our twentieth article is said to be *decisive* on this subject. In *vain* (say our adversaries) do the ministers of the Established Church acknowledge the Protestant principle, that in the momentous concerns of future happiness or misery, it is the inalienable right of man to think and determine for himself. Our twentieth article, they say, condemns us: for that article declares, that the

Church hath authority in controversies even of *faith*.

Now, as no advantage is derived from the mere *evasion* of an argument, let us meet it at once in its whole strength. For this purpose I will state the argument in all its bearings, and display it in all the force which it can possibly receive.

Our sixth article declares, in reference to holy Scripture, that “whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of the faith.” And the twenty-first article, which relates to general councils, declares in like manner, that “things ordained by them as necessary to salvation, have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of holy Scripture.” It is *allowed*, therefore, that, as far as *theory* goes on this subject, the Church of England *agrees* with Protestants in general, in acknowledging Scripture as the *sole* fountain of faith; whereas the Church of Rome derives its doctrines from *tradition*, as well as from Scripture. So far, then, we are exposed to no difficulty. But the objections commence when the propositions delivered in the above-quoted articles are reduced to *practice*. For, in the *application* of those propositions, a *controversy* may arise on the question, whether a doctrine, *said* to be contained in holy Scripture, really *is* contained in holy Scripture.

Men may *differ* in opinion with respect to particular doctrines, whether they *can* be proved by holy Scripture, or whether they can *not*. They may be *at issue* on the question, whether it can be declared of any given doctrine, that such doctrine *is* taken out of holy Scripture. Now *such* controversies of faith must either remain undecided, or there must be some *judge* of controversy to *determine* this dispute. On this subject, says our twentieth article, “The *Church* hath —— authority in controversies of faith?” — *Where* then (exclaim our adversaries) is the difference between the Churches of England and Rome in the exercise of *Church-authority*? Does not the former, as well as the latter, exalt itself to the proud pre-eminence of *dictating* in matters of faith? Is not, therefore, the right of private judgment invaded in the one Church, as much as in the other? And is it consistent with genuine Protestantism, which has professed to *restore* the right of private judgment, and which never could have reared its head without the *exercise* of that right,—is it consistent (say our adversaries) thus to imitate the Church of Rome, and lay claim in our turn to the exercise of the *same* authority?

To this formidable objection, on which our adversaries delight to dwell, the friends of the Established Church have, on various occasions, attempted a reply. But many, if not *most* of those replies, have been rather *evasions* of the

argument, than *confutations* of it. Sometimes it has been said, that the first clause of the twentieth article, which gives authority to the Church, in controversies even of *faith*, is not an *original* part of the article ; or, in other words, that it was not contained in the original manuscript signed by the convocation, from which we *received* our articles. Now this question can never be decided, as the original manuscript was destroyed in the great fire of London. Nor would it avail in the *present* case, if the question *could* be decided. For, even, if it could be *proved*, that the original manuscript did *not* contain the clause in question, it would still be an indisputable truth, that the clause occupied a place in the twentieth article, when our religion was established by *law*, and the Act of Uniformity declared, that an assent to the liturgy and articles was a condition of holding an office in the Church ¹. We must be able, therefore, to *vindicate* that clause, or we shall be unable to vindicate the religion *by law established*. We shall be unable to vindicate the articles according to *that* form, under which we have all subscribed to them.

So difficult, however, has the vindication appeared, that several writers, who have made the twentieth article a subject of *comparison* with the

¹ Subscription to the articles is required in sect. 19, of the Act of Uniformity passed in the fourteenth of Charles II.

principles maintained by the Church of Rome, have left the clause in question wholly unnoticed. But instead of *suppressing* this clause, we ought fairly to *compare* it with the corresponding declaration made by the Church of *Rome* on the same subject. Now the *second* decree, which passed at the fourth session of the Council of Trent, has a clause which *corresponds* to the clause in question. This decree relates to the *interpretation* of the sacred writings; and, according to this decree, the *Church* has authority, when the sense of Scripture is disputed, to *determine* the true sense (*judicare de vero sensu*²). The two Churches, therefore, so far *agree* on the subject of Church-authority, that each of them claims the power of deciding in controversies of *faith*. Nor is even the *second* clause of the twentieth article at variance with the *principles* of the Church of Rome. For it is a principle with that Church, as well as with the Church of England, “that it is not lawful for the Church to ordain any thing that is *contrary* to God’s word written;” and this principle is unequivocally maintained by the Romish writers themselves³.

² Præterea, ad coercenda petulantia ingenia, decernit ut nemo suæ prudentiæ innixus, in rebus *fidei* et *morum*, ad edificationem doctrinæ Christianæ pertinentium, sacram Scripturam ad suos sensus contorquens, contra eum sensum, quem tenuit et tenet sancta mater Ecclesia, cujus est *judicare de vero sensu*, &c. P. xxi.

³ Bellarmine himself says, “Scriptura, quia est regula,

That the *practice* of that Church does not always agree with the *principles* which it thus professes, may be readily granted : and our twentieth article very properly *protests* against such practice. But, when we are considering the *principles* on which Church-authority is founded, we must not compare the principles of one Church with the *practice* of another. We must distinguish between a principle, which is right *in itself*, though wrongfully *applied*, and a principle which is wrong from the very beginning. Nor will the circumstance, that the Church of Rome has *two* foundations of faith, while the Church of England builds on Scripture *alone*, affect the question of Church-*authority*. For we are at present concerned, not with the *materials*, on which the authority is employed, but with the authority *itself*, considered as a *judge of controversy*.

Another attempt to solve the difficulty attending the first clause of the twentieth article has been made, by giving to the term ‘authority,’ as it is there used, a sense, which virtually destroys its whole effect. It has been represented, not as an *absolute*, but only as a kind of *relative* authority ; as something, not *positively binding*, but as something entitled to our *respect*, in consideration of the deference due to the wisdom of our reformers. Bishop Burnet himself, per-

inde habet, ut quicquid continet sit necessario *verum et credendum*, et quicquid ei *repugnat* sit necessario *falsum et repudiandum*.” De Verbo Dei, lib. iv. cap. 12.

plexed with the word ‘authority,’ when applied to the Church of *England*, has taken refuge in this lax interpretation. He says, in his exposition of the twentieth article, that “a distinction is to be made between an authority, that is *absolute*, and founded on *infallibility*; and an authority of *order*.” But an authority may be *absolute*, though not *infallible*. The parliament of Great Britain does not aspire to the infallibility, which the Church of Rome ascribes to a *general council*; yet no one will pretend, that an act of parliament is not *absolutely* binding on all the subjects of this realm. With respect to the “authority of *order*,” as it is called by Bishop Burnet, he says that “when such definitions (namely, as articles of religion) are made by the body of the pastors of any Church, all persons within that Church do owe great *respect* to their decision.” Now, if they owed nothing *more* than respect, and were therefore at liberty to obey or disobey, the authority of the Church would be an authority only in *name*.

But *whatever* authority be claimed for the decisions of the Church, it is still objected, that those decisions, which are nothing more than the decisions of its *rulers*, must yield to the decisions of *God himself in holy Scripture*. The Bible and the Bible only, is the religion of the *Protestant*! Now this position, though perfectly true *in itself*, has no more connexion with the case before us, than it has with some other

cases, to which it has been lately applied. It is in fact *absurd*, to draw a parallel between the authority of *Scripture*, and the authority of the *Church*: for they are things, which are really *incapable* of comparison. With men who acknowledge *Scripture* as a rule of faith, which is done by Christians of every denomination, it never *was* and it never *can be* a question, whether the sense of *Scripture* shall yield to the sense of the *Church*. But then we must *know* the sense of *Scripture*, or we cannot say *how* it decides. And this is the *very point* to which the twentieth article relates. That article presupposes a *controversy* on the sense of *Scripture*. The question therefore *now* before us is simply this. When the sense of *Scripture* is *disputed*; when some men explain it *one* way, and others explain it *another* way; where are we to look for the authority, which shall *determine* this controversy of faith? In the *Church*, saith our twentieth article. And that this authority is not a mere authority of *deference* and *respect*, but an authority of *positive obligation*, appears from the very *exercise* of that authority. For, if a minister of the Established Church *impugns* the liturgy and articles, he is amenable to the ecclesiastical court, and liable, not only to be *suspended*, but altogether *deprived* of his ecclesiastical preferments. And this very exercise of Church-authority is recognised by the law

of the land, as well as by the canons ecclesiastical.

II. How then, it may be asked, is the Church of England to be vindicated, in the end, from the charge of acting like the Church of Rome in the exercise of its *authority*? How can it be rescued from the charge of trenching on the right of private judgment, which is the glory and the pride of Protestants?

Arduous as the task may seem, it is still a task *to be performed*. And the Church of England will be sufficiently vindicated if we can establish the three following propositions.

First, that the Church of England carries its authority no further, than is absolutely necessary for *its own preservation*.

Secondly, that Protestants in *general*, the Dissenters themselves not excepted, exercise their spiritual authority on the same principle, and carry it to the very *same extent*, as the Church of England.

Thirdly, that the Church of *Rome* not only carries its authority *further* than is necessary for its own preservation, but that its authority is exercised in such a manner, as to extinguish the right of private judgment in its *own* members, and to trample on the rights of *all other* Churches.

In the first place then, let us endeavour to show, that the Church of England carries its

authority no further, than is absolutely necessary for its own preservation. When the twentieth article gives authority to the *Church* in controversies of *faith*, it gives it no more authority, than such as is possessed by every *civil* society in controversies of *civil* import. When doubts arise about the meaning of a *human* law or statute, there must in *every* state be some authority to *determine* its meaning, or the operation of the law will be *suspended*. In this country the authority of *interpreting* the law is confided to the twelve judges, who are necessarily supposed from their knowledge and experience to be best *acquainted* with its meaning. And the decision of such authorised interpreters is effectually *binding* upon those, who are subject to the law or statute *itself*. For it is still the law or statute, from which the *force* of the obligation is derived ; the intervention of the authorised interpretation having no other object, than to determine, when the meaning of the law is *disputed*, what its meaning really *is*. Now as we act in concerns of the *State*, we act also in concerns of the *Church*. As the former determines in reference to the law of *man*, the latter determines in reference to the law of *God*. For the *doctrinal* articles of our Church are so many interpretations of *Scripture*, received from the convocation, which *framed* and *signed* the articles. At the time of the Reformation the sense of Scripture, in regard to various doctrines, was

disputed. The convocation therefore, which is our highest judicial authority in *spiritual* concerns, as the judges are the highest judicial authority in *temporal* concerns, assembled and determined, in the name of the Church which is represented, what the sense of Scripture, in regard to the disputed points, really *was*⁴. The Protestants of Germany acted in the same manner, with respect to the confession of Augsburg: the Protestants of Switzerland acted in the same manner with respect to the Helvetic confession: the Protestants of Holland acted in the same manner with respect to the con-

⁴ The judicial power of the convocation, thus exercised in the *interpretation* of Scripture, and in the framing of articles *founded* on such interpretation, is quite distinct from the authority which was exercised by Queen Elizabeth in the *ratification* of the articles. "We give not to our princes the ministering either of God's Word or of the Sacraments:" but we acknowledge that to the king's majesty, "the chief government of all estates of this realm, whether they be ecclesiastical or civil, in all causes doth appertain." See Article XXXVII. When the convocation, therefore, had composed the thirty-nine articles, as articles "*agreeable to the Word of God*," (Can. 36.) it was still necessary to obtain the royal assent, before they could be "*holden and executed within the realm*." See the ratification annexed to the articles. And this ratification is again a totally distinct authority from the act or acts of the legislature, by which the religion, described in our liturgy and articles, became the religion *by law established*. The acts of this description were chiefly the act of 13 Eliz. cap. 12. compared with those of 1 Eliz. cap. 1, 2; and the act of 14 Car. II. cap. 4. On the respective provinces of the convocation and the parliament, in regard to the established religion, more will be said in a subsequent note.

fession of Dordrecht ; and so must *all* Churches act without exception.

But is there no difference (it will be said) between the interpretation of a *human* law, and the interpretation of a *divine* law ? If in the former case we are bound to *submit* to the interpretation, whether we *approve* of it, or not, we are, at the very worst, exposed only to a *partial* and *temporary* evil. But the concerns of religion are the concerns of *eternity*. Shall any man therefore be *bound* to accept an interpretation of Scripture, imposed on him by the will of *another*, if on mature deliberation he *himself* is convinced that such interpretation is *false* ? Undoubtedly he is *not* bound : nor does our Church *impose* the obligation. In *this* country, allegiance to the *Church* is not like allegiance to the *State* : we may withdraw ourselves from the *former*, though we cannot withdraw ourselves from the *latter*. And here lies the solution of the whole difficulty. If our conscience will not *allow* us to comply with those terms, which are offered by the Established Church, we may *withdraw* from its communion, and profess Christianity under *any* form, which we may think proper to adopt. We may become Methodists, or Moravians, or Baptists, or Presbyterians, or Independents, or Quakers, or Swedenborgians, &c. &c., and still exercise our religion under the equal protection of the *law*. Nay, if any man prefers the theological lectures, which have been

hammered on the anvil, or stitched at the stall, to the theological lectures even of a divinity professor, he may indulge himself in the preference, without fear of impeachment, either for his taste or for his judgment.

But if men *choose* to continue members of the Established Church, they must conform to its *regulations*; as they must also to the regulations of any *other* society, for which they may think proper to *exchange* it. For no society *whatever* can long subsist, unless rules are prescribed for the conduct of its members, and an *assent* to those rules is made a condition of *communion* with that society. Now the rules of a *religious* society cannot be confined to mere *ceremonies*: they must necessarily embrace also articles of *faith*, or the religion of that society will be an *empty parade*. It is, therefore, impossible to hold any *religious* society in the bond of peace and union, unless the society, in the first place, establishes some *formulary of faith*, and unless, in the second place, it makes an *assent* to that formulary a condition of *communion* with it. The society must further have the power of *removing* those members, who, after having *declared* their assent, yet *act* in opposition to the terms: for no society can *maintain* itself, whether civil or religious, if it keeps within its bosom the very persons who are plotting its destruction. And if the *officers* of the society violate the terms of admission, it is especially necessary to enforce

the rules in *their* case, because, in the same proportion as they contribute to the *stability* of the society, when they act *agreeably* to the terms of communion, in the same proportion do they contribute to the *destruction* of the society, if they act in *opposition* to them. When the Church of England, therefore, exercises the power of *removing* those ministers who *violate* the terms on which they were *admitted* to the sacred office, it carries its authority no further than is absolutely necessary for its *own preservation*.

That spiritual authority is carried to the same extent by *all other* Protestant societies, is known to every one who is acquainted with their transactions. The ministers of Protestant *Dissenters*, no less than the ministers of Protestant *Churchmen*, are liable (as we have seen in repeated instances) to be removed from their office, if they *violate* the conditions on which the office was *conferred*. It matters not, in *this* respect, whether we form single and *independent* congregations, or whether *many* congregations are united in *one society*, and all of them subjected to the *same* authority. The authority, by which ministers are removed for a non-compliance with the *terms* of admission, is in either case exercised on the *same principle*. Nor can this principle be affected by the question, whether the authority which is exercised, is the authority of an *established* Church, or the authority of a religious society, which is only *protected* by the state. It is true,

that the state *itself* provides for the ministers of the former ; while the ministers of the latter are left to be supported at the discretion of their respective congregations. But whatever be the *source*, from which the incomes of the clergy are derived, whether they be derived from *voluntary* contributions, or from contributions enforced by *the law of the land*, this difference affects not the *principle* on which the authority over those funds is exercised. Nor will the principle be affected by the further consideration, that an established Church acts in *concert* with the State. It is an unfounded, and a highly *unjust* assertion, that religion is thus made a tool of politics. For the authority, exercised in controversies of *faith*, is exercised solely by the governors of the *Church*. And this *judicial* authority is as much independent of the *legislative* authority, by which our religion was *established*, as the judicial authority in the courts of *common* law is independent of the legislature, which *establishes* the law. But if the legislative and judicial powers are *independent*, the latter cannot be considered as *subservient* to the *former* ⁵. The authority, there-

⁵ The analogy, which the judicial authority of the *Church* bears in this country to the judicial authority of the *State*, holds good in their different relations. Both of them are employed in a *twofold* capacity ; they are employed either in *interpreting* the law, or in *administering* the law. In all things relating to the *interpretation* of the law, the parallel lies between the convocation and an assembly of the twelve judges. The former meets to interpret the law of *God* : the latter

fore, which the Church of England exercises in controversies of faith, is exercised on the *same*

meets to interpret the law of *man*. In all things relating to the *administration* of the laws the parallel lies between the *ecclesiastical* courts and the *temporal* courts. As the latter *administer* the law in *civil* concerns, so the former *administer* the law in controversies, not only of discipline, but also of *faith*. When the authority of the Church is exercised on the *interpretation* of the divine law, the authority neither *is*, nor *can be*, confided to any but the *clergy*. But the *administration* of law, in the ecclesiastical courts, is frequently (and indeed *always* in the *higher* courts) confided to *laymen*. Now the exercise of Church-authority by *laymen* cannot possibly be construed into an extension of *spiritual* power.—Further, if we consider our religion in reference to its *establishment*, the analogy holds good again. The members of the convocation, which framed the thirty-nine articles, were concerned only with the question, What form of Christianity was most consonant with *Scripture*? Their sole object was to distinguish *true* religion from *false* religion, and to state what they believed to be the *true* religion in the form of *Articles* of Religion. But it was not in the power of the convocation to *establish* the religion defined by the liturgy and the articles. The *establishment* of a religion consists in a provision being made for the maintenance of its ministers by the *law of the land*. Where the contributions for the clergy are mere *voluntary* contributions, there is no *establishment*. But it is only the law of the land which can *enforce* the payment, either of civil or ecclesiastical contributions. The *truth* of a religion, therefore, and the *establishment* of a religion, are two totally distinct things. The convocation was concerned with the *former*, and with the *former alone*. The parliament was concerned with the *latter*, and the *latter alone*. As the convocation was competent to decide on the *truth* of our religion, but had no power to give it a civil *establishment*, the parliament had the power of giving it a civil *establishment*, though the province of parliament did not extend to a determination of its *truth*. But even the supreme *civil* authority in a state cannot always *establish* a

principle, and carried only to the *same extent*, as it is by the Protestant Dissenters themselves.

III. If, indeed, the Church of England went beyond the simple act of *removing* those who had violated the terms of communion, it would do *more* than is necessary for its own preservation.

religion, however *true* that religion may be. If, for instance, the great majority of the English nation had, in the time of Queen Elizabeth, still resolved to remain members of the Church of *Rome*, the statute of the first of Elizabeth, (by which the benefices, or public funds, assigned for the maintenance of the ministers of religion, were transferred from the clergy, who acknowledged the *pope* to be the head of the Church, to the clergy who acknowledged the *queen* as such) either would not have been made, or could not have been enforced, without danger of an insurrection. But it was that statute which *established* our religion in the time of Queen Elizabeth ; as it was a similar statute which again established our religion in the time of Charles II. So true is the assertion, that the *establishment* of a religion in any country must depend on the opinion which is entertained of it by the great *majority* in that country : where majority denotes not merely a majority of numbers, but a majority of power and influence. Thus in Ireland the majority of power and influence is certainly *Protestant*, though the majority of *numbers* is not so. At the same time we must consider the Established Church in *Ireland* as an integral part of the *united Church* ; and, fortunately for the *Protestants* in Ireland, the Romanists of the *United Kingdom* are still in the minority, as well of numbers as of influence.— Since then the authority, which *establishes* a religion, is quite distinct from the authority which judges of its *truth*, since also the authority by which ecclesiastical concerns are *administered*, is again a *distinct* authority, the *judicial* and the *legislative* powers, in all things concerning the established religion, are no less detached from each other, than they are in *civil* concerns.

For the welfare of a *religious* society, in things relating to *faith*, requires nothing more, than that they, who *counteract* it, should be made to *withdraw* from it. *There* the jurisdiction of every Church, in matters of faith, should *cease*: and *there* the jurisdiction of the Established Church, in matters of faith, *does* cease. In the faith and worship of *other* societies it does not presume to interfere; but recognises, to the utmost extent, the right of every man to worship according to his conscience. Nor are even its *own* members compelled to *continue* members against their will; though of necessity it requires a compliance with its rules from those who *choose* to remain in communion. It says not with the Church of Rome, “You have neither the liberty to *forsake* the Church, nor to vary from the *established creed*.” No! The language which the Church of England holds is this: “We have prescribed a formulary of faith, which we believe to be in all respects conformable to the Word of God, as declared in Holy Scripture. Persuaded ourselves, that our religion is *true*, we gladly receive, and cordially embrace, all those who are willing to *partake* in our faith and worship. But, as our welfare depends on the *observance* of our rules, we *expect* such observance from our members in general, and from our authorised ministers in particular.” On the other hand, if at any time there should be found among its members a person, who, on

mature reflection, thought the creed *erroneous*, which he had once received, the Church of England would say, "Though we lament the evils of religious *dissension*, we own the blessings of religious *liberty*. If then you can no longer *conform* to our creed, and the continuance in our communion would be a restraint on the exercise of your private judgment, you are at liberty to *exchange* our society for one which is more congenial with your own opinions. We shall neither throw impediments in the way of your departure, nor follow you, as an apostate, with pains and penalties, when you have *withdrawn* from our communion ⁶."

⁶ To prevent mistakes on this subject, it is necessary to observe, that, though the Church of England acknowledges the right of withdrawing from its communion, if men cannot conscientiously remain in it, this does not imply an admission, that there is no sin in *schism*, or a separation from the Established Church, in cases where *no plea of conscience* can be urged. The very preamble to the Toleration Act, passed in the first year of William III., begins with the words, "Forasmuch as some ease to *scrupulous consciences* in the exercise of religion, may be an effectual means to unite their majesties' Protestant subjects in interest and affection," &c. But as no human judgment can determine men's *motives* for separation, the question, whether they are urged by *conscientious motives*, or by motives of a different description, is properly left to be settled between themselves and their Maker. The liberty therefore to withdraw from the Established Church is, so far as *human* authority goes, open indiscriminately to all men. But they who *wantonly* withdraw from the Established Church, must not forget, that they will hereafter be amenable to a *higher* tribunal for the evil consequences of *unnecessary* divisions among members of the same society. This observa-

Suppose, however, that a member of a religious society *disapproves*, on the one hand, of its

tion particularly applies to those Methodists, who professing a belief in our doctrines, and not objecting to our ceremonies, yet worship in separate conventicles, in many of which, at this present time, the service is conducted precisely in the same manner as in the Churches of the establishment.—But I request the reader not to misunderstand me, when I speak of the *sin* of schism. There cannot be a doubt that they, who object to the doctrine or discipline of the established Church, have a right to *secede* from it; and, moreover, that this right is founded on the same principle as that by which the Church of England seceded from the Church of *Rome*. If we say, that we had substantial reasons for separation from the Church of *Rome*, but that the Dissenters have not equal reason for separating from *us*, we say what I believe is perfectly true. But then we must not make *our* opinion a rule for the conduct of those who *dissent* from us. For if the Church, from which the separation is made, be the *judge* of its propriety, our *own* Reformation will be condemned. Since then we judged for *ourselves*, when we seceded from the Church of *Rome*, we must allow others to judge for *themselves*, when they secede from the Church of *England*. Indeed, unless the persons, whose consciences are concerned in the decision, have the privilege of deciding on the question of separation, their consciences are subjected to the will of others, and the right of private judgment is destroyed. There is no *sin* therefore in separation from an established Church, where the plea of *conscience* can be urged. But since in every society, whether civil or religious, divisions among its members are always injurious, and may be ultimately fatal, the *authors* of such divisions are responsible for the consequences, when created *without necessity*. They are not indeed responsible to *man*, who is unable to penetrate into *motives*. But they are responsible to *God*, who searches all hearts; who knows whether the plea of conscience operates or not; and if it does *not* operate, will punish the *sin* of schism. For, as on the one hand, no evil arising from the abuse of religious

formulary of faith, and yet, on the other hand, is unwilling to *relinquish its communion*. What is to be done (it may be asked) in *such* a case? To this question there is only one answer to be given. As he cannot expect that the formulary of faith, approved by the general body, should be surrendered to the will of an individual, he must resolve, as long as he *remains* in communion with that society, to leave its formulary of faith *unmolested*. For, if he is so inconsistent as to continue in *communion* with it, and yet openly act in *contravention of its laws*, he must expect, that what he ought to have done *previously* of his own accord, he will be *afterwards compelled* to do by the society at large. If it be further objected, that such *compulsory* acts are inconsistent with *the right of private judgment* in matters of faith, I answer, that whether the act of removal be voluntary, or compulsory, he is in *either* case withdrawn from a society, which, by professing a faith to which he objects, had served only as a *restraint* on his private judgment. In *either* case, therefore, he obtains the full enjoyment of the right, about which he had previously *complained*.

Lastly, it may be objected, that, as the *au-*liberty can be compared with the evil of a preventive which enslaves the conscience, so on the other hand, when the plea of conscience does *not* operate, there is no inconvenience which an individual can sustain from continued communion with an established Church, to be compared with the evils arising from secession.

thority of our Church in controversies of *faith*, is now exercised chiefly, if not solely, on the *clergy* of the establishment, the exercise of that authority will affect not only their *persons*, but their ecclesiastical *property*. And is it consistent (it may be urged) with those principles, on which a *religious* society should be governed, to punish a man for his opinions by the confiscation of his *property*? Has it not been already admitted, that the welfare of a religious society, in matters of faith, requires nothing more, than that the persons who counteract it should be made to *withdraw* from it? Now, if the Church could confiscate *private* property, as a punishment for *heresy*, it would have a power which no tribunal on earth, whether ecclesiastical or civil, should be allowed to possess. It would be a power, of the very same detestable kind, as that which the Inquisition employs on the *person* of a heretic. But the emoluments of *office* are inseparable from the office *itself*. And those emoluments are only so far our own, as we *perform* the conditions on which the emoluments were *granted*. In the Church of England, no man is admitted to a benefice except on the condition, *publicly and solemnly expressed*, that he will conform to the liturgy and articles. But, if after this solemn engagement he *refuses* to conform, he voids the contract by his own act and deed. And, if he *loses* his benefice, he loses only that to which he had forfeited the *right*. On the very *same* prin-

ciple the Protestant Dissenters *themselves* deprive their ministers of their office, and consequently of its emoluments, when their ministers violate the terms of that communion to which they belong. Nor is it in *religious* societies alone, that conditional emoluments are forfeited by a violation of the conditions on which they were granted. It is the same also both in *civil* and in *military* societies. By a transgression of the laws, to which an office or commission implies obedience, the office or commission is vacated, and its emoluments are consequently lost. The plea of *conscience* for a departure from the law is very inconsistently alleged, especially in a *religious* society. If a man is urged by his conscience to violate the terms on which he was *admitted* to his office, that same conscience, in order to be *consistent*, should urge him also to relinquish its *emoluments*. For it is downright *dishonesty*, it is dishonesty of the grossest kind, to receive the *pay* of a society, and yet act *in opposition to its welfare*.

Upon the whole, then, we may conclude that the Church of England carries its authority no further than is absolutely necessary for its own preservation. It requires, on the one hand, a compliance with its rules from its members in general, and its ministers in particular; but as no man is compelled to *remain* a member, he may exercise his private judgment in the investigation of its doctrines, and withdraw from its

communion, if he believe that its doctrines are false. We allow, therefore, to *others* the privilege which we claimed for *ourselves*, in withdrawing from the Church of *Rome*. And since they, who withdraw from *us*, continue the exercise of that very authority, to which they had been previously subjected in the Church of England, our Church stands exculpated from the charge of inconsistency, and a departure from the principles of the Reformation. And when the *third* proposition is proved, which will be done in the following chapter, the difference between the Churches of England and Rome, in the exercise of Church-authority, will appear in the clearest light.

CHAPTER IX.

PROOF THAT THE CHURCH OF ROME NOT ONLY CARRIES ITS AUTHORITY FURTHER THAN IS NECESSARY FOR ITS OWN PRESERVATION, BUT THAT ITS AUTHORITY IS EXERCISED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO EXTINGUISH THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT IN ITS OWN MEMBERS, AND TO TRAMPLE ON THE RIGHTS OF ALL OTHER CHURCHES.

It appears from the preceding chapter, that the welfare of a religious society, in matters of *faith*, requires nothing more than that they who violate its articles be made to withdraw from its communion. And it is equally apparent, that a society which has *not* the power of removing determined contraveners, has not the power which is necessary for its own preservation. On these principles, of which the truth is indisputable, the Church of England exercises its authority in controversies of faith. Every society has the undoubted right to take such measures as are requisite for its own welfare, provided they interfere not with the rights of *other* societies. But if laws are enacted, or even if principles are admitted, which its own welfare does *not* require, there will be an unnecessary, and therefore an *unjust*, diminution of natural right. Whenever men unite themselves in a society, whether civil or religious, a *portion* of that freedom which

they would otherwise possess is unavoidably surrendered, in exchange for the benefits which they derive from *communion* with that society. To a certain extent, therefore, the will of the *individual* must yield to the will of the *body*. But as that society is the best constituted in which the *general* welfare is promoted with the smallest share of individual sacrifice, the latter should never be required, if the former can be promoted *without* it. Now as the objects of a religious society are faith and worship, and every man has a natural right to worship God according to his conscience, the surrender of *this* right can never be deemed necessary to the purpose for which a religious society is formed. If an individual member of such a society can no longer conscientiously partake in its faith or worship, the welfare of the society is so far from requiring his *continuance* in that communion, that this very continuance would serve only to destroy its harmony. Consequently, there is no *pretence* for compelling a man to remain a member of a religious society against his will. And with respect to the *consequences* of such compulsion, it is obvious, that conscience would thereby be enslaved, and the right of private judgment altogether extinguished. As long as we are at liberty to withdraw from a religious society, whenever we disapprove of its principles, we possess the right of exercising private judgment in matters of faith and worship. Indeed, the

very act of withdrawing from the society, is an act in which that right is exercised.

But if the Church of *England* thus allows the right of private judgment, this right is absolutely refused by the Church of *Rome*. For the latter not only requires obedience from all who *continue* in its communion, but prohibits a *departure* from that communion. And this prohibition is carried so far, that the Church of Rome claims the power of exercising spiritual jurisdiction over those who have *ceased to be its members*. Allegiance to the *Church* is considered in the same light as allegiance to the *State*; and apostates from the religion of Rome are regarded as rebels against their lawful Sovereign. The Council of Trent has formally declared, that the Church of Rome is the *mother and mistress* of all Churches¹; whence they who have deserted its standard, and have gone over to other Churches, are still declared amenable to the Church of Rome. Accordingly, we find in the Roman Catechism, published by order of Pius V., that heretics and schismatics, though no longer *members* of the Church of Rome, are still “in the *power* of the Church, as persons to be called by it to judgment, punished, and doomed by anathema to damnation².” And this claim, thus officially

¹ *Ecclesia Romana, quæ omnium ecclesiarum mater est et magistra, &c.* p. liii. See also the Trent Confession of Faith, quoted in note ³, p. 136.

² *Hæretici vero et schismatici, qui ab Ecclesiâ desciverunt,*

made in the Roman Catechism, is urged at this very day in the theological lectures which are given in the College of Maynooth. For in the treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi*, which contains the sum and substance of those lectures, it is positively asserted, that “the Church *retains* its jurisdiction over all apostates, heretics, and schismatics, though they no longer belong to its body³.” And the following is assigned as a *reason* why the Church of Rome claims jurisdiction over those who have ceased to be its members; namely, “that a general has the right of inflicting severer punishments on those deserters whose names have been erased from the muster-roll⁴.” Now, when a man has *ceased* to be member of a society, whether it is religious, civil, or military, it is difficult to comprehend on what principle of justice or equity he can be considered as still amenable to the *laws* of that society. Nor is it true, that military punishment can be inflicted on those whose names are erased from the regimental list. When deserters are punished,

&c. Non negandum tamen quin in Ecclesiæ potestate sint, ut qui ab eâ in judicium vocentur, puniantur, et anathemate damnentur. *Catechismus Romanus*, p. 78. ed. 1587.

³ Ecclesia suam *retinet* jurisdictionem in omnes Apostatas, Hæreticos, et Schismaticos, quanquam ad illius corpus non jam pertineant. P. 394.

⁴ Immediately after the words quoted in the preceding note is added, Quemadmodum dux militiæ jus habet severiores poenas decernendi adversus militem transfugam, qui ex albo militiæ fuisset erasus.

they are punished as being *still members* of the society which inflicts the punishment: they are punished for a violation of the laws which they have sworn to obey, and from which, without the consent of their superiors, they have no right to withdraw. But a *religious* society has no analogy in this respect to one that is purely *military*. If the members of a military society were at liberty to withdraw from it whenever they pleased, the very object for which an army is collected would at once be defeated. The necessity of the case itself, therefore, prevents the exercise of that liberty. But no such necessity operates in a *religious* society, from which every member has a right to withdraw, as soon as his conscience forbids him to partake of its faith and worship. The spiritual tyranny of those who *govern* the Church of Rome, may find indeed support in such comparisons as that which has been just stated: but the Church of Christ was founded for a very different purpose, than that of extending the power and influence of those who direct it. But whether the reasoning of the Church of Rome on this subject be valid or futile, whether the jurisdiction thus claimed be well or ill defended, it is sufficient to know that the claim is made, and made by those very persons whose sentiments we are especially concerned to ascertain.

It may be urged, indeed, in answer to this claim of extended jurisdiction, that when a

member of the Church of Rome is once become a Protestant, he has nothing further to *apprehend* from the jurisdiction of that Church. He may despise the appellations of apostate and heretic, and smile at the threat of punishment, which can no longer reach him. Now this argument implies, that the conversion takes place in a state, where Protestantism is *protected*, a protection not afforded in *every* state, where the Church of Rome claims jurisdiction. But let us take for granted, that the state is both able and willing to protect those, who for conscience' sake change their religion; let us consider the situation of the Romanists resident in Great Britain and Ireland, and thus we shall be enabled to appreciate the influence of the Church of Rome over its own members, even when its *spiritual* authority is not aided by *temporal* power.

When the authority claimed for the Church of Rome, both in the Roman Catechism and the Lectures at Maynooth, is inculcated into the minds of men from their earliest years, they are deterred from ever *attempting* to exercise their private judgment in matters of faith. When the notion is once impressed, that if they should ever desert the Church, the Church would still retain its *authority* over them, unconditional submission is the natural consequence. To inquire into the *grounds* of their faith might lead them into inextricable difficulties. They might come to conclusions, which were *different*

from the established creed : and thus they would be reduced to the dilemma, either of joining in a worship which their conscience condemned, or of being exposed to danger, if they worshipped as their conscience required. Under such circumstances it will appear most prudent to *abstain* from religious inquiry. Indeed the Council of Trent has formally *prohibited* religious inquiry. For it has not only decreed, that its ministers shall not interpret the Scriptures in their *public* discourses, so as to impugn the authorised interpretation of the Church (which *every* Church has an undoubted right to require), but it has further decreed, that no one even *in private* shall interpret the Scriptures in any other way, than according to the prescribed form⁵. Conscience is therefore reduced to a state of *servitude* : and men are compelled even to *think*, as the Council has determined that they *shall* think. The welfare of every religious society requires indeed, that its formulary of faith be not openly impugned by its ministers. But if men are not at liberty to investigate the sense of Scripture for themselves ; if they are not at liberty to *examine*, whether the articles of their religion are founded in Scripture ; and finally if, in the event of their being persuaded to the contrary, they have not

⁵ At the end of the sentence, of which the beginning was quoted in note ², of the preceding chapter, is added, *etiamsi hujusmodi interpretationes nullo unquam tempore in lucem edendæ forent.*

the liberty of *withdrawing* from the communion, of which those articles are the creed, a spiritual tyranny is established, which subverts all the ends of religion.

Nor must we forget, in reference to the authority claimed by the Church of Rome, that it is not confined to the punishment of the *body*, but extends to the punishment of the *soul*. In the passage above quoted from the Roman Catechism, all heretics and schismatics are denounced as persons “to be brought to justice, punished, and by anathema doomed to damnation⁶.” And agreeably to this notion, the bare act of separation from the Church of Rome is declared, in the theological lectures of Maynooth, to be nothing less than the forfeiture of salvation⁷. Now let notions like these be instilled into children, from their earliest years, and they must have very strong minds indeed, if, when men,

⁶ See note 2.

⁷ Certissima est doctrina, Patrum consensione, et Ecclesiæ praxi confirmata, Schismaticos, etiamsi in fide non errarent, solo sui Schismatis facto esse extra Ecclesiam, et *viam salutis*. De Ecclesiâ Christi, p. 25. We find also at p. 16, Necesse est agnoscere, hæreticos omnes, quos e sinu suo rejicit Ecclesia, ad illam non pertinere. Sed eo ipso illis *nulla est speranda salus*. Further we find at p. 19, Ergo iterum confirmatur doctrina, omnes hæreticos, quos rejicit Ecclesia, ad illam non pertinere, et esse *extra viam salutis*. And of those, who are born and baptized out of the Romish Church, it is said at p. 24, Eo magis periculosum esse statum eorum, qui in *schismate baptizati fuerunt*, quod nunquam cogitabunt de quærendâ *verâ Ecclesiâ*, extra quam *non est salus*.

they ever venture to form an opinion of their own in matters of faith. And that such notions *are* instilled into the minds of children, who are educated in the Romish religion, appears from the *Catechisms*, in which they are instructed. Now there is no Romish Catechism so generally used in these dominions as that, which bears the following title “The most Rev. Dr. James Butler’s Catechism, revised, enlarged, approved and recommended by the four R. C. Archbishops of Ireland, as a general Catechism for the Kingdom ;” of which the *eighth* edition was printed at Dublin in 1811. At p. 15, 16, of this edition, we find the following questions and answers.

Q. Where are true Churchmen to be found?

A. Only in the true Church.

Q. How do you call the true Church?

A. The holy Catholic Church.

Q. Is there any other true Church, besides the holy Catholic Church?

A. No. As there is but one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, there is but one Church.

Q. Are all obliged to be of the true Church?

A. Yes : *no one can be saved out of it.*

That the terms “true Church” and “Catholic Church” here denote exclusively the Church of *Rome*, appears from what follows at p. 17, of the same Catechism. For the “true Church” is there described as being “One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolical;” and to the question, how

the Church is *One*, is answered, "In all its members believing the same truths, having the *same sacraments and sacrifice, and being under one visible head on earth.*" All Protestants therefore without exception, inasmuch as they reject the authority of the Pope, and the sacrifice of the Mass, are thus denounced as excluded from the "true Church;" and consequently as excluded from *salvation*. In like manner the author of the treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi*, declares that the Church of Rome *alone* has that unity, which is the character and mark of the *true Church*⁸: and he denounces Protestants in general as *Schismatics*⁹, who, as we have already seen, are declared *incapable of salvation*.

Now let any one compare *this* doctrine of exclusive salvation with the doctrine taught in our eighteenth article, and see whether they admit of a comparison. This article is entitled, "Of obtaining eternal salvation only by the name of Christ," and the article itself is as follows: "They also are to be had accursed that presume to say, that every man shall be saved by the law or sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that law and the light of nature. For Holy Scripture doth set out unto us only the name of Jesus Christ,

⁸ Ecclesia Romana, *et sola*, illam habet unitatem, quæ est character, et nota *veræ* Ecclesiæ. P. 46.

⁹ Societas Protestantium sese a Schismatis reatu excusare non potest. P. 43.

whereby men must be saved." This article therefore excludes from salvation *no Christian whatever*; whereas Protestants *in general* are excluded from salvation by the Church of Rome. The Churches therefore of England and Rome are so far from *agreeing* on the subject of exclusive salvation, (as the advocates of the latter argue from our eighteenth article,) that no two opinions can be more opposite. The Romanists exclude *us* from salvation: but we do not exclude *them* from salvation¹. Nor do we exclude them from salvation even by the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian Creed; for that very Creed, in the form in which we now have it, was received by the Church of England from *the Church of Rome*. The members therefore of *that* Church have no right to complain of it; and in a "Comparative view of the Churches of England and Rome," we have no concern with *other* Churches.

¹ If it be further objected, that our eighteenth article, though it excludes *no Christian* from salvation, yet excludes from salvation all who are *not* Christians, I answer, that the *covenanted* mercies of God are offered only to those, who accept the conditions, on which the offer is made. The article therefore applies only to those, who have the *means* of knowing what those conditions *are*, and who knowing those conditions wantonly *reject* them. It was intended to confute the error, that works were *every thing*, and faith *nothing*. The article has a marked opposition to a tenet, then advanced by various free-thinkers. It must be explained therefore with *reference* to that tenet; and not be so construed, as if it meant to assert, that they, who had never *heard* of the Gospel, were in the same situation with those who had wantonly *rejected* it.

It is moreover *unfair* to argue from the anathemas of a particular Creed to the general sentiments of the Church of England. Those sentiments are officially declared in our *articles* of religion; and by those articles no Christian whatever is excluded from the hope of salvation². Nor is it fair to confound the sentiments of *other* Protestant Churches with the sentiments maintained by the Church of *England*, which can only be answerable for its *own* opinions. If Calvin asserted, that there is no salvation out of the bosom of the *Church*³, and by the term Church is meant, not the *universal* Church, including Christians *in general*, but only a *particular* Church, no such doctrine is maintained by the Church of *England*. If “the same doctrine is distinctly taught in various professions of faith made by the Reformers, as in that of Strasbourg presented to Charles V. in 1530, in that of Switzerland in 1566, in that of the Low-Coun-

² Though I argue against the *inferences* deduced from the Anathemas of the Athanasian Creed, I do not mean to *defend* those Anathemas. They are no part of the Creed itself. And though such anathemas were not uncommon in ancient Creeds, they might have been consistently rejected from the Athanasian Creed, when it was adopted by our Reformers. See the sentiments of the Bishop of Lincoln on this subject in his *Elements of Christian Theology*, vol. ii. p. 222.

³ *Extra ecclesie græmium nulla est speranda peccatorum remissio, nec ulla salus*, quoted from Calvin's *Institutes* (lib. iv. cap. i.) by Sir J. C. Hippisley in the Appendix, No. xv. to his speech in the House of Commons, May 18, 1810.

tries, in that of Scotland in 1647, which was approved in a general meeting of Theologians, and sanctioned by parliament⁴," it serves only to show the superior moderation of the Church of England, in which such doctrine is not maintained. But let us confine ourselves to the subject immediately before us, which relates only to a comparison between the Churches of England and *Rome*: and for this comparison it is sufficient to know, that while the Church of Rome excludes *us* from the hope of salvation, we are not so uncharitable as to entertain the same opinion of *them*⁵. However greatly we may disapprove of those doctrines, which have no foundation in Scripture, we are far from thinking, that they, who have been taught to believe in them, and are unable to judge for themselves, will be punished hereafter for opinions over which they have no control⁶. But the Church

⁴ Ib. ib.

⁵ This moderation on the part of our Church must not however be so construed, as if it implied either doubt or indifference about the *truth* of the established Creed. Though we charitably admit, that there is more than one way to salvation, we still believe that our own is *the best*.

⁶ The objection indeed has been somewhere made, that we call their doctrine of Transubstantiation "a damnable doctrine," an expression which excludes (as is said) from salvation all who believe in it. Now I am really not aware that our Church in any of its *official* documents, has applied that epithet to Transubstantiation; and it cannot be answerable for an epithet which may have been used *elsewhere*. Nor would the inference be just, even if the premises were cor-

of Rome requires for salvation, not only a belief of those doctrines, which are *common* to the two Churches and indeed to *most* Christians, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement; it requires also for salvation a belief in those doctrines, by which the Church of Rome is *distinguished*, such as the doctrines of Transubstantiation, the worshipping of the Host, the invocation of Saints, the sacrifice of the Mass, the praying of souls out of purgatory, &c. All these *peculiar* doctrines are enumerated in the Trent Confession of Faith, and at the end of them is added, that this is the true Catholic faith, *out of which no one can be saved*⁷. It is therefore quite irrelevant to quote the sentiments of any *individual* member of that Church. It may be readily granted, that among the members of the Church of Rome, there are men of

rect: for a mere *epithet*, expressing only an abhorrence of a particular doctrine, can hardly imp'y that they who *receive* the doctrine will be exposed to *damnation*. But the whole objection is probably founded in a *mistake*, arising from a confusion, either of the Declaration against Popery, or of that against Transubstantiation, with the oath of Supremacy. In the latter, the position that princes excommunicated by the Pope may be deposed and murdered by their subjects, is called, and very justly called "a *damnable doctrine*." But that epithet is not applied to *Transubstantiation*, either in the declaration against Transubstantiation, or the declaration against Popery. See Burn's Ecclesiastical Law, vol. iii. p. 16, 17. And it is certainly not so applied in our *Articles*.

⁷ Hanc veram Catholicam fidem, *extra quam nemo salvus esse potest.*

learning and talents, who, though attached to the *cause*, are too liberal to confine their hope of salvation to a *single* Church. But we are now concerned with the *rule itself*; not with the exceptions to the rule. And when we consider, that the doctrine of exclusive salvation is taught, not only in the Trent Confession of Faith, not only in the theological lectures at Maynooth, but in the very *Catechisms*, which are put into the hands of children, surely no man can pretend, that the doctrine of exclusive salvation is not the *general* doctrine of that Church.

When we further consider, that the decisions of that Church, in matters of *faith*, are believed to be absolutely *infallible*, we clearly perceive that no room is left for the exercise of *private* judgment in controversies of faith. Whatever diversity of opinion may prevail about the *seat* of infallibility, its existence is asserted by all Romish writers without exception. Whether a general council derives infallibility from the Pope, which was the opinion of Bellarmine; or whether the Pope derives infallibility from a general council, as others have asserted; or whether the supposed infallibility is a sort of joint production, the *decrees* of a general council in matters of faith and morals are pronounced infallible by them all. And as the Church of Rome is represented in a general council, convoked by the authority of that Church, the decrees of such a council and the decrees of that Church are one and the

same thing. Hence it is positively asserted in the Roman Catechism, that the Church of Rome *cannot* err in matters of faith and morals, inasmuch as it is guided by the Holy Spirit; but that all other Churches *must* err in faith and morals, inasmuch as they are led by the spirit of the devil⁸. Now as the Roman Catechism is one of the *official* documents of that Church, nothing further can be wanted for the purpose of *proving*, that the Church of Rome claims such infallibility. But it is of additional importance to *us*, that the same tenet is strongly enforced in the theological lectures at Maynooth⁹; for the belief that the Church of Rome is infallible, is the key-stone of the whole edifice. Now one of the chapters in the treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi* is entitled, “Of the infallibility of the Church

⁸ Quemadmodum hæc una Ecclesia errare *non potest* in fidei ac morum disciplinâ tradendâ, cum a Spiritu Sancto gubernetur, ita cæteras omnes, quæ sibi Ecclesiæ nomen arrogant, ut quæ a Diaboli spiritu ducantur, in doctrinæ et morum perniciosissimis erroribus versari *necesse est*. Catech. Rom. p. 83. ed. 1587.

⁹ On this subject I can quote the authority of Sir J. C. Hippisley. For in No. xv. of the Appendix to his speech of May 18, 1810, he makes the following observation on the treatise *de Ecclesiâ Christi*. He calls it “the *Class Book* of the students destined for Holy orders:” and he adds, “It is of great importance to ascertain what are the tenets professed and taught in the seminaries, which supply candidates for the priesthood of the Roman Catholic Communion within the Realm; especially on the points generally objected to Catholics.”

assembled in general councils¹:" and the proposition maintained in the next chapter is, that "councils, which are general in their convocation and celebration are *infallible*²." The reason of this supposed infallibility, as assigned by the Roman Catechism, is, that such councils are under the immediate guidance of the Holy Spirit; and this very reason is assigned by the Council of Trent³. But the author of the above-quoted treatise argues further from the *necessity* of the case, and maintains, that in the Church of Christ an authority is requisite, which shall determine controversies of faith, by an irrefragable, and therefore *infallible* judgment⁴.

Now we have seen that the Church of England claims likewise authority in controversies of faith. But this authority no more implies infallibility, than the authority of the judges in controversies of *law*. Whether the law of God be interpreted in our convocation, or the law of man in an assembly of the twelve judges, the authority of the interpretation rests on its sup-

¹ De Infallibilitate Ecclesiæ in Conciliis generalibus congregatæ. P. 164.

² Concilia, convocatione et celebratione generalia, sunt infallibilia. P. 166.

³ In most of the decrees it styles itself, Sacrosancta Tridentina Synodus, *in Spiritu Sancto legitime congregata*.

⁴ In Ecclesiâ Christi admittenda est autoritas quædam exterior, loquens, et coercitiva, quæ controversias de divinis rebus irrefragabili, proindeque *infallibili* judicio dirimat. P. 96.

posed agreement with the text. Indeed, the infallibility of *any* synod, and consequently of the synod which settled our articles of religion, is positively disclaimed in the twenty-first of those articles. It is there asserted, that even *general* councils both *may* err, and *have* erred, in things pertaining to God. It is true, that the Church of England has its fanatics, as well as the Church of Rome; and that those fanatics, like the holy fathers who composed the Council of Trent, suppose themselves favoured by the especial guidance of the Spirit, and therefore exempted from the possibility of error. But the delusions of a party must not be ascribed to the Church at large. If the *Articles* of our Church disclaim infallibility, the Church *itself* disclaims it: for the Articles speak the *sense* of the Church.

If then, while the Church of England admits that it *may* have erred, the Church of Rome contends that it *cannot* err; if, while the Church of England admits, that salvation *may* be obtained in the Church of Rome, the latter denies the possibility of it in the former, we cannot have a more striking contrast between the powers which are claimed by the respective Churches. The authority of the Church of England goes no further, than is necessary for its own preservation; its members have no other restraints, than such as the welfare of *every* society requires: it neither prevents them from adopting any other form of Christianity, nor excludes them from

salvation, if they *do*. But the Church of Rome, which *denies* salvation to all who depart from it, and inculcates the belief that the very *act* of departure is the forfeiture of salvation, enslaves the conscience, and enchains the faculties of man. The Church of England then is a system of *religious liberty*; the Church of Rome a system of *religious slavery*.

This state of slavery is further promoted, and most effectually secured by what is called the Sacrament of *Penance*⁵, which the *Council of Trent* has declared to be necessary for *Salvation*⁶. Now an essential part of this Sacrament is confession, and moreover private confession to a priest⁷. This private confession is required by the *Roman Catechism* to be made at least once every year⁸: and the confession itself is

⁵ Sacramentum Poenitentiae. See the fourteenth Session of the Council of Trent.

⁶ The fourth Canon of the seventh Session, which relates to the Sacraments in general, is as follows, Si quis dixerit Sacramenta novæ legis non esse ad salutem necessaria, sed superflua, et sine eis, aut eorum voto, per solam fidem homines a Deo gratiam justificationis adipisci, licet omnia singulis necessaria non sint, anathema sit. P. 51. Now the expression *non omnia singulis* applies to orders and matrimony; but not to baptism or confirmation, or the eucharist, or penance, or extreme unction.

⁷ See the fifth and sixth chapters of the decree relating particularly to the Sacrament of penance; the former of which is entitled, *De Confessione*, the latter *De ministro hujus Sacramenti et absolutione*. P. 89—92.

⁸ Quo vero potissimum tempore confiteri oporteat, eo ca-

required to be whole and absolute, including even *mortal* sins⁹. Hence in *Butler's Catechism*, p. 50, we find the following question and answer:

Q. What do you think of those, who conceal a mortal sin in confession?

A. They commit a most grievous sin by telling a lie to the *Holy Ghost*¹.

Now when children are educated in the belief, that as soon as they come to years of discretion, they must periodically confess their sins to a priest, and confess them without reserve, they are subjected to a spiritual tyranny, which would never be borne if the impression of its necessity were not made at an age, when habits of servitude are most easily acquired. To confess our sins to Almighty God is a duty incumbent on us all. But to be placed under the *obligation* of going annually to a *priest*, for the purpose of Confession, and to be told, that if we conceal from him even a mortal sin, we lie to the *Holy Ghost*, is such an insult to a rational being, that even the prejudices of education are hardly sufficient to account for the patience, with which the

none de quo antea diximus, sancta Ecclesia decrevit : jubet enim *semel saltem quotannis* fideles omnes peccata sua confiteri. P. 229.

⁹ Illud autem imprimis doceant Parochi, in confessione curandum esse, ut *integra et absoluta* sit : etenim *omnia mortalia peccata* Sacerdoti aperire oportet. Ib. ib.

¹ The same declaration is made in the abstract of the Douay Catechism, p. 142.

servitude is endured. The case is widely different, when men *voluntarily* go to consult their ministers, in order to seek relief for a troubled conscience, and relate to him at *their own discretion* the offences, which cause their uneasiness. Now the confessions *required* by the *Church of England* are general confessions to Almighty God, in which the priest joins with the congregation; and though on certain occasions especial confession is *recommended*, it always depends on the will of the person himself. Thus in the exhortation to attend the Sacrament, the minister, after admonishing those, who have been guilty of any "*grievous crime*," to *repent* of their sins before they come to that holy table, subjoins, "if there be any of you, who by this means cannot quiet his own conscience herein, but requireth further comfort or counsel, let him come to me, or to some other discreet and learned minister of God's Word, and open his grief." This exhortation is so far from containing a *command* to make private confession of sins, that in the first place it applies only to cases, where men are unable to quiet their *own* consciences, and in the second place offers only the *means* of relief to those, who choose to *accept* them². But the

² As the Church of England *allows*, though it does not *command*, the use of private confession, it has wisely made the following provision in the 113th Canon, which relates to ministers certifying to the Ecclesiastical Courts notorious crimes and scandals by presentment. "Provided always,

advocates of the Church of Rome avail themselves of an expression in the office for the "Visitation of the Sick," which is considered as implying something more than mere recommendation. In one of the Rubrics to this office it is said, "Here the sick person shall be moved to make a special confession of his sins, if he feels his conscience troubled with any weighty matter." Now the force of the word "moved," on which great stress is laid, may be best appreciated by considering the use of it in the Rubric immediately preceding, which is: "The minister

that if any man confess his secret and hidden sins to the minister, for the unburdening of his conscience, and to receive spiritual consolation and ease of mind from him; we do not any way bind the said minister by this our constitution, &c." Surely nothing could be more proper, or even more necessary than this provision. By the 109th Canon the churchwardens of every parish are required to present notorious offenders; and by the 113th Canon, the same is required of ministers if the duty is neglected by the churchwardens. Since then confession to a minister is *allowed* by the exhortation in the Communion Service, there would have been a strange inconsistency, if men who *voluntarily* confessed, for the purpose of unburdening their conscience, and whose offences would otherwise have remained unknown to the minister, were confounded with those whose offences were *notorious*. To betray a secret, confided by one man to another, for the purpose of unburdening his conscience, is something so detestable, that the prohibition of the 113th Canon can require no further defence. And if this Canon had been estimated, as it ought, with reference to the exhortation in the Communion Service, it would have excited less surprise, when Sir J. C. Hippisley read it in the House of Commons. See his speech of May 18, 1810, p. 46.

should not omit earnestly to move such sick persons, as are of ability, to be liberal to the poor." Here the verb in question is coupled with the adverb "earnestly;" yet no one will contend that a Rubric, relating to the sick man's *property*, can imply a *command* on the part of the minister. No such command then is implied in the Rubric, which relates to his confession. Nor must we forget that this confession is not recommended in *all* cases; it is recommended only "*if* he feels his conscience troubled with any weighty matter." And how is the minister to *know* this, unless the sick man of his own accord declares it? But if he *does* declare that "his conscience is troubled with some weighty matter," the minister who prays with him, may surely advise him to specify the cause of his uneasiness, as the surest mode of quieting his conscience. Here is no spiritual tyranny, for all depends on the will of the patient. On the other hand, if a minister of the established Church were desired to pray with a sick person, and that sick person gave no intimation of a troubled conscience, or a *want* of spiritual relief, the minister would not be authorised by the Rubric even to *recommend* a special confession. It would be a most impertinent, and unjustifiable prying into secrets, with which he is no otherwise concerned, than as the patient himself *requires* his assistance³. There is no

³ Even the absolution is not given unless "he humbly and

similarity therefore whatever between confession of the Church of *England*, and confession in the

heartily desire it." Of this absolution, though it is often quoted for the purpose of showing the similarity of *our* Church to the Church of Rome, it cannot be necessary to make many observations. The case, in which alone it is to be used, is a case which *hardly ever occurs*. It is to be used only, according to the Rubric, when the sick person has thought proper to make a "*special* confession of his sins," and then heartily *desires* the absolution. The consequence is, that very few clergymen have ever had occasion to use it. It would be foreign to our present inquiry, to consider how far a Christian minister can go beyond the act of *declaring* that God pardoneth and absolveth those who truly repent, as in the absolution of the Morning and Evening Service ; or, of offering a solemn *petition* to Almighty God for that purpose, as in the absolution of the Communion Service. But if the form of the absolution in the Visitation of the Sick implies a *judicial* power, or a power of pardoning vested in the minister *himself*, it is still an act of injustice to the Church of England, to compare a form which is prescribed for the bed of sickness, at the approach of death, and even *then* to be used only in extreme cases, with the *ordinary* form of absolution in the Church of Rome. This form, as given in Latin in the *Rituale Romanum Pauli V. Pont. Max. jussu editum*, in the chapter *De Sacramento Poenitentiae* (p. 37. ed. Antverpiæ, 1625, 4) is as follows. Dominus noster, Jesus Christus te absolvat ; et ego auctoritate ipsius te absolvo ab omni vinculo excommunicationis, suspensionis, et interdicti, in quantum possum, et tu indiges. Deinde ego te absolvo a peccatis tuis in nomine Patris, Filii, et Spiritus Sancti. Amen. Now this judicial absolution is not confined to the bed of sickness, but is employed for persons in health ; a *shorter* form being used when there is danger of death, namely, Ego te absolvo ab omnibus censuris et peccatis, in nomine Patris, Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, Ib. p. 58. The foregoing judicial absolution therefore is *repeated*, as often as a person confesses, and does the penance enjoined him. *Such* a power of absolution is capable of the

Church of *Rome*. Confession of sins to a priest, being an act of *obligation* in the latter, becomes a powerful engine of spiritual tyranny⁴. But as private confession is a *voluntary* act in the former, provision is made for the spiritual *com-*

greatest abuse, whereas it is hardly *possible* to convert the absolution in our "Visitation of the Sick" into an engine of spiritual dominion. The cases indeed are widely different; the confession which precedes absolution being in the one case *compulsory*, in the other case *voluntary*. Nor must we forget the difference arising from the power of the Romish Clergy to require acts of *penance*, before they give absolution, a power, which no clergyman of our Church can exercise toward those, who have confessed to him. If at any time penance is enjoined with us, which happens very rarely, it is a punishment inflicted for some offence by the sentence of an ecclesiastical court.

⁴ Mr. Crowley, who was formerly a Student in the College of Maynooth, and is therefore perfectly well acquainted with the effects of confession among the Romanists in Ireland, says, at p. 4 of his *Thoughts on the Emancipation of the Roman Catholics*: "Long before children are sent to *Confession*, they are taught by their parents and others to respect and dread the priest. Confession, and especially confirmation, afford him the best opportunities that can be, and which he very rarely neglects, to make the deepest impressions on their tender minds. And his occasional admonitions and threatenings, together with the discourses and examples of priest-ridden or credulous people, are in general sufficient to prevent those impressions from being afterwards either effaced or weakened." At p. 23, he says of the Romish Priests in Ireland, "Considering the restraint under which they labour, it is wonderful how much power they presume with the aid of these doctrines to exercise over the common people." And he adds in a note, "that many a countryman has patiently borne a flogging from a priest, which would entitle him to heavy damages in a court of justice."—Among other

fort of the sinner, without diminution of his spiritual freedom.

The last engine of spiritual tyranny in the Church of Rome is the *Inquisition*, which is very closely connected with that of *compulsory* confession. This horrid tribunal was founded on the arrogant assumption, that they who conduct the councils of that Church, are exempted by the Holy Spirit even from the *possibility* of error. Pretending to possess that *unerring judgment*, which belongs alone to the Almighty, but discarding the attribute of divine *mercy*, relentless man inflicted tortures and death on his fellow-creatures, for the sole offence of entertaining *opinions*, which differ from *his own*. It is true, that the Inquisition, though lately restored in Spain, and at no time abolished, either in Portugal or in Italy, was never established as a regular tribunal in this country. Yet many have been condemned to the flames for heresy against the Church of Rome. It is urged indeed, that similar cruelty has been displayed by Protestants themselves: and the victims of the Church of Rome in the reign of Elizabeth have been compared with the victims of the Church of England in the reign of Mary. But the cases

instances of patient submission, I remember many years ago to have seen, in the Cathedral of Mecheln, a grenadier, who had been the terror of the Turks, kneeling two hours on the bare stones, performing a penance imposed by his confessor.

are quite dissimilar. When Cranmer and Latimer, and Ridley, and Hooper, with the numerous other martyrs, were committed to the flames in the reign of Mary, their *sole* offence was a rejection of Transubstantiation, and the other doctrines peculiar to the Church of Rome. But the papists, who were executed in the reign of Elizabeth, were not executed because they *believed* in those doctrines, but because their desire to restore the Romish religion had led them to acts of rebellion against their lawful sovereign.

CHAPTER X.

THE PROOF OF THE PROPOSITION ADVANCED AT THE HEAD OF
THE PRECEDING CHAPTER, CONTINUED AND CONCLUDED.

THE second part of the proposition, of which the first part was proved in the preceding chapter, derives additional importance from the close connexion which subsists in this country between the *State* and the established *Church*. If the Church of Rome tramples on the rights of all other Churches (the part of the proposition, which we are now going to prove), it is a necessary consequence that it affects, in this country, the rights also of the *State*.

The arguments, which were used in the preceding chapter, to show that the Church of Rome enslaved the consciences of its own members, are, many of them, applicable also to the proof, that it tramples on the rights of all *other* Churches. When, for instance, the Church of Rome contends that it “*retains* its jurisdiction over all apostates, heretics, and schismatics, though they no longer belong to its body¹,” it pretends to a right which directly interferes with the rights of the Church, or Churches, of

¹ Chap. ix. notes ², ³.

which those apostates, as they are called, are become members. Now, if a member of our *own* Church thinks proper to withdraw from it, and to profess Christianity under a different form, our Church presumes not to interfere, whatever be the *motive* for withdrawing. The person so withdrawn is considered as withdrawn from its authority, which can no longer be extended to him, without infringing the rights of the community to which he has acceded. But the authority of the Church of Rome is of so peculiar a description, that it neither suffers the exercise of private judgment within its *own* pale, nor allows its members to remove to any other community, where they might *obtain* that right. The claim of jurisdiction still follows them, wherever they go; they are not only considered as deserters, but as still liable to punishment, even after their names are erased from the muster-roll of the Romish Church². Nor is this extension of authority confined to mere *personal* desertion, or to *individual* acts of secession. It embraces whole *societies*, and applies no less to those, whose *ancestors* withdrew from the Church of Rome, than to those who have withdrawn from it *themselves*. In the theological lectures at Maynooth, the whole *society of Protestants* is denounced as a society of *Schismatics*³; and Schismatics in general, though not *members* of that

² Chap. ix. note 4.

³ Ib. note 9.

Church, are declared in those very lectures to be *amenable* to that Church. In like manner the Roman Catechism declares of heretics and schismatics in general, that they are still “in the *power* of the Church, as persons liable to be called to judgment, punished and doomed by anathema to damnation⁴.” Now this declaration is made in a work which was published by the authority of the pope himself, and was sanctioned even by a decree of the Council of Trent⁵. And since the same tenet (as appears from note 3, to the preceding chapter) is maintained at this very day in the college of Maynooth, there can be no necessity for sending to any *foreign* university, whether the Church of Rome considers the members of *our* Church as amenable to its jurisdiction on the charge of heresy and schism. Now, if such a tenet is maintained in the college of Maynooth, when the Romanists are *petitioners* for political power, we cannot doubt what would be the fate of Protestants, if the Church of Rome should again acquire in these dominions the ascendancy to which it is

⁴ Chap. ix. note 2.

⁵ It is entitled *Catechismus Romanus, ex Decreto Concilii Tridentini et Pii V. Pontificis Maximi jussu primum editus*. The decree of the Council of Trent, which authorised the publication of this Catechism, as well as of the Breviary and the Missal, was made at the twenty-fifth session, and is entitled, *De Indice librorum, Catechismo, Breviario, et Missali*. P. cccxxxiv.

aspiring⁶. Nor is even the *sovereign* of these dominions exempted from the claim of jurisdiction; for he is equally included in the title of heretic and schismatic; he is equally included among those whom the Church of Rome has declared to be worthy of punishment.

But that Church, it seems, is the *mother* and *mistress* of all other Churches, and is therefore authorised to interfere in their concerns. The claim to this distinguished title was asserted by the Council of Trent⁷: and, in the words of the Trent Profession of Faith, the beneficed clergy of the Church of Rome acknowledge “the holy, catholic, and apostolic Roman Church to be the mother and mistress of all Churches⁸.” Now, that the Church of Rome is the *mother* of all Churches, is an assertion so *palpably false*, that we may justly wonder how an infallible council could declare it, and still more that the Romish

⁶ Mr. Gandolphy, who, like Dr. Dromgoole, speaks out where a prudent man would be silent, says, at p. 17 of his second letter, in reference to the Church of England, “To withstand the torrent, which is now set in against this fabric, it should have been built upon a rock, which it is not; it must therefore pass away, like all establishments raised on a sandy foundation.” Yet, at p. 16, he thinks there is *one* chance of our escaping from ruin, “namely, a re-union with the Church of Rome, and a concordatum with the papal see,” &c.

⁷ See note ¹, to chap. ix.

⁸ Sanctam, Catholicam, et Apostolicam Romanam ecclesiam omnium Ecclesiarum matrem et magistram agnosco.

clergy should *swear* to it⁹. The mother of all Churches was unquestionably the Church of *Jerusalem*. On the *very day* on which the Apostles were “filled with the Holy Ghost¹,”—“Peter standing up with the eleven lifted up his voice, and said unto them (the Jews), Ye men of Judea, and all ye that dwell at Jerusalem, be this known unto you, and hearken to my words².” The effect of St. Peter’s address to the Jews, then assembled at Jerusalem, is well known. “On the same day were added unto them about *three thousand souls*³.” “and the Lord added to the *Church* daily such as should be saved⁴.” The Church of Jerusalem is mentioned also on several other occasions in the Acts of the Apostles. Thus, at chap. v. 11, “great fear came upon all the *Church* ;” chap. viii. 1, “there was a great persecution against the *Church which was at Jerusalem* ;” chap. xv. 4, “when they were come to *Jerusalem*, they were received of the *Church*, and of the Apostles and Elders,” &c. &c. Unquestionably, therefore, the Church of *Jerusalem* was the mother of all Christian Churches.

With respect to the *other* part of the title, namely “*mistress* of all Churches,” it shows such ambition and arrogance on the part of the Romish Church, as is sufficient to put all other Churches

⁹ The Trent Profession of Faith is made on *oath*. But on the subject of *oaths* more will be said in the sequel.

¹ Acts ii. 4.

² Ib. ver. 14.

³ Ib. ver. 41.

⁴ Ib. ver. 47.

on their guard against future encroachments. If one Church considers itself as the *mistress* of another, it will certainly not fail to exercise its authority, whenever it acquires the *power*. Now in whatever light we view this claim of spiritual dominion, it must equally excite our surprise and our indignation. That either a prince or a priest, residing in *one* country, should claim the right of interfering in the administration of *another* country, which is perfectly independent as a state, and subject only to its *own* prince, is an anomaly in the government of the world, of which the Roman pontiff affords the sole example. While the Roman empire existed, and Rome was the seat of government, the *bishop* of Rome might properly be considered as the *primate* in the Roman empire. But when the empire was *divided* and one emperor resided at Rome, another at Constantinople, the independence of the east on the *temporal* power of the west necessarily required the same independence in *spiritual* concerns. Hence the patriarch of Constantinople very properly *resisted* the pretensions which were still continued by the bishop of Rome, and eventually succeeded in *establishing* his independence. When the empire of the West itself was divided into separate kingdoms, independent of all *temporal* authority emanating from the city of Rome, the ecclesiastical concerns of those kingdoms would have been consistently administered, if no *spiritual* authority

had been permitted to emanate from the same place. But the west of Europe was then enveloped in spiritual *darkness*, and thus an entrance was afforded for spiritual *tyranny*. Of this spiritual tyranny we freed ourselves at the Reformation, and we must guard against its entrance a *second* time. We must not forget that a *universal bishop* is a thing as much to be dreaded as a *universal monarch*. We must not forget, that as universal empire in temporal concerns is subversive of *civil* liberty, so universal empire in ecclesiastical concerns is subversive of *religious* liberty.

That the extensive jurisdiction originally exercised by the bishop of Rome, arose from no other cause than his being bishop of a city, which was then the capital of a great empire, is too obvious to require a proof. But when the *temporal* power of Rome was reduced to a small portion of Italy, it was necessary to find some other *basis*, on which the bishop of Rome might rest his pretensions to the former extent of *spiritual* power. The pope was represented as the successor of St. Peter; St. Peter was represented as the chief of the Apostles; hence it was inferred, that the pope was the chief over all bishops; whence it was further concluded, that he had *spiritual jurisdiction* over all bishops, and consequently in the universal Church. Hence we find in the Trent Profession of Faith, that the Roman pontiff is denominated “the succes-

sor of St. Peter, prince of the apostles⁵; and that in the theological lectures of Maynooth is maintained the following proposition: "The Roman pontiff, as successor of St. Peter in his episcopal see, deservedly claims, by divine right, that *primacy of honour and jurisdiction in the universal Church* which was granted to St. Peter⁶."

In support of this reasoning, if such it may be called, appeal is made to Irenæus⁷, who wrote in the latter part of the second century, and who is the *earliest* writer that speaks of St. Peter, as having had any share in founding the Church of Rome. In his third book against heretics, chap. III., says Irenæus, "Of the greatest, and most ancient, and universally known Church of Rome, *founded and constituted by the two most glorious apostles, Peter and Paul*⁸," &c. This opinion, that St. Peter was concerned

⁵ Immediately after the words quoted in note ⁸, is added, *Romanoque Pontifici, B. Petri Apostolorum principis successor, ac Jesu Christi Vicario, veram obedientiam spondeo ac juro.*

⁶ Romanus Pontifex, tanquam Petri successor in ejus episcopali sede, merito sibi divino jure vindicat primatum honoris et jurisdictionis in universâ Ecclesiâ, qui Petro concessus fecit. *De Ecclesiâ Christi*, p. 341.

⁷ *Ib.* p. 342.

⁸ Maximæ, et antiquissimæ, et omnibus cognitæ a gloriosissimis duobus Apostolis, Petro et Paulo, Romæ fundatæ et constitutæ Ecclesiæ, &c. What Irenæus says in the next sentence about the pre-eminence of that Church (*propter potiozem principalitatem*) can be ascribed to no other cause, than that the *city* of Rome was then the capital of a great empire, whence of course it followed, that the *Church* of Rome was

in the foundation of the Church of Rome, is repeated also by many other writers, who lived *after* the time of Irenæus, and who probably depended on his authority. Yet it is really *impossible* to reconcile it either with the Acts of the Apostles, or the Epistles of St. Paul; and we must either *renounce* the opinion, or let Scripture give way to tradition. That St. Paul was the *only* Apostle who can be said to have founded the Church of Rome, is evident from his Epistle to the Romans. Nor can even St. Paul be said to have founded that Church in any other sense, than that he sent an *Epistle* to the Romans, and afterwards *resided* among them. For a Christian community had been previously established at Rome, as indeed his very Epistle, which was written before he went thither himself, necessarily *implies*. But if that community had then received any foundation from an *Apostle*, St. Paul would surely not have said in his Epistle to the Romans, that he took care not to “build upon *another man’s foundation* ⁹.” Further, if St. Peter had been at Rome when St. Paul wrote that Epistle, he would surely have inclu-

then considered as the first among the *Churches* of the empire. It might therefore, at *that* time, be properly called *maxima ecclesia imperii Romani*: but it does not follow that it *retained* its primacy when the Roman empire was *dissolved* — N.B. The Greek original of this passage is lost, which is the reason of its being here quoted in a Latin translation.

⁹ ἵνα μὴ ἐπὶ ἄλλοῦ ἰπῖον θεμελίω. Rom. xv. 20.

ded him in the number of those persons, to whom he sent salutations in the last chapter. Again, if St. Peter had been at Rome, when St. Paul himself arrived there, St. Luke could not have failed to notice it. But he concludes his history by saying, that St. Paul dwelt at Rome two whole years, preaching the kingdom of God¹, and gives not the slightest intimation of *St. Peter* having been there. Nor is it credible, if St. Peter had been at Rome during *any* part of the time, when St. Paul himself was there, that St. Paul would have written Epistles from that very place, and have said nothing of St. Peter. Yet he wrote not less than *six* Epistles from Rome; namely, to the Colossians, to the Ephesians, to the Philippians, to the Hebrews, to Philemon, and the Second Epistle to Timothy: and in none of those Epistles does the name of St. Peter ever once occur. Indeed, he says expressly in the Second Epistle to Timothy, “only Luke is with me².” And this very Epistle appears to have been written by St. Paul only a short time before his death. For he says at chap. iv. 9, “*I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand. I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course.*” The opinion, therefore, that St. Paul and St. Peter were *together* at Rome, and that they suffered martyrdom together, is an opinion which, however prevalent after the

¹ Acts xxviii. 30, 31.

² Chap. iv. 11.

time of Irenæus, must be devoid of foundation. *Better* evidence we cannot have, than is afforded by St. Paul's Epistles ; and it is well known, that reports may be propagated without contradiction, a hundred years after an event is said to have happened, especially when it flatters the vanity of those among whom it is propagated. Nor is it unworthy of our notice, that when St. Paul calls *himself* the Apostle of the *Gentiles*, he calls *St. Peter* the Apostle of the *Jews*³. On what principle then, it may be asked, is he claimed by the Church of *Rome*? But if the evidence afforded by St. Paul should still be thought insufficient to outweigh the evidence of Irenæus, it may be further observed, that Irenæus *himself* has shown, that the evidence of Irenæus, at least on this subject, is of no value. For in the very same sentence he asserts that the Church of Rome was not only the greatest but the most *ancient* Church, an assertion, which *directly contradicts* the account given in the Acts of the Apostles relative to the Church of Jerusalem⁴. Now if *one* part of his evidence contains

³ Gal. ii. 7.

⁴ See the references in the notes ¹—⁴, in p. 229, whence it appears that St. Peter laid the foundation of the Church at Jerusalem on the *very same day* on which the Apostles received the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The Church of Antioch, where the disciples were first called Christians, (Acts xi. 26,) must likewise have been founded long before it was *possible* to found a Church at Rome ; to say nothing of the Churches founded by St. Paul before he wrote his Epistle to the Romans.

a palpable falsehood, the credit of *the other* part is at once destroyed.

But if St. Peter did not *found* the Church of Rome, and even if he had never been there, when St. Paul wrote his Second Epistle to Timothy, it is still possible (as may be urged) that he came *afterwards* to Rome, and became *bishop* of that see. Let us suppose then, that St. Peter *was* Bishop of Rome, and examine what inference can be drawn from the supposition. Even if he was called by the *name* of bishop, he was still *in fact* an Apostle. His *apostolic* quality was not altered by the assumption of another title. But it was only in reference to that *title*, that the bishops of Rome could be considered as his successors, even if St. Peter *bore* that title. For they certainly did not succeed him, in reference to his quality as an *inspired Apostle*. It is true, that bishops in general are frequently called successors of the Apostles as being heads of the Church: but they do not therefore pretend to inherit the *miraculous powers* of the Apostles. The argument from analogy therefore entirely fails. Indeed, the whole is a dispute about *words*, and hardly merits a serious reply. But since so much stress has been laid on the word “bishop,” as if it had been borne by St. Peter, and was not merely ascribed to him by the Latin writers to gratify their own vanity, let us hear what Irenæus says on this subject, whose evidence cannot be rejected by those, who admit his evi-

dence, as proof that St. Peter was the *founder* of their Church. Now immediately after the passage, in which he speaks of St. Peter and St. Paul as founders of the Church of Rome, he proceeds as follows, “When the blessed *Apostles* had founded and built the Church, they entrusted the office of BISHOP to *Linus* ⁵.” Even according then to the account of Irenæus, the Bishops of Rome must be considered, as successors of *Linus*, not as successors of *St. Peter* ⁶.

And after all it would be difficult to comprehend, on what principle the primacy of the popes could be established, even were it *granted*, that they were successors of St. Peter, and his successors in any sense of the word which they might choose to adopt. If bishops, who preside

⁵ Θεμελιώσαντες οὖν καὶ οἰκοδομήσαντες οἱ μακάριοι ἀπόστολοι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, Δίνῳ τὴν τῆς Ἐπισκοπῆς λειτουργίαν ἐνεχείρησαν. Of this passage, Dr. Delahogue very prudently takes no notice : though it *begins* exactly where his own quotation *ends*. See p. 342, of his *Treatise de Ecclesiâ Christi*. Yet *this* passage exists in the Greek original, whereas the passage which he quotes exists only in a Latin translation.

⁶ Irenæus adds, that Linus was succeeded by Anacletus, and Anacletus by Clemens, who wrote, as he observes, an Epistle to the Corinthians. Now this Epistle is still extant, and if Clemens had considered himself as successor of *St. Peter* in the see of Rome, one might expect that some allusion would have been made to it. But I have lately read the whole of that Epistle, and not a syllable does he say of St. Peter having been Bishop of Rome. Yet he had a very good opportunity, as, in chap. v., he speaks of the *martyrdom* of St. Peter ; though he speaks of it without saying *where*.

where a Church was founded by an *Apostle*, have on that account a title to precedence, the Bishops of Corinth, Thessalonica, Ephesus, and of other Churches founded by St. Paul, had as good a right to precedence as the Bishop of Rome. Ay, but St. Paul, they say, was not equal in *rank* to St. Peter, who was the *prince* of the Apostles (*princeps Apostolorum*). Now St. Paul himself has positively *denied* such precedence: he says (2 Cor. xi. 5.) that he “was not a whit behind the very chiefest Apostles.” It is further argued, that St. Peter was the *Rock*, on which the Church was built. So indeed he *was*. He was the Rock, on which the Church of *Jerusalem* was built, the Church which was the *mother* of all Churches, and which, if the arguments of the Romanists were valid, might claim to be *mistress* of all Churches. At this very day there is a Patriarch of Jerusalem, who, though he possesses no *patrimony* of St. Peter, has an infinitely stronger claim to the *primacy* among Christians, than the Pope of Rome. The Church of Jerusalem is unquestionably the *mother* Church, which the Church of Rome is *not*. The Church of Jerusalem was unquestionably founded by St. Peter, which the Church of Rome was *not*. In the Church of *Jerusalem*, and not in the Church of *Rome*, was fulfilled the prophecy of our Saviour, that the Church should be founded on St. Peter, as a rock. It is through the Church of Jerusalem, which was the *mother* of all Churches,

and not through the Church of Rome, that Christian Churches *in general* partake of the prophecy of our Saviour⁷.

But if the Church of Rome is determined to maintain a title, to which it has no legal claim ; if it is resolved to act, as the mother and mistress of all other Churches ; if agreeably to these pretensions it claims a spiritual jurisdiction over the

⁷ As the inference deduced by the Romish writers from our Saviour's prophecy, that St. Peter was the Rock, on which the Church should be built, admits of so obvious an answer, it is much to be lamented that such unnecessary, and, at the same time, such unsuccessful pains should have been taken to show that our Saviour, under the word *Rock*, did not understand *St. Peter*. The distinctions which have been made between Πέτρος and Πέτρα in the Greek, or between *Petrus* and *Petra* in the Latin Vulgate, when the language of our Saviour was neither Greek nor Latin, are surely unworthy of a critic. The language spoken by our Saviour with his Apostles was Syriac ; and the identical words which He used on the occasion in question, must be sought therefore in the old Syriac version. Now, for the Greek words, σὺ εἶ Πέτρος, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ Πέτρᾳ, which in fact are only a translation, we find in the old Syriac, ܐܬܐ ܕܥܝܢܐ ܕܥܝܢܐ ܕܥܝܢܐ ܕܥܝܢܐ ܕܥܝܢܐ which literally translated is, "Thou art *Rock*, and upon this *Rock*," &c. The same word ܐܬܐ (Cepha) is used in both places : the same word is both an appellative and a proper name, as the word "Rock" is also in English. The effect, therefore, in Syriac was exactly the same, as if we said in English to a person, whose name was Rock, and who at the same time was likely to be the support of some great cause, "Thou art Rock in name, and shalt be Rock in deed, for on thee," &c. As our Saviour necessarily alluded to St. Peter when he used ܐܬܐ the first time, he could not possibly allude to any one else, when the very same word was immediately repeated.

members of other Churches, whom it considers as deserters deserving of punishment, it is both our interest and our duty to resist demands, which are equally dangerous to Church and State.

II. If we further examine the principles of that Church, on the subjects of infallibility and exclusive salvation, we shall find that hostility to all other Churches is the unavoidable result. If, while men *believe* that they are right, they admit that they are *possibly* wrong, they are naturally disposed to bear with religious opinions which differ from their own. But they who are persuaded, not only that they *do not* err, but even that they *can not* err in matters of faith, are disposed to consider it as a *duty*, to check the growth of all other opinions, which they must consider as dangerous heresy. Guided, as they suppose, by the Holy Spirit, and thus exempted from even the *possibility* of error, they will deem it impious to tolerate what the Spirit, as they imagine, has condemned⁸. The belief, that there is no salvation except in the Church of Rome, must, even from motives of *humanity*, and independently of all *ambitious* views for the extension of power and party, impel the members of that

⁸ If it be objected, that there are likewise *Protestants*, who fancy themselves under the immediate influence of the Holy Spirit, and consequently exempt from the danger of error, I answer that the Church of England, in its own *official* documents, lays no claim to infallibility, and therefore cannot be answerable for the fanaticism of those, who suppose themselves so gifted.

Church to bring over heretics and schismatics into the only communion, in which they can be saved. The bare act of *separation* from the Church of Rome, even if accompanied by *no error in faith*, is declared sufficient to exclude men from the hope of salvation⁹. Now when such a tenet is inculcated in the regular education, which is received by the students at Maynooth, and this tenet is coupled with the tenet, likewise inculcated in the same College, that the Church of Rome *retains* its jurisdiction over all schismatics¹, the Church of England has sufficient reason to apprehend the consequences, if temporal power should ever be added to the spiritual will. And not the Church only, but the State; for the one is allied to the other. The King of Great Britain is to the Church of Rome no less an heretic and schismatic, than any of his subjects; and to tolerate an heretical king is to expose the true religion to imminent danger².

⁹ Certissima est doctrina, Patrum consensione, et Ecclesiæ praxi confirmata, Schismaticos, *etiamsi in fidei non errarent*, solo sui Schismatis facto esse extra Ecclesiam, *et viam salutis*. De Ecclesiâ Christi, p. 25.

¹ Ecclesiam suam *retinet* jurisdictionem in omnes Apostatas, Hæreticos, et Schismaticos, quanquam ad illius corpus non jam pertineant. Ib. p. 394.

² This inference naturally follows from the admitted premises. Of course the inference is not drawn in the treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi*: but it is drawn by Bellarmine, who says, "Tolerare regem hæreticum, vel infidelem, conantem pertrahere homines, ad suam sectam, est exponere religionem evidentissimo periculo." *De Romano Pontifice*, lib. v. cap. 7.

Such are the consequences of that spiritual authority, which is claimed by the Church of Rome, and which is alike incompatible with the welfare of other Churches, and of other *states*. The pretence, that it only exercises *spiritual* power, is futile in the extreme: for if the exercise of spiritual power produces *civil* mischief, we must argue from the consequence, and not from the cause. In fact, it is of no importance by what *name* an authority be called, if it leads to evils which ought not to be borne.

Nor is it always *possible* to distinguish between the exercise of spiritual and the exercise of temporal power, especially when both temporal and spiritual power is vested, as at the Court of Rome, in the *same person*. But even were the pope a mere *spiritual* bishop, yet there are so many acts which are of a *mixed* nature, that a Romanist in this country might easily consider as *spiritual*, what our government might justly consider as *temporal*. In this divided opinion it may be asked, Who is to determine, and who is to be obeyed? A clear and distinct answer is given to this question by Bellarmine, who says, that when the *jus divinum* and the *jus humanum* are at variance, the former must be observed in preference to the latter³.

The distinction, therefore, which is now made between obedience to the pope in *spirituals*, and

³ *De Romano Pontifice*, lib. v. cap. 7.

obedience to the king in *temporals*, is a distinction, which the Romanists themselves must in *practice* find it difficult to observe. As far as *theory* goes on this subject, the power of the pope over the *temporal* concerns of other countries is now formally disclaimed; though it was once very strenuously asserted, and Bellarmine himself was some time in disgrace at the Court of Rome, because he admitted that the power of the pope in temporals was only *indirect*⁴. But if all power over the temporal concerns of other countries is now disclaimed for the *Pope* of Rome, it is absolutely impossible to disclaim

⁴ The title of Bellarmine's sixth chapter of the fifth book *De Romano Pontifice* is, "Papam habere summam temporalem potestatem *indirecte*." But one should suppose, that Bellarmine had said enough in this very chapter, to appease the anger of the pope for his unguarded admission. For at the beginning of this very chapter he says, "Asserimus Pontificem, ut Pontificem, etsi non habeat ullam *mere* temporalem potestatem, tametsi habere in ordine *ad bonum spirituale* summam potestatem disponendi de *temporalibus* rebus omnium Christianorum." And in a subsequent part of the same chapter he makes the following nice distinction. "Non potest Papa, *ut Papa*, ordinarie temporales Principes deponere, etiam justâ de causâ, eo modo quo deponit Episcopos, id est tanquam *ordinarius* Judex; tamen potest *mutare regna*, et uni auferre atque alteri conferre, tanquam summus Princeps spiritualis, si id necessarium sit *ad animarum salutem*."—Now, since Bellarmine, as appears from the disgrace which he incurred in consequence of his denying the *direct* power of the pope, certainly did not represent the authority of the pope as *greater* than the pope himself considered his due, I should prefer this opinion of Bellarmine to the opinion of any University in France or Spain.

that power for the *Church* of Rome. And what consolation is it to know, that the pope, *as pope* (papa, *ut papa*, as Bellarmine distinguishes) renounces a power, if that power is claimed by the *Church*, of which he himself is the head?

III. That the *Church* of Rome claims a power in matters which are purely *temporal*, is evident from various canons, which have been made by general councils. The canon which has attracted the most attention, is the third canon of the fourth Lateran Council, holden by Pope Innocent III, in the year 1215. The canon is entitled, *De hæreticis*, and the extirpation of heresy is the object of it⁵. But as the measures,

⁵ It begins, "Excommunicamus et anathematizamus omnem hæresim extollentem se adversus hanc sanctam, orthodoxam, Catholicam fidem, quam superius exposuimus, condemnantes *universos hæreticos, quibuscunque nominibus censeantur.*" And after a short interval it proceeds as follows, "Moneantur autem et inducantur, et si necesse fuerit per censuram ecclesiasticam compellantur *sæculares potestates, quibuscunque fungantur officiis,* ut, sicut reputari cupiunt et haberi fideles, ita pro defensione fidei præsent publice juramentum, quod de terris suæ jurisdictioni subjectis *universos hæreticos* ab ecclesiâ denotatos bonâ fide *pro viribus exterminare* studebunt; ita quodammodo, quandoque quis fuerit in potestatem, sive spiritalem, sive temporalem assumptus, hoc teneatur capitulum juramento firmare. Si vero dominus temporalis, requisitus et monitus ab Ecclesiâ, terram suam purgare neglexerit ab hac hæretica fœditate, per metropolitanum et cæteros comprovinciales episcopos excommunicationis vinculo innodetur. Et si satisfacere contempserit infra annum, significetur hoc summo pontifici; ut ex tunc ipse *vasallos ab ejus fidelitate denunciaret absolutos, et terram exponat Catholicis occupandam, qui eam, exterminatis hæreticis, sine ullâ contradictione possideant, et in fidei puritate conservent:* salvo

adopted for that purpose, amount to nothing less, than the deposing of temporal lords in general, who refuse to *assist* in the extirpation, the advocates of the Church of Rome have employed every effort to evade the conclusions which are drawn from it. And with a view of showing, especially, that it cannot be applied to *this* kingdom, they have argued, first, that the term “heretic” in that canon cannot include Protestants, because they did not then *exist*; and secondly, that the temporal lords, against which the canon exercises a deposing power, were only *feudal* lords, or such as held of a *principal* lord, and consequently could not include a lord paramount, like the King of England. Now throughout the whole canon there is no such thing as a *specification* of heretics, either by this, or by that name; they are mentioned in the most *general* manner possible; the canon expressly includes *universos hæreticos quibuscunque nominibus censeantur*⁶. There is *no* species of

jure Domini principalis, dummodo super hoc ipse nullum præstet obstaculum, nec aliquod impedimentum opponat; eâdem nihilominus lege servatâ circa eos qui *non* habent dominos principales.” Concilia Labbei et Cossartii, tom xi. col. 148.

⁶ Mr. Lingard at p. 43 of his “Review of certain Anti-Catholic publications” has given a translation from that part of the third canon which begins with the words, “Si vero dominus temporalis,” &c. He says the canon enacts, “that if the lord of a fee patronise the Albigenses, he shall be excommunicated by the metropolitan and bishops of the province; that if he does not amend;” &c. and he prefixes inverted commas, from which his readers will conclude that he

heresy therefore, to which the canon does not apply, and as Protestants in general are called heretics by the Church of Rome, the inference is unavoidable, that Protestants are *included* in its application. That it applies only to *feudal* lords is argued from the expression *salvo jure domini principalis*; but we must not forget what immediately follows, *eâdem nihilominus lege servatâ circa eos, qui dominos principales non habent*. For surely lords who have no *principal*, must *themselves* be principal lords⁷. Nor is it possible

presents them with a translation from the very words of the canon. From what edition he has translated I cannot say; but this I can positively assert, that the word "Albigenses" does not *exist* in this canon either in the well-known edition of Labbé and Cossart, which I have now before me, or in any edition which I have ever seen. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge the term "Albigenses" does not occur in any *one* of the canons made at the fourth Lateran Council. It was the *third* Lateran Council holden by *Alexander III.*, not the *fourth* Lateran Council holden by *Innocent III.*, in which the Waldenses and Albigenses were condemned.

⁷ To evade the force of this inference it has been asserted, that the expression *qui non habent dominos principales* meant only persons whose estates were *allodial*. But to *have* a principal lord (*habere dominum principalem*), and to *hold* of a principal lord (*tenere a domino principali*), are two totally different things. Spelman in his *Glossarium Archæologicum* explains "Allodium," as "*terra libera, quam quis a nemine tenet*;" but he adds, "*est sub domino districtûs quoad protectionem et jurisdictionem*." Since then it may be said of those who have allodial property "*non tenent a dominis principalibus*," whereas it *cannot* be said of them "*non habent dominos principales*," the expression used in the canon appears to be *inapplicable* to them. But it certainly *may* be applied to those who are lords paramount, which was full enough for the purpose, either of

to have an expression more general, than that of *sæculares potestates, quibuscunque fungantur officiis*. If we further ask in what manner the authority which *proposed* the law has itself *construed* the law, we shall find that it *does* apply to the Sovereigns of England⁸.

Innocent III., or of his successors. But says Sir J. C. Hippisley (Speech, 1810, p. 73), of the words *domini principales*, "Catholics contend, and it seems with reason, that those words cannot mean *Sovereigns*, as is often supposed, since they occur in the same manner in the constitution of Frederick II., which could only bind his own vassals." This constitution is quoted by Mr. Lingard, p. 45 : but in copying he has made two mistakes. For in Goldasti, *Constitutiones Imperiales*, tom. ii. p. 295, whence his copy is taken, we find "*salvo jure domini temporalis*," where he has copied "*salvo jure domini principalis*;" and "*non habent dominos temporales principales*," where he has copied "*non habent dominos principales*," and omitted the word "*temporales*." But even if the *very same* expressions had been used by the Emperor, which had been used by the Pope, it would still be no necessary consequence, that the Emperor and the Pope used them in the *same sense*.

⁸ To say nothing of *former* excommunications, it will be sufficient to quote the bull of excommunication published by Pius V. against Queen Elizabeth, in 1569, and republished by Sixtus V. in 1588. This bull is entitled, "S. D. N. Pii Papæ V. Sententia declaratoria, contra Elizabetham prætensam Angliæ Reginam, et ei adhærentes Hæreticos. Quâ etiam declarantur absoluti omnes subditi a juramento fidelitatis, et quocunque alio debito : et deinceps obedientes anathemate illaqueantur." The bull itself begins as follows : "Regnans in excelsis, cui data est omnis in cœlo et in terrâ potestas, unam sanctam apostolicam et catholicam ecclesiam, *extra quam nulla est salus*, uni soli in terris, videlicet apostolorum principi Petro, Petrique successori Romano Pontifici, in potestatis plenitudine tradidit gubernandam. Hunc unum *super omnes gentes et omnia Regna principem constituit*," &c. And the sentence of excom-

But there is a decree of the Council of Trent, in which “the emperor, kings, dukes, princes,” &c. are specifically named⁹. It relates not indeed to heresy; it relates to duelling; but it is no less an invasion of *temporal* rights¹. For all who fight duels, as well as their seconds, are by this decree not only excommunicated, but incur the *forfeiture of all their goods*². Now, whatever punishment may be due in such cases, it is not the province of an *ecclesiastical* council to punish by the confiscation of *private property*, and the very attempt is a gross violation of the

munication and deposition is delivered in the following words : “ De apostolicæ dignitatis plenitudine declaramus prædictam Elizabetham hæreticam, et hæreticorum fautricem, eique adhaerentes in prædictis anathematis sententiam incurrisse, esseque a Christi corporis unitate præcisos : quinetiam ipsam prætenso regni prædicti jure, necnon *omni et quocunque dominio, dignitate privilegioque privatam* : et item procures, subditos, et populos dicti regni, et cæteros omnes, qui illi quandocunque juraverunt, *a juramento hujusmodi, ac omni prorsus dominii, fidelitatis et obsequii debito perpetuo absolutos* ; prout nos illos præsentium auctoritate absolvimus, et privamus eandem Elizabetham prætenso jure regni, aliisque omnibus supradictis.” The whole of this document is preserved in *Camdeni Annales*, tom. i. pp. 179—181. ed. 1615. On the papal usurpation of supremacy both in this and in other states, I particularly recommend Lord Clarendon’s admirable work entitled, *Religion and Policy*.

⁹ Imperator, Reges, Duces, Principes, &c.

¹ It was made at the twenty-fifth session, and is contained at p. cxxxi. of the edition quoted in this work.

² Qui vero pugnam commiserint, et qui eorum patrini vocantur, excommunicationis, *ac omnium bonorum suorum proscriptionis* ac perpetuæ infamiæ poenam incurrant.

temporal rights vested in independent states, to which alone the subjects of those states are amenable, and not to any foreign *ecclesiastical* power. But this is not all. For “the emperor, kings, dukes, princes,” &c. are in the same decree declared “*eo ipso* excommunicated³,” if they suffer duelling in their territories. And moreover, the city, castle, or place in which the duel was fought, is withdrawn from their jurisdiction⁴. It may be argued indeed, that such a law, made merely by *ecclesiastical* authority, which has not the power of *enforcing* it, is nothing better than a *brutum fulmen*. But it must be remembered, that the Church of Rome commands obedience, not by the sword of civil justice, but by the dread of *spiritual* censures. And as long as either kings, or their subjects, have the weakness to believe, that excommunication from the Church of Rome is *exclusion from salvation*, unless atonement be made, such as satisfies the Church, they will be willing slaves of its authority.

In explanation, however, and likewise in defence of such acts of general councils, they have been lately represented as a sort of general *parliament*, deriving their authority as well from temporal as from spiritual power. But whoever examines the convocation, the celebration, the signatures, and the confirmation of a general council, will find that it is wholly and solely *eccle-*

³ *Eo ipso sint excommunicati.*

⁴ *Ib. ib.*

siastical. Who *convoked*, for instance, this very Council of Trent? Pope Paul III., as appears from his bull of indiction⁵. Who *presided* at the council? Three legates of the pope⁶. Who were the persons whose *signatures* were affixed to its canons and decrees? Four legates of the pope, two cardinals, three patriarchs, twenty-five archbishops, a hundred and sixty-eight bishops, seven abbots, thirty-nine proctors of absent ecclesiastics, and seven generals of monastic orders⁷. By whom were its canons and decrees finally *confirmed*? By the pope himself, as appears from the *Confirmatio Concilii*⁸. It is clear, therefore, that the council had no *temporal* character of any kind belonging to it. That temporal ambassadors from different princes were at Trent, during the time that the council was

⁵ The *Bulla Indictionis* of Paul III. is prefixed to the decrees of the council. When Julius III. succeeded to Paul III., the council was continued by a *Bulla Resumptionis*. See p. lxvii. And when Pius IV. became pope, the council was continued and concluded by the authority of the *Bulla celebrationis Concilii Tridentini*. See p. cxvii.

⁶ The three legates having been named in the Bull of Indiction, the second, third, fourth, fifth, &c. sessions begin with Sacrosancta Tridentina Synodus, in Spiritu Sancto legitime congregata, in eâ præsidentibus eisdem tribus Apostolicæ sedis legatis, &c.

⁷ See p. ccxxviii.

⁸ Ib. The confirmation of the council ends with the following words: "Confirmamus atque ab omnibus Christi fidelibus recipi, et inviolabiliter observari mandamus in nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti." Amen.

holden, is perfectly true: and they intrigued perhaps with the cardinal legates. But the acts of the council itself derived their whole validity from ecclesiastical authority. Again, if we inquire into the character of the persons who composed the fourth Lateran Council in 1215, we shall find that ecclesiastics, and ecclesiastics *alone*, were summoned to that council⁹. Indeed, if it were otherwise, a general council would not represent the *Church*. Let us hear what the professor of divinity at Maynooth says on this subject. In his treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi*, he has a chapter entitled, “Of the Infallibility of the *Church* assembled in General Councils¹:” he defines a council as “a lawful congregation of *bishops*, assembled to give judgment in things relating to the *faith*, the *morals*, and the *discipline* of the *Church*²:” and he declares that “the Roman Pontiff, in consequence of his primacy, *convokes* general councils by ordinary right, *presides* over them, either by himself or by his

⁹ Eodem anno 1215, vocati sunt a Papâ Innocentio Romæ ad Concilium Generale *Prælati* universalis Ecclesiæ, *Patriarchæ*, scilicet, *Archiepiscopi*, *Episcopi*, *Primicerii*, *Archidiaconi*, *Decani cathedralium Ecclesiarum*, *Abbates*, *Priores*, *Templarii*, et *Hospitalarii*, ut comparerent in præsentia *Domini Papæ* in urbe Româ Kalendis Novembris, sicut canonicam vitare voluerunt ultionem. *Concilia Labbei et Cossartii*, tom. xi. p. 238.

¹ De infallibilitate *Ecclesiæ* in Conciliis generalibus congregatæ. P. 164.

² Concilium est legitima *Episcoporum* congregatio, ut iudicium de iis ferant, quæ ad *fidem*, *mores*, et *Ecclesiæ disciplinam* pertinent. -Ib.

legates, and *confirms* them³.” It was the Church of Rome, therefore, represented in the Council of Trent, which claimed the right of excommunicating kings, and depriving their subjects of their private property. It was the Church of Rome, represented in the fourth Lateran Council, where Innocent III. presided in person, which claimed the right of exterminating heretics, and of deposing princes, if they refused to assist.

It is urged, indeed, that such decrees relate merely to the *discipline* of the Church, which must be carefully distinguished from decrees on *doctrines*. It is urged, that the Church of Rome claims infallibility, in regard only to the *latter*; as if no decree, or law, could be *binding*, unless the power which made it were *infallible*. But it is a *mistake*, that the infallibility claimed by the Church of Rome is confined to doctrines or articles of faith. It claims infallibility, not only in things pertaining to *faith*, but in things pertaining to *morals*. The Roman Catechism, which is *official* authority, says expressly, that “the Church *cannot* err in delivering rules for FAITH and MORALS⁴.” Even the Council of Trent, in the decree made at the fourth session, extends

³ Romanus Pontifex, ratione sui primatûs, Concilia generalia jure ordinario *convocat*, illis *præest*, vel per se, vel per legatos, et illa *confirmat*. P. 370.

⁴ Hæc una Ecclesia errare *non potest* in FIDEI ac MORUM disciplinâ tradendâ. P. 83. 1587.

the traditions, which it receives as equal with Scripture, both to *faith* and to *morals*⁵. Hence *all* Catholics, as Bellarmine says, are agreed in the opinion, that the pope, with a general council, *cannot* err in respect to FAITH and MORALS⁶. And the professor of divinity at Maynooth appears to go still further. He speaks “of the infallibility of the Church assembled in general councils,” and speaks of it without any reservation. Again, he asserts that “councils, which are general in their convocation and celebration, are *infallible*”⁷;” and the assertion is accompanied with no limitation. Since then he declares, that the objects of a general council are *faith*, *morals*, and *discipline*⁸, one might conclude, that he not only agreed with all other Romish writers in comprehending *faith* and *morals* within the claim of infallibility, but that he extended that claim also to *discipline*. And to a certain degree he undoubtedly *does*, though the distinction which he makes is so refined, that I shall not attempt an analysis, but merely state his own words in a note⁹.

⁵ Tum ad *Fidem*, tum ad *Mores*. See the whole passage in note ⁸, to chap. ii.

⁶ De Romano Pontifice, lib. iv. cap. 2.

⁷ P. 166.

⁸ See note ², p. 251.

⁹ Ecclesia jus habet sanciendo Articulos *Disciplinæ*; et ubi certo ac firmo decreto illos proponit, cum intentione omnes Ecclesias obligandi, *non potest errare* eo sensu, quod illa disciplina vel cum doctrinâ fidei non consentiat, vel bonis moribus

Now, if the Church of Rome claims infallibility in things pertaining both to faith and to morals, I would ask, whether the decree against duelling does not come under the *latter* description? Though it has certainly no reference to an article of faith, it is a subject in which the *morals* of mankind are very deeply involved. And with respect to the third canon of the fourth Lateran Council, it is not very easy to bring it within that predicament, within which the advocates of the Church of Rome have usually placed it. They assert, that the first and second canons relate to *doctrines*, but that the third and following canons relate only to *discipline*. Now, if the *second* canon relates to doctrine, the third must *also* relate to doctrine. The second canon is entitled *De errore Abbatis Joachim*; it begins, “Damnamus et reprobamus libellum sive tractatum, quem Abbas Joachim edidit,” &c.: and, that *particular* heresy having been condemned, the council proceeds in the third canon to condemn heresy *in general* in the following terms, “Excommunicamus et anathematizamus *omnem* hæresim,” &c. Undoubtedly, therefore, the *third* canon is no less a canon about doctrine than the *second*. It is true, that the *punishment* denounced against heresy may be considered as a matter of *discipline*: and very severe discipline it is, when heretics are *exterminated*, and the kings of heretics *deposed*.

adversetur, vel in iis, in quibus præscribitur circumstantiis, religioni Christianæ sit nociva. P. 196.

But what has a *Protestant* king to apprehend from canons on discipline, when they have no *validity* in any country, which has not received and published them? This question is frequently put, and is *supposed* to be put with great success. But it involves such a confusion of terms, that it answers no other purpose than to *perplex* the subject. When we speak of the validity of an act of parliament, as soon as it has received the royal assent, every one knows what is meant by it. In *this* sense of the word, the acts of the Council of Trent can, in a *Protestant* state, have no validity whatever, whether they relate to *faith*, or to *morals*, or to *discipline*. And if in that Protestant state there are persons who profess the religion of Rome, their obedience to those decrees is no obedience which the *State* requires. In a *legal* sense, therefore, validity is out of the question. And with respect to decrees, which excommunicate *kings* for disobeying the orders of the *Church*, like the decree against duelling made by the Council of Trent, one should suppose that *no* king, unless actually enslaved by the spiritual tyranny of the Romish Church, would acknowledge such a decree as *a law in his dominions*. But if a Protestant king has *subjects* who are enthralled by the Church of Rome, its decrees, even on discipline, will *so far* be valid, as those infatuated subjects may think it their *duty* to obey. In this sense, and in this

sense alone, have the mandates of Rome validity in these dominions. But it is a kind of validity, which might overturn, as well the State, as the Church of England. The right of excommunicating kings is *expressly* claimed by the Council of Trent, which therefore has *recognised* the similar power which has been claimed by the Lateran Council. The canon therefore of the Lateran Council is not a *dead letter*, as many have pretended. The Council of Trent has not repealed, but confirmed it¹. Nor is it in the power of all the universities of France and Spain to explain away what has been ratified by a general council. If the *interpretation* of the law contradicts the *letter* of the law, the interpretation is not to be trusted. The *best* interpreters of the Romish ecclesiastical law are the popes themselves. And their *practical illustrations* in excommunicating sovereigns of this country af-

¹ Nothing can be more unfounded, than the pretence that the tenets of the Church of Rome are at present different from what they *formerly* were. It is wholly *impossible* to make an alteration in things decreed by an authority pronounced *infallible*; for it would be a tacit admission of previous error. But this infallibility, according to *all* Romish writers, includes every thing pertaining to *faith* and *morals*: and, according to the theological lectures given at Maynooth, it includes also, in a certain degree, what relates even to *discipline*. See notes ⁴—⁹, pp. 252, 253. *Such* a Church is altogether incapable of change. And, even if it *were* capable of change, the *oaths*, which are taken by the bishops and beneficed clergy, would *prevent* a change.

ford a better rule for *our* conduct than the *theoretical opinions* of the Paris or Salamanca divines².

IV. Let us now consider the two oaths of fidelity, which are taken by the Romish clergy. One of them is taken by the beneficed clergy *in general*; the other is taken by bishops at their consecration, and again by archbishops, when they receive the Pallium. The former is a part of the Trent profession of faith, which was given at length in the sixth chapter, for the purpose of exhibiting the Romish Creed. But that part, which properly contains the *oath*, it is now necessary to repeat.

“I acknowledge the holy, catholic, and apostolic Church of Rome to be the mother and mistress of all Churches; and I promise and swear true obedience to the Roman Pontiff, successor of the prince of the apostles St. Peter, and the vicegerent of Jesus Christ. Further I do, without doubt, receive and profess all other things, which have been delivered, defined, and declared by the sacred

² The first question proposed to the foreign universities was this: “Has the pope or cardinals, or any body of men, or any individual of the Church of Rome, any *civil* authority, power, jurisdiction, and pre-eminence whatever, within the realm of England?” But the question should have run thus, Does the Church of Rome claim any *spiritual* authority, which may *affect* temporal concerns, within the realm of England? The universities denied that the pope has any *civil* authority in this country. But they could not have denied that the Church of Rome claims a *spiritual* authority, which deeply *affects* the temporal concerns of this kingdom.

canons, and œcumenical councils, especially by the holy Council of Trent; and all things contrary thereunto, and all heresies of whatsoever kind, which have been condemned, rejected, and anathematized by the Church, I in like manner condemn, reject, and anathematize. This true Catholic faith, out of which no one can be saved, which by these presents I profess and verily hold, I do promise, vow, and swear most firmly to keep and confess (by God's help) entire and inviolate to the last breath of my life; and that I will take care, as far as in me lies, that the same be holden, taught, and preached by all, who are subject to my control, and who are connected with my charge. So help me God, and these the holy Gospels of God³."

This oath, by a decree of the Council of Trent, and a bull of pope Pius IV., is required to be taken by all beneficed clergymen, in the presence of their bishop, or his official; and if they are members of a chapter, they are required to *repeat* it in the chapter⁴. Now, as the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent are holden in such high estimation at the college of Maynooth, that even in points of *discipline* they are

³ The Latin original, of which this is a translation, has been already given in note ³, page 136. It is annexed also, with the bull of pope Pius IV., to the acts of the Council of Trent, in the collection published by Labbé and Cossart, tom. xi. col. 944.

⁴ See notes ⁸, ⁹, pages 135, 136. The oath is of course taken in the words of the Latin original, or the same form would not be every where observed.

considered as a “Manual of the Clergy⁵,” we might conclude without further information, that this oath was taken by the beneficed Romish clergy in Ireland. But if any doubt remained, that doubt would be removed by the declaration of Dr. Troy, titular Archbishop of Dublin, who says, that it is taken only “on the appointment to a *benefice*⁶ ;” that is, that the oath is taken only where the Council of Trent requires that it *shall* be taken. But still the great body of the Romish clergy in Ireland will sooner or later be appointed to some benefice, and therefore will sooner or later take the oath. Indeed we want only to know, that they who are in *possession* of an office, take the *oath* of office. But whoever swears, that he holds the Church of Rome to be the *mistress* of all Churches, must necessarily be hostile to the Church, which is *now* established. He must consider it as his *duty* to use every effort in regaining for the mistress, what is now usurped by the servant. Again, whoever swears, that he “without doubt, receives and professes *all* other things, which have been delivered, defined, and declared by the sacred canons, and œcumenical councils,” undoubtedly swears to that, which is inconsistent with the allegiance due to his lawful sovereign.

⁵ See note 22, page 42.

⁶ See Dr. Troy’s Letter, in the second appendix to Sir J. C. Hippisley’s speech of 1810, pp. 24, 25.

It is useless to declare, that when he swears "obedience to the pope," he means obedience only in *spirituals*: for among the things, which have been delivered, defined, and declared by the sacred canons and œcumenical councils, there are things, which affect as much the *State* of this country, as they do the established *Church* ⁷. The canons, which relate to *discipline*, no less than the canons which relate to faith and morals, will be considered as binding by the person, who swears to receive them *all*. This very oath therefore confutes the argument, which is founded on the distinction between the *obligation* of canons relating to doctrine, and the *obligation* of canons relating to discipline ⁸. Let the third canon

⁷ Dr. Delahogue himself, in reference to such canons and decrees of General Councils, says, "Ex his omnibus conciliorum generalium Decretis, ex quibus Patres adversus *Hæreticos*, vel quoquomodo eis *Rebelles*, pœnas temporales cumulant cum spiritualibus, manifestum est *Ecclesiam credidisse*, se a Christo aliquam accepisse potestatem in *Temporalibus*." De *Ecclesiâ Christi*, p. 264.

⁸ Sir J. C. Hippisley, in his speech, May 18, 1810, says in a note at p. 71, "the distinction between canons of faith and discipline, and the relative obligation imposed by them, should ever be kept in view in the discussion of this question." Indeed this distinction is perpetually urged; the former being represented as binding, but not the latter. Now if a man swears to both, he is *bound* by both. On the other hand, if the Romish clergy in Ireland have really the *option* of accepting or rejecting the canons on discipline, it is no consolation to know, that they *might* reject them, if they *would*, when we have proof that they do *not* reject them. It is

then of the fourth Lateran Council be called only a canon about *discipline*, and the whole

useless to argue from a distinction of *names*, when equal reception is given to the *things*.

But not only the *canons of councils*, which relate to discipline, are thus received by the Romish clergy in Ireland: the bare *decree of a pope*, relating to discipline, though not sanctioned by a council, is declared to be valid in the theological Lectures at Maynooth. At p. 368 of the treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi* is maintained the following proposition: "Romanus Pontifex *jus habet condendi decreta, quæ ad omnes et singulas Ecclesias dirigantur.*" He then proceeds, "Probatur 1^{mo} pro decretis de *Fide,*" &c. He afterwards proceeds, "Probatur 2^{do} De rebus *disciplinæ* universalis leges sancire posse S. Pontificem quæ, servatis servandis, *omnes Ecclesias obligandi vim habent.* Quot enim *Disciplinæ* capita, quæ arctissimam, sive cum *dogmate*, sive cum *bono regimine* Ecclesiæ connexionem habent! Ergo *jus de his decernendi pertinere debet ad Romanum Pontificem, cui incumbit universalis Ecclesiæ cura.*" If the pope then makes a decree on *Discipline*, and that decree has any connexion either with doctrine, or with the *well-governing of the Church*, that decree, according to the principles maintained in the College of Maynooth, is a decree which ought to be obeyed. When *such* principles are maintained, there is no latitude, which may not be given to the efficacy of papal authority. The pope may deem, that the well-governing of the Church requires the excommunication and deposition of his majesty, and the decree will come under the predicament, "*jus de his decernendi pertinere debet ad Romanum Pontificem.*" Of this tenet we find a very good explanation given by Bellarmine: "Potest ac *debet* Pontifex omnibus Christianis ea *jubere* atque ad ea *cogere*, ad quæ quilibet eorum secundum statum suum tenetur, id est, singulos cogere, ut eo modo Deo serviant quo secundum statum suum debent. Debent autem *reges* Deo servire defendendo Ecclesiam, et *puniendo hæreticos et schismaticos.*—Ergo potest ac debet Regibus *jubere*, ut hoc faciant, et, nisi fecerint, etiam

body of the beneficed clergy in Ireland, who belonged to the Romish Church, are bound by their oath to *obey* it. The right to excommunicate and depose Princes, who refuse to assist in the extirpation of heresy, is acknowledged therefore by this oath of fidelity to the pope⁹. And how this oath of fidelity to the pope is compatible with the oath of allegiance to the king, is more than all the casuists in the Church of Rome will be able to explain.

The oath taken by bishops at their consecration, which is a very long one, is contained in the *Pontificale Romanum Clementis VIII. Pont. Max. jussu restitutum atque editum. Romæ, 1595. fol.* Another edition of this pontifical was published at Paris in 1664, by the title *Pontificale Romanum Clementis VIII. primum, nunc denuo*

cogere per excommunicationem aliasque commodas rationes." De Romano Pontifice, lib. v. cap. 6.

⁹ In p. 20 of Sir J. C. Hippisley's Speech on April 24, 1812, we find the following passage relative to the deposing power ; " That many individual popes have held and have acted upon such principles is but too well substantiated ; but it is contended by the Catholics, that no general council nor the see of Rome, properly recognized as such in *Cathedrá*, ever declared such doctrines to be the doctrines of the Church." But if they have not declared them to be the *doctrines* of the Church, have they not declared them to be the *discipline* of the Church ? If such things *are* declared by general councils, and moreover if such declarations become rules of *action*, of what consequence is it to those, who *feel* the action, whether it goes by the name of doctrine or discipline ? When a man is knocked down, does he think it necessary to ask, whether the club is of *elm* or of *oak* ?

Urbani VIII. auctoritate recognitum. I have examined the Episcopal oath in *both* editions, and have discovered no difference. I will copy it therefore as contained at p. 79 of the former, and at p. 69 of the latter edition¹. *Ego N. Electus Ecclesiæ N. ab hac horâ in antea fidelis, et obediens ero beato Petro Apostolo, sanctæque Romanæ Ecclesiæ, et Domino nostro, Domino N. Papæ N. suisque successoribus canonice intrantibus. Non ero in consilio, aut consensu, vel facto, ut vitam perdant, aut membrum; seu capiantur mala captione; aut in eos violenter manus quomodolibet ingerantur; vel injuriæ aliquæ inferantur, quovis quæesito colore. Consilium vero, quod mihi credituri sunt, per se, aut Nuntios suos, seu litteras, ad eorum damnum, me sciente, nemini pandam. Papatum Romanum, et Regalia sancti Petri adjutor eis ero ad retinendum, at defendendum, salvo meo ordine², contra omnem hominem.*

¹ Several English translations have been already given of this oath, but I do not know that the original Latin has been given in any of the late publications. And I give it *only* in the Latin, because the meaning of several passages has been disputed.

² Of the words *salvo meo ordine* we find the following explanation at p. 10 of the notes to Sir J. C. Hippisley's speech of April 24, 1812, which explanation is taken from father O'Leary's answer to the bishop of Cloyne. He says, "In the midst of it is *inserted* in express words, a saving clause, which speaks the dignity of Catholic bishops, and reconciles their *allegiance* to their respective sovereigns, with the canonical obedience due to the head Pastor; '*salvo meo ordine.*' This clause does

Legatum Apostolicæ sedis in eundo et redeundo honorifice tractabo, et in suis necessitatibus adju-

away every difficulty, and leaves the sceptre in the prince's hands, while it leaves the censer in the hands of the pontiff."—Now every one who reads this explanation of *salvo meo ordine*, which is here said to have been "*inserted*," will conclude, that it has been *lately* inserted, and inserted as a saving clause of allegiance to the king. But it is so far from being a *modern* insertion, that it has *uniformly* occupied a place in the Episcopal oath. The very edition, from which the copy in the text was taken, was printed at Rome in 1595, by authority of pope Clement VIII. It is again in the edition published in 1664 by authority of pope Urban VIII. It is contained also in editions which preceded that of 1595; for instance, in the Venice edition of 1561. It must have been contained also in *manuscripts* of the Pontifical; for the preface to the edition of 1595 declares that, "*nihil ab antiquis Pontificalium codicibus—alienum aut discrepans irrepserit.*" Consequently the clause "*salvo meo ordine*" could not have been inserted as a saving clause of allegiance to the *Protestant kings of England*. Besides, if it had been intended as a saving clause of allegiance to the king, it would have been expressed, not by '*salvo meo ordine*,' but by '*salvo meo rege*,' or '*salvo jure mei regis*,' or some similar expression. There cannot be a doubt that '*ordine*' means '*ordine monastico*.' In former times, when this oath was first used, it seldom happened that a man was consecrated bishop, who had not previously belonged to some monastic order, the rights of which he was particularly pledged to defend, and of which the monastic orders were particularly jealous. In taking therefore an oath of obedience to the pope, it was deemed necessary to stipulate, that such obedience should not prejudice the privileges of his *own order*. But to pretend, that the clause was inserted for the purpose of saving allegiance to the kings of England, is so absurd, that we may justly wonder it could ever obtain credit.

vabo. *Jura, honores, privilegia, et auctoritatem Sanctæ Romanæ Ecclesiæ, Domini nostri Papæ et successorum prædictorum, conservare, defendere, augere, promovere curabo. Neque ero in consilio, vel facto, seu tractatu, in quibus contra ipsum Dominum nostrum, vel eandem Romanam Ecclesiam aliqua sinistra, vel præjudicialia personarum, juris, honoris, status, et potestatis eorum machinentur. Et, si talia a quibuscumque tractari, vel procurari novero, impediam hoc pro posse, et quanto citius potero, significabo eidem Domino nostro, vel alteri, per quem possit ad ipsius notitiam pervenire. Regulas sanctorum Patrum, decreta, ordinationes, seu dispositiones, reservationes, provisiones, et mandata apostolica, totis viribus observabo, et faciam ab aliis observari. Hæreticos, schismaticos, et rebelles eidem Domino nostro, vel successoribus prædictis pro posse persequar et impugnabo*³. *Vocatus ad*

³ This sentence pope Pius VI., by a Rescript dated June 1791, "was graciously pleased to grant" that the Irish bishops might omit. (See No. xvi. of Sir J. C. Hippisley's appendix.) Since then they have the *option*, I conclude that they *do* omit it; though we have no positive *evidence* on the subject, as the oath is not taken publicly in a court of justice, but by the bishop elect, kneeling before the consecrating archbishop, and reading the oath (as stated in the rubric) *de verbo ad verbum*. But the cardinals who communicated the pleasure of his holiness, consoled them for the admission by declaring that "*the pursuit and opposition to heretics, which the bishops undertake, are to be understood as referring to their solicitude and efforts in convincing*

synodum, veniam, nisi præpeditus fuero canonicâ præpeditiõne. Apostolorum limina singulis trienniis personaliter per me ipsum visitabo; et Domino nostro, ac successoribus præfatis rationem reddam de toto meo pastoralis officio, ac de rebus omnibus ad meâ Ecclesiæ statum, ad cleri et populi disciplinam, animarum denique, quæ meâ fidei traditæ sunt, salutem quovis modo perinentibus, et vicissim mandata Apostolica humiliter recipiam et quam diligentissime exequar. Quod si legitimo impedimento detentus fuero, præfata omnia adimplebo per certum Nuntium ad hoc speciale mandatum habentem, de gremio mei Capituli, aut alium in dignitate Ecclesiasticâ constitutum, seu alias personatum habentem; aut, his mihi deficientibus, per diœcesanum Sacerdotem; et clero deficiente omnino, per aliquem alium presbyterum sæcularem, vel regularem, spectatæ probitatis, et religionis, de supradictis omnibus plene instructum. De hujusmodi autem impedimento docebo per legitimas probationes ad Sanctæ Romanæ Ecclesiæ Cardinalem proponentem in Congregatione sacri Concilii⁴, per supradictum Nuntium transmittendas.

heretics of their error, and procuring their reconciliation with the Catholic Church." (Ib. ib.) When heretics are denounced as rebels to my lord the pope, the bishop who swears "pro posse persequar et impugnabo," does not show a very paternal solicitude.

⁴ For the words *Cardinalem proponentem in congregatione sacri concilii* are now substituted the words *Cardinalem præ-*

“Possessiones vero ad mensam meam pertinentes non vendam, nec donabo, neque impignorabo; nec de novo infeudabo, vel aliquo modo alienabo, etiam cum consensu Capituli Ecclesiæ meæ, inconsulto Romano Pontifice. Et si ad aliquam alienationem devenero, pœnas in quâdam super hoc edita constitutione contentas, eo ipso incurrere volo.

“Sic me Deus adjuvet, et hæc sancta Dei Evangelia⁵.”

Such is the oath of fidelity to the pope of Rome, which is taken by the Romish bishops in Ireland, with the exceptions already noted. The motive to the principal alteration, which consists in the omission of the words *Hæreticos, Schismaticos, &c.* is stated in the following representation to pope Pius VI.⁶ “The Archbishops Metro-

fectum sacrae congregationis de propagandâ fide. The reason of this alteration is that the college *de propagandâ fide* is the college with which the Romish prelates in Ireland hold their correspondence, as appears from the letter inserted in No. xvi. of the above quoted appendix.

⁵ To this oath the Romish bishops in Ireland now add the following sentence: “*Hæc omnia et singula eo inviolabilius observabo, quo certior sim in illis nihil contineri, quod fidelitati meæ erga Serenissimum Magnæ Britanniae et Hiberniae Regem, ejusque ad thronum successores debitæ, adversari possit.*” See Sir J. C. Hippisley’s supplementary appendix, p. 24. This addition, with the omission stated in note ³, and the alteration stated in note ⁴, pages 265, 266, make the sum total of the differences between the form now used in Ireland, and the form which is printed in the Pontificale Romanum.

⁶ No. xvi. of Sir J. C. Hippisley’s appendix to his Speech of 1810. The precise date of the representation does not appear: but as the pope’s answer is dated June 9, 1791, the

politans of the kingdom of Ireland represented to his holiness, that from the ignorance or malice of some persons, certain expressions prescribed in the Roman Ritual⁷, to be taken by bishops at their consecration, and by archbishops on receiving the pall, have been misrepresented; which has added new perplexities to those, which they daily experience in a kingdom, where *the Catholic faith is not the religion of the State*. Wherefore, they humbly requested, if it should appear expedient to his holiness, that he would vouchsafe to apply a remedy by some act of his apostolical vigilance." The remedy itself has been already stated; but the *reason* why the titular archbishops of Ireland thought a remedy necessary, is not unworthy of notice. The "*perplexities*" in which they were involved on this occasion, were owing, as they themselves declare, to the circumstance, that "*the Catholic faith is not the religion of the State*." Does not this

representation itself must have been made early in that year. About that time the Catholic Question, as it is called, was a subject of much investigation in Ireland; and the most obnoxious passage in the Episcopal oath having excited attention, it was deemed prudent to apply to the pope on that subject.

⁷ Here is a very strange mistake for a representation made by Romish *Metropolitans*. It is not the Roman *Ritual*, but the Roman *Pontifical*, which contains the episcopal oath. The *Rituale Romanum* contains the offices, which the parochial clergy perform in their respective parishes, as parish priests. But the *Pontificale Romanum* prescribes the forms for the *ordination* of the clergy, the *consecration* of bishops, abbots, &c.

imply, that if the Catholic faith *were* the religion of the State, those perplexities would not *exist*? Must we not thence infer, that if the Romish religion had been the established religion of Ireland in 1791, it would not have been deemed *necessary* to apply for an omission of the sentence *Hæreticos, Schismaticos, et Rebelles eidem Domino nostro, vel successoribus prædictis pro posse persequar et impugnabo*? Nor would it then have been necessary to apply the mild construction, which has been lately put upon those words. The “pro posse persequar” would have a very different meaning, if the Romish religion were the *established* religion of Ireland, from that which it has, when the Romish religion lies under *restraint*. Nor must we forget, that if the obnoxious sentence is *now* omitted, it may be at any time restored at the discretion of the Romish bishops themselves. It is an *original* part of that oath: and if the pope was “graciously pleased to grant” its omission, on account of the *perplexities* of the Romish bishops in Ireland, yet those perplexities being once removed, there is nothing to prevent the restoration of the sentence.

But, even *without* that obnoxious sentence, the episcopal oath contains enough that is objectionable in a *Protestant* state. Nor are those objections removed by the sentence, which in the year 1791 was *subjoined* to the oath, namely, “I will observe all and every one of these things the more inviolably, as I am firmly convinced that

there is nothing contained in them which can be contrary to the fidelity I owe to the most serene king of Great Britain and Ireland, and his successors on the throne⁸." In the first place, this additional sentence contains an additional declaration to observe inviolably "*all and every one*" of the things contained in the preceding oath. Secondly, the very circumstance that it was deemed expedient to *assert* the consistency of this oath of fidelity to the Pope with the oath of allegiance to the king, shows that in the opinion of *other* persons the oaths were *not* consistent. And when to an oath, which is taken by *one* party, a saving clause is added for the satisfaction of *another* party, it is *especially* necessary, that the party should be satisfied for whose sake it was added, or the clause itself becomes useless. There is likewise an *ambiguity* in the expression "most serene king of Great Britain and Ireland, and his successors to the throne." In the oath of allegiance we promise to "bear true allegiance to his majesty king *George*:" and in the oath of abjuration, we declare that "our sovereign lord king *George* is lawful and *rightful* king of the realm." But the saving clause of the episcopal oath is so general, that it would apply as well to any other dynasty as to the house of Brunswick. I do not say that the ambiguity was *intentional*: but when we are speaking of *securities*, it is

⁸ The Latin form has been already given in note ⁵, p. 267.

necessary to examine whether that which is *offered* as security in reality *affords* it. Nor would I by any means assert, that the Bishops who take this oath are *conscious* of its inconsistency with any oath to the king. But, without intending to offend their consciences, we may venture to declare, that the episcopal oath, even in its present form, is quite incompatible with that allegiance which we owe to our sovereign king George. If we swear to be faithful and obedient (*fidelis et obediens*)—*Domino nostro, Domino Papæ N. suisque successoribus canonice intrantibus*, we withdraw at least a *part* of that allegiance which we profess by the words, “I will bear faithful and *true* allegiance to his majesty king George.” Whoever swears, “*mandata apostolica totis viribus observabo*,” is bound to obey the Pope, how greatly soever that obedience may interfere with the obedience which is due to his king. Whoever swears in reference to the popes, “*consilium quod mihi credituri sunt, per se aut nuntios suos, seu literas, ad eorum damnum, me sciente, nemini pandam*,” cannot consistently swear, in reference to his majesty king George, “I will do my utmost endeavour to *disclose and make known* to his majesty and his successors all treasons or traitorous correspondences which I shall know to be against him or any of them.” Whoever swears, “*Jura, honores, privilegia, et auctoritatem Sanctæ Romanæ Ecclesiæ, Domini nostri Papæ, et successorum prædictorum, conservare*,

defendere, augere, et promovere curabo," must swear it at the expense of his fealty to his lawful sovereign.

It is true, that the College of Cardinals belonging to the Propaganda did, in a letter to the Romish Archbishops of Ireland, dated Rome, June 23, 1791, make the following declaration⁹: "The See of Rome never taught that faith is not to be kept with the heterodox; that an oath to kings separated from Catholic communion can be violated." But if the See of Rome never *taught* that the Romish subjects of heretical princes might disregard their oaths to them, the See of Rome has shown by its *practice*, that it considers an oath to a king as of little value, when it interferes with an oath to the *pope*. Else why did the pope annul the oath of allegiance which the Romish subjects of Elizabeth had taken to their queen? A pope indeed may dispense, and yet no one may *avail* himself of the dispensation. An individual may feel himself bound, even when the sovereign pontiff has *released* him from the obligation. Indeed, the very *reluctance* which the Romanists of this country have on many occasions shown to the taking of oaths, is of itself sufficient proof that they think themselves *bound* by an oath which they have taken. And that the non-observance

⁹ See No. xvi. Appendix to Sir J. C. Hippisley's Speech, 1810.

of faith with heretics is an acknowledged *principle* among them, is an assertion which cannot be made without great injustice. Indeed, if I may judge from my own *personal* experience, there is no more reason to doubt their honour and integrity in every thing relating to the common intercourse of life, than the honour and integrity of Protestants themselves. But in things relating to *religion*, that anomaly of government, a *foreign* jurisdiction in spiritual concerns, distracts their allegiance, and makes them obedient to the pope, where they *ought* to be, and are probably *inclined* to be, obedient to the king. The intervention of an *external* allegiance affords a perpetual drawback on their allegiance *at home*. The theoretical distinction between spiritual obedience to the pope and temporal obedience to the king, cannot always be observed in *practice*: and they may easily mistake for a *spiritual* concern, what their sovereign might regard as a *temporal* concern. In such a dilemma, the power which disposes of the *soul* would be obeyed in preference to the power which can only affect the *body*. The plea which they often urge, that the *Protestant* dissenters do not, any more than themselves, acknowledge the king's supremacy in *spiritual* concerns, is nothing to the purpose. The Protestant dissenters acknowledge no *foreign* head: to whomsoever they confide the direction of their spiritual concerns, those persons are all *subjects of his majesty*.

And if the Romanists of this country would likewise renounce all foreign jurisdiction, if they would consent to choose a pope of their own, who was a native of this country, and a subject of his majesty, they would then, as citizens of the state, be on the same footing with the *Protestant* dissenters. They might then take the oath of supremacy, which is merely *negative*, and provides only for the rejection of *foreign* interference. The *discipline* of their Church, as they themselves have repeatedly declared, is not a matter of *general obligation*. They might retain, therefore, the established *doctrines* of their Church, and new-model its *discipline*, as present circumstances require. They might even in their *own* estimation remain *good Catholics*, and yet altogether cease to be *Papists*.

V. These observations on the baneful influence of the authority exercised by the See of Rome in countries subject to *other* princes, may be concluded by a relation of what was done on that subject by the empress Catherine II., who was one of the most profound politicians that ever sat upon a throne. When the partition of Poland had brought under her dominion a considerable population professing the Romish religion, she determined to provide for their *spiritual* wants in a manner which should do no injury to the *state*. She resolved, therefore, to erect *a popedom in her own dominions*, and at once to prohibit all *foreign* interference. The decree

which she issued on this occasion, bearing date Jan. 17, 1782, is given by Sir J. C. Hippisley, both in the appendix to his speech of 1810, and in the notes to his speech of 1812¹. From this valuable document I will transcribe the first, second, third, fifth, eighth, tenth, eleventh, and thirteenth articles, as being those which relate to the present subject.

“ I.—We now erect the city of Mohilow, the capital of the government of the same name, into an archbishopric of the Roman Catholic religion, including within the jurisdiction of its archbishopric all the churches and convents of the said religion which are in the governments of Mohilow and of Polotski, as well as those of our two capitals, and in *all other parts of the Russian empire*.

“ II.—We *graciously name*² the Bishop Stanislaus Tsches Tschersovisch to the Archbishopric See of the Roman Catholic Church of Mohilow.

“ III.—To aid the same in his functions, we appoint a co-adjutor, and elevate to that dignity the Abbot John Benisslashi, canon of the archi-

¹ See No. xx. of the former, or p. 85 of the latter.

² Here is actual appointment, not a mere veto ; though even *this* is refused by the Romish bishops of Ireland. In like manner the king of Prussia has always *actually appointed* to the Romish bishopricks in his dominions, whether in Silesia or in Poland. And even the king of Great Britain appoints the Romish bishop of Canada.

episcopal Church of Mohilow, and superior of Danburg; and *we have given orders that measures shall be taken for his elevation to the episcopacy*³.

“ V.—The Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church of Mohilow *shall not receive any order from any person whatever, besides us and our senate*⁴.

“ VIII.—The appointment of superiors and heads of convents, of curates for the parishes, and of all other promotions to the ecclesiastical degrees of the Roman Catholic religion, shall be dependent, *in all the extent of the Russian empire, on the will of the Archbishop whom we have appointed*⁵; and we order him to examine, either personally or by means of his co-adjutor, all the aforesaid superiors and curates: to let those remain who were born our subjects, or are become such; to appoint others that are so; and to dismiss and send away those who may have come from foreign countries, and not to suffer any of them to come in for the future, forbidding them to return, under the penalty of

³ Here again the *whole* power of raising to the episcopacy is vested in the crown.

⁴ Here the interference of the pope in the Russian empire is prohibited altogether.

⁵ Thus the Archbishop of Mohilow was made *metropolitan* of all the Russians professing the Romish faith. And as by the fifth article he was forbidden to receive any order from any person whatever, beside the empress and the senate, he became a metropolitan perfectly *independent of the pope*.

being juridically prosecuted for having *disobeyed the decrees of the supreme government*⁶.

“ X.—We confirm the prohibition expressed in our decrees of July 3rd, 1779, addressed to the governor-general of White Russia, and of Jan. 31st, 1780, to all the governors-general, *not to permit the entrance within our frontiers of ecclesiastics of foreign appointment*⁷: and we direct that, wherever any of them appear, they shall be sent back, and threatened with being delivered over to the tribunals of our departments, to be judged according to the laws: and finally, those who, contrary to this decree, receive them, without the permission of the Archbishop, shall be sent to the competent tribunals, to be there judged according to the laws.

“ XI.—We command that all the religious orders of the Romish religion shall only be dependent on the Archbishop of Mohilow, on his co-adjutor, and on his consistory, without *daring to submit to any other ecclesiastical power out of our empire*⁸, to send to such power any portion of their incomes, or to have any *connexion* with it, under the penalty of being juridically prosecuted for disobeying the laws of the supreme government.

⁶ A very wise measure for the prevention of foreign interference and foreign intrigue.

⁷ Here is a total end of the *pope's* appointment.

⁸ Here is a total overthrow of the pope's pretended *supremacy*.

“ XIII.—We confirm our preceding decrees, which *prohibit the reception of any bull from the pope, or any other writings sent in his name; ordering that the same shall be sent to our senate, who, after having examined their contents, and particularly any thing that may be found contrary to the laws of the Russian empire, or to the rights of the ecclesiastical power which we have received from God, shall be obliged to communicate to us its opinion, and to wait our permission or prohibition in rendering public such bulls or writings*⁹. ”

By this master-piece of policy did the empress Catherine divest herself at once of that foreign interference in the spiritual concerns of her dominions, of which she well knew the destructive influence. It is true, that the pope was permitted to send a *pallium* to the new metropolitan by the hands of Cardinal Archetti. But such ceremonies are as insignificant on the one hand, as they are splendid on the other. Whether adorned with the pallium, or clad only in the robes of a bishop, the metropolitan of Mohilow owed his *real* elevation to the authority of his

⁹ Though the empress had already prohibited the *reception* of any bull from the pope on the part of the metropolitan, yet as she could not prevent the pope from *sending*, it was a wise precaution to direct that, if in case a bull *should* be sent, it should be received only by the senate, who should make their report to her majesty. And then, if she *permitted* the publication of any such writings, their authority was derived from the *sovereign of the country*, and not from any *foreign potentate*.

lawful sovereign. But lest the ceremony should be misunderstood or abused, the empress took care to be *present* on the occasion.

It appears, then, that there are no more *papists* in the Russian dominions, though probably in their own estimation they are as good *Catholics* as before. The metropolitan of Mohilow, by consecrating *other* bishops, can perpetuate episcopacy, in its *spiritual* sense, as episcopacy is perpetuated in *Protestant* countries. And the aid of the pope is no more wanted for the Catholic bishops in *Russia*, than for the Protestant bishops in *England and Ireland*. Nor would it be wanted for the Catholic bishops in our own country, if they would consent to put the government of their Church on the same footing as in Russia, in Prussia, and our own province of Canada. The examples of three different sovereigns, *not in communion with the Church of Rome*, having the sole appointment to Catholic bishoprics, might surely be sufficient to remove their religious scruples. But the resolutions officially published by the titular bishops of Ireland¹, to say nothing of Dr. Dromgoole's Address to the Catholic Board², afford no hope that they will

¹ See Nos. vi. vii. of the Appendix to Sir J. C. Hippisley's Speech of 1810.

² Dr. Dromgoole's Address to the Catholic Board, on the 8th of December, 1813, which was originally printed in the Dublin Evening Post, was re-printed in the Protestant Advocate for February, 1814. It well deserves an attentive perusal, though it is much too long to be inserted here.

ever admit an accommodation so necessary to the welfare of all parties. For it is wholly impossible that they whose allegiance is *divided*, should be as good subjects as they whose allegiance is *entire*.

The question of Church-authority, as exercised by the Church of England on the one hand, and by the Church of Rome on the other, is now brought to a conclusion. And no doubt will probably remain, that the authority exercised by the latter is incompatible with the welfare both of other Churches and of other states. In concluding this proof, I have been led, by the connexion between the Church and the State in this country, to the examination of subjects not promised in the title of the chapter. But their importance at the present period makes it unnecessary to apologize for their introduction.

AN

APPENDIX

TO THE

“COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE CHURCHES OF
ENGLAND AND ROME.”

CONTAINING SOME

EXPLANATORY NOTES

ON CHURCH AUTHORITY, THE CHARACTER OF SCHISM,

AND THE ROCK

ON WHICH OUR SAVIOUR DECLARED THAT HE

WOULD BUILD HIS CHURCH.



APPENDIX.

Note A.

THE readers of the Comparative View are requested to keep constantly in mind, that the eighth chapter relates to the authority of our Church in controversies of *faith*, as expressed in the twentieth Article, which is quoted at the beginning of that chapter. We have no concern therefore with the authority exercised by our ecclesiastical courts in *secular* matters, or in controversies of *any* kind, except those which relate to articles of faith. A want of due attention to this necessary distinction has been productive of various mistakes: and our Church has been supposed to exercise an authority, which it neither does, nor *can* exercise. When our ecclesiastical courts exercise authority in *secular* matters, whether it relates to wills, or to divorces, or to controversies about tithe, or indeed to any controversies but controversies of *faith*, their authority is exercised indiscrimi-

nately, over Churchmen and over Dissenters. And since every court must have some means of enforcing its own orders, a contempt of the Court Ecclesiastical must in *such* case be followed by ecclesiastical censures, whatever be the religion to which the offending party belongs. In this manner Dissenters, as well as Churchmen, may, for a contempt of court, be punished in the first instance by excommunication, and then by those additional penalties, which the *civil* power inflicts in aid of the ecclesiastical, and without which the excommunication of a Dissenter would be a mere *brutum fulmen*. But the case is widely different when our ecclesiastical courts exercise their authority over those who impugn the articles of the established Church. For the exercise of *this* authority is confined to those who *belong* to the established Church ; while Dissenters, of every description, being protected by the law of the land, both in the free profession of their religious faith, and the free exercise of their religious worship, are thereby *exempted* from the jurisdiction of the Court Ecclesiastical in things pertaining to *faith* and *worship*. Nor does the Church of England *require* a more extensive authority than in such cases it really has. For the laws of a *religious* society, considered merely as such, relate immediately to faith and worship. And though the support of *every* society requires that an obedience to its laws be enforced on its own members,

yet no society can require for its support an obedience to its laws on the part of those who are *not* members of it. The observations contained in this note apply equally to every thing which is said also in the ninth and tenth chapters relative to the authority or jurisdiction of the Church of England. We have no concern whatever in the Comparative View with the jurisdiction of our ecclesiastical courts in *secular* matters.

Note B.

Whoever undertakes to defend the authority of the Church of England in controversies of *faith*, undertakes a task of much greater difficulty than is commonly supposed. For he has to defend it against two opposite parties, and to preserve *consistency* in his answers to *both*. He has to defend it against the objections of Romish writers on the one hand, and those of Protestant Dissenters on the other. If he allows *too little* for the right of private judgment in the concerns of religion, he is accused by the latter of pleading for the intolerance exercised by the Church of Rome. If he allows *too much* for the right of private judgment, he is in danger of being accused from other quarters, that he surrenders the authority which is due to the Church of Christ. He must take therefore a station which lies between the two extremes: for it is only *such* a station, in

which he can repel the attacks of the two opposite parties. It was my first object, therefore, in the eighth chapter of the Comparative View, to find such a station : and, when I believed that I had found it, my next object was, to intrench myself in that station in such a manner, that I might repel the attacks of Romish writers on the one hand, and of Protestant Dissenters on the other. In answer to the former, I undertook to prove, “that the Church of England carries its authority in controversies of faith no further than is necessary for its *own preservation* : but that the Church of Rome carries its authority so far, as to trample on the rights of all other Churches.” In answer to the latter, I undertook to prove, “that Protestants *in general*, the Dissenters themselves not excepted, exercise their spiritual authority on the same principle, and carry it to the very same extent, as the Church of England.” Hence I concluded, that not even the *Dissenters* in this country had any reason to complain of the authority exercised by the established Church in controversies of faith.

At the same time, being aware of a material objection which not only *may be*, but frequently *has been*, made to the argument which I was then conducting, I thought it necessary to *obviate* that objection. For if that objection were *valid*, it would be absolutely *impossible* to defend the authority of the Church of England against

the arguments of the Dissenters. The pretensions of the Church of *England* would then be carried as high as the pretensions of the Church of *Rome*: and I could have discovered no mode of repelling the charge, that our Church, though called a *Protestant* Church, is still infected with *popery*. Is it consistent (say the Dissenters) with genuine Protestantism, which professed to *restore* the right of private judgment, thus to imitate the Church of Rome, and claim an authority which *destroys* that right? Is it consistent (they say) in the Church of England, which could not have reared its head without the *exercise* of that right, so far to forget its own conduct, that being now an *established* Church, it should claim in its turn the spiritual dominion, from which the Reformation is supposed to have *delivered* us? For that the authority of our Church, in controversies of faith, is not a mere authority of *order* (as it is sometimes called by way of excuse), or an authority to which only *respect* is due, but an authority of *strict obligation*, must be evident to every one who considers that *disobedience* of that authority on the part of a clergyman is punishable by the forfeiture of his ecclesiastical preferments. It makes no difference, in this respect, whether the authority be called *absolute*, or *relative*; whether the Church, which exercises such authority, supposes itself infallible, or not. The authority *is* exercised: and the persons, over whom it is exer-

cised, have no more the option, whether they will obey, or not, than whether they will obey an act of parliament, or not. There is only *one* mode therefore of solving the difficulty in which we are thus involved, and that is by having recourse to the following proposition: "If our conscience will not allow us to comply with those terms which are offered by the Established Church, we may *withdraw* from its communion, and profess Christianity under *any* form which we may think proper to adopt¹." The *truth* of this position is indisputable: for the law of the land, which has given to our Church an *establishment*, has granted to the faith and worship of all other Christians *complete protection*. Whether the same liberty of withdrawing from the established Church, existed in the early ages of the Reformation, is a question with which I was not concerned. I was comparing the Churches of England and Rome according to their *present* state. The situation of the Church of Rome is the same at present, as it has been ever since the holding of the Council of Trent: nor is there any authority, according to the principles of that Church, which can make an alteration, except another general council. But no such authority is wanted to alter the situation of the Church of England: and it has consequently undergone *material* alterations. The situation

¹ See the Comparative View, p. 185.

of the Church of England, in respect to *spiritual power*, is very different now from what it was before the writ was abolished *de Hæretico comburendo*. This was abolished in the time of Charles II. Then came the Act of Toleration in the time of William III., which was made expressly (as declared in the preamble) for the relief of "*scrupulous consciences* in the exercise of religion." And the protection thus afforded, has been gradually on the increase, till it was completed by the late *Religious Worship Act*. The fact therefore is indisputable, that as the Church of England is *now* circumstanced, all persons, who cannot conscientiously partake of its faith and worship, are at liberty to *withdraw* from its communion. And the existence of this liberty is fully sufficient to obviate every objection which may be made to our present exercise of Church authority in controversies of faith. For though it is neither necessary, nor expedient, that *one* religious society should interfere with the faith and worship of *another* religious society, yet *every* society must have authority over its *own* members, or the society would be soon dissolved. It must have the power of expelling those who persist in acting contrary to its rules: and if the persons so expelled held offices in the Church, they have no reason to complain, since in every society obedience to its rules is a *condition* of office. But then the persons thus *removed* from the society, must be consi-

dered as withdrawn from the *jurisdiction* of the society.

Such were the principles on which I endeavoured to defend the authority now exercised by the Church of England in controversies of faith: and these principles were briefly stated in the following words: "If the Church of England went beyond the simple act of *removing* those who had violated the terms of communion, it would do *more* than is necessary for its own preservation. For the welfare of a religious society, in things relating to *faith*, requires nothing more, than that they who *counteract* it should be made to *withdraw* from it. *There* the jurisdiction of every Church in matters of faith should cease: and there the jurisdiction of the established Church in matters of faith *does* cease. In the faith and worship of *other* societies it does not presume to interfere; but recognizes, to the utmost extent, the right of every man to worship God according to his conscience. Nor are even its *own* members compelled to *continue* members against their will; though of necessity it requires a compliance with its rules from those who choose to remain in its communion²."

From the advocates of the Church of *Rome* I was prepared to expect some answer to this passage: for it is in direct opposition to the principles of *their* Church. No Romanist can allow,

² See p. 190, of the Comparative View.

that the jurisdiction of the Church in matters of faith should be confined to the *members* of the Church. *Ecclesia suam retinet jurisdictionem in omnes Apostatas, Hæreticos, et Schismaticos, quanquam ad illius corpus non jam pertineant.* This is the doctrine maintained in the college of *Maynooth*³. The same doctrine is maintained also in the Roman Catechism. And that in countries where the Romish religion lies under *restraint*, a distinction should be made between a jurisdiction of *right*, and a jurisdiction of *fact*, a distinction which implies, that the jurisdiction *would* be exercised if it *could*, can excite no surprise. The doctrine of *Nulla salus extra ecclesiam* leads of necessity to an interference in the faith and worship of other Christians. But the Church of England does *not* exclude other Christians from the hope of salvation. The eighteenth Article says, “Holy Scripture doth set out unto us only the name of Jesus Christ, whereby men must be saved.” But it is no where asserted, that the *only society of Christians*, which can hope for salvation, is that particular society which is denoted the *Church of England*. There is a tolerating spirit, therefore, which is breathed in the very *Articles* of our religion; and they who are properly *endowed* with this spirit, will never *wish* to prevent their Christian brethren from worshipping God in their own way. There

³ See the treatise *De Ecclesiâ Christi*, p. 394.

may indeed be individuals of an intolerant disposition, as well in the Church of England as in the Church of Rome : but intolerance is certainly not the *general* character of our Church.

Here, however, the advocates of the Church of Rome interpose, and exclaim,—The spirit of toleration, which you ascribe to the *Church* of England, should be ascribed only to the *State*. If your Church acknowledges, as you say, the right of every man (that is, of every *Christian* man) ⁴to worship God according to his conscience, it is because your Church cannot *now* do otherwise. If your Church recognizes that right by its *actions*, in leaving other Christians undisturbed in the exercise of *their* worship (which, you will say, perhaps is better than doing it by mere *declarations*) it is at best the acknowledgment of a right, which you have no longer the power to *dispute*. It is true, that “in the faith and worship of other societies it does not presume to interfere:” but what is the *reason* of this forbearance? No other than this ; that the law of the land has interposed, and set *bounds* to its interference. Unless, therefore, you can show that your Church *would not* interfere, even if it *could* interfere, you have no reason to represent *our* Church as less tolerant than your own.

⁴ An explanation is hardly necessary on this point, since a Comparative View of the Churches of *England and Rome* can relate to no other faith and worship, than the faith and worship of *Christians*.

And this you will find it difficult to do. For though your Church cannot at present *exercise* authority in controversies of faith, over those who do not belong to it, the *claim* to that authority is still urged by some of your own writers, who contend that even now such authority attaches to the *Church*, though its operation has been suspended by motives of expediency on the part of the *State*. Nay, it has been asserted, that your *Church* has not only never relinquished its claim to such authority, but that it never *can* relinquish it. A Church which claims authority *jure divino*, can never consent to the new-fangled doctrine, that heretics and schismatics may believe and worship according to their own good pleasure. Where then (concludes the Romanist) lies the difference between the Church of Rome and the Church of England, when the latter is considered merely as a *Church*, or without reference to the *State*? Does not the same maxim attach to both, *Ecclesia suam retinet jurisdictionem in omnes Apostatas, Hæreticos, et Schismaticos*? That your Church *claims* at least such jurisdiction, appears further from the indisputable fact, that it *exercised* such jurisdiction before the law of the land interfered to *prevent* it. Before the writ *de Hæretico comburendo* was abolished by a statute of Charles II., heretics were condemned to the flames for no other offence, than that of dissenting from the established creed of the English Church. Blackstone himself

acknowledged four such examples : two Anabaptists in the seventeenth of Elizabeth, and two Arians in the ninth of James I. ⁵

Such is the sum and substance of the objections, which have been made to the principles on which I have endeavoured to defend the authority exercised by the Church of England in controversies of faith. And I must acknowledge, that, if in this country, where the alliance is so close between Church and State, it is allowable to separate the one from the other, I know not how the Church of England can be vindicated from the charge which is laid to it, as well by Protestant Dissenters as by the Church of Rome. If it is true, that the *Church* of England denies to those who dissent from it, the right of worshipping God according to their conscience, it can have no more pretension to the character of toleration than the Church of Rome. And, if it be further true, that our Church can

⁵ With particular reference to the two last-mentioned examples, a letter was addressed to me in the *Morning Chronicle*, soon after the publication of the first edition, in which the writer desired me, either to explain the difference in the mode of prosecuting heretics, between the Churches of England and Rome, or to acknowledge that both Churches were on a footing of equality with respect to intolerance. Not choosing to enter into a newspaper controversy about what is called the Catholic question, I resolved to defer the answer till a new edition was published of the *Comparative View*. And I hope that the present note will be sufficient to show that the two Churches, with respect to intolerance, are *not* on a footing of equality.

never acknowledge the right of other Christians to worship God according to their conscience, because it holds an authority which it possesses *jure divino*, we must acknowledge, at once, that in our pretensions to Church authority we are on a footing of perfect equality with the Church of Rome. If we hold that our Church, in controversies of faith, has still an authority *de jure*, though no longer an authority *de facto*, over the members of *other* Christian societies, we hold the same doctrine with the college of Maynooth, *Ecclesia suam retinet jurisdictionem in omnes Apostatas, Hæreticos, et Schismaticos, quanquam ad illius corpus non jam pertineant.*

But I really do not see how it is *possible* to separate in this country the *Church* from the *State*. The alliance between them is so close, that the character which attaches to the latter, must also attach to the former. Though the *truth* of the doctrines maintained by our Church has no dependence on the decisions of the State, the *establishment* of our Church depends wholly and solely on the authority of the State. And it is only in its quality of an *established* Church, that the Church of England can even *ask*, whether it has a right to interfere with the faith and worship of *other* societies. No one would ask, whether the Presbyterians in this country had a right to interfere with the Independents, or the Independents with the Baptists, or the Baptists with the Quakers. If, therefore, the Church of

England had no *establishment*, the question, whether it had authority over any other than its own members (an authority possessed by *every* society) could not even be entertained. It is evident, therefore, that when several religious societies exist in the same State, no one society can have authority over another, but what it derives from the *paramount* authority, to which *all* of them owe obedience. The authority, therefore, of the Church of England over *other* religious societies is precisely that which the State has determined that it *shall* be. But the State, by various Acts, has determined, that in controversies of *faith* the authority of the Church of England is confined to its own members. The same power which has granted to our Church an *establishment*, has granted to all other Christians in this country *complete toleration*, and consequently an exemption from the jurisdiction of the Church in controversies of faith. The claim, therefore, to such jurisdiction no longer *exists*: and it is neither wise in the *friends* of our Church to struggle for the claim, nor fair in its *adversaries* to contend that the claim is still urged by the Church itself. Though the religious liberty now enjoyed in this country originated with the *State*, the adoption of it by the Church has been a matter of choice, as well as a matter of necessity. It is congenial with the very principles of our religion, which claims not the privilege of *exclusive* salvation. And if (what can neither be

denied nor be justified) four instances have occurred in the annals of our Church in which religious dissent has been punished with death, they bear no proportion to the similar examples in the annals of the Church of Rome. They occurred at a period when we were not wholly disengaged from the spirit of intolerance which distinguishes the Church from which we seceded, and ever *must* distinguish a Church which allows not the hope of salvation to other Christians. But though the Church of *Rome* has not changed, the Church of *England* has changed in its pretensions to spiritual authority. We are no longer what we were, before the writ was abolished *de Hæretico comburendo*: and it is unfair to argue from our former to our present state. Our ecclesiastical and our civil authorities go hand in hand: and as the authority of our Church at *present* exists, it certainly claims no jurisdiction in controversies of faith over any other than its own members. And this jurisdiction it *must* claim, or it loses the power of self-preservation.

NOTE C.

In note ⁶, to Chapter VIII., I represented *all* Schism as injurious; but I confined the *sin* of Schism to a separation from the Church, where the party seceding had not the plea of *conscience* to urge in his defence. But it has been ob-

jected, that there is no ground for such a distinction; that schism is something sinful in its own nature; consequently that there can be no schism without sin; and therefore that they who make distinctions do not reprobate schism so strongly as they ought. Now this objection is nothing more than the proposal of another *definition*. The term Schism is here *defined* as a term including among other notions, the notion of *sin*. But this is not the *only* definition, and certainly not the best. Dr. Johnson's definition of Schism is, "A separation or division in the Church of God." This definition does *not* necessarily include the notion of sin. For unless a *separation* in the Church may take place without sin, it is useless for us to talk about the *grounds* on which we separated from the Church of Rome. If a thing is sinful in itself, there are no grounds on which we can defend it. The Greek word σχίσμα, from which the English word schism is derived, denotes *simply* division, or separation, without the association of any other notion. Thus St. John (vii. 43.) says, σχίσμα οὖν ἐν τῷ ὄχλῳ ἐγένετο δι' αὐτόν, which means nothing more, than that the people were *divided* in their opinions concerning Christ. In the same sense St. John uses it again in chap. ix. 16. καὶ σχίσμα ἦν ἐν αὐτοῖς. And again in chap. x. 19. σχίσμα οὖν πάλιν ἐγένετο ἐν τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις. In the Epistles the term σχίσμα occurs in only three places, and all three are in the first Epistle

to the Corinthians: namely, chap. i. 10; xi. 18; xii. 25. In the first example, St. Paul says to the Corinthians, *μὴ ᾗ ἐν ὑμῖν σχίσματα*, which in our authorised version is rendered, “that there be no *divisions* among you.” In the second example, he says to them, *ἀκούω σχίσματα ἐν ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν*, which in our authorised version is again rendered, “I hear that there be *divisions* among you.” In the third example, he says to them, *ἵνα μὴ ᾗ σχίσμα ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων μεριμνῶσι τὰ μέλη*, which in our authorised version is rendered, “that there should be no *schism* in the body, but that the members should have the *same care* one for another.” This is the only instance in which the word “*schism*” occurs throughout the whole of our English Bible: and even here it appears, from the context, that the want of unanimity, of which St. Paul complained, related rather to *moral* than to *religious* dissensions. In the other two examples, he warns the Corinthians against divisions *generally*: and it is manifest, that in the first example he had chiefly in contemplation that *party spirit*, which prevailed among the Corinthians. Having cautioned the Corinthians against divisions (*σχίσματα*) he adds, “*For* it hath been declared unto me of you, my brethren, by them which are of the house of Chloe, that there are contentions (*ἔριδες*) among you. Now this I say, that every one of you saith, I am of *Paul*, and I of *Apollos*, and I of *Cephas*,” &c.

If then we define the English word “schism” according to the use which St. John and St. Paul have made of the Greek word σχίσμα, we shall not define it as a division or separation, which, in its own nature, or of necessity, is *sinful*. In fact, the notion which many persons attach to the English word “schism” is not founded on the notion which St. Paul and St. John attached to the Greek word σχίσμα, but on the notion which the Church of Rome has attached to *schisma* in the Latin Vulgate. The Church of Rome, presuming on its own *infallibility*, regarded every separation from the Church as a thing necessarily *sinful*. It was urged that St. Paul had said, *Non sit SCHISMA in corpore*. And again, *Non sint in vobis SCHISMATA*. If the party, which separated from that Church, replied, that his separation could not be *sinful*, because he in his conscience believed that the Church, from which he separated, was in *error*, the immediate answer was, “Our Church *cannot* be in error.” *Ecclesia non potest errare*. If he further alleged in his defence, that a man may fall into *error*, without falling into *sin*, provided he *sincerely believes* that the opinions which he has embraced is *not* error, the answer was, “It is not sufficient that you are *sincere* in your belief: it is your business to inform yourself of the *truth*, and, if you do not, you are responsible for the consequence.” He might reply, indeed, “*I know* it is my business to search for the truth:

it is your business also to do the same : I have searched for the truth, as well as you ; I have searched for it in the *Bible*, which is the highest authority, and I sincerely believe that I have *found* the truth. You have likewise searched for the truth, and in the same place : you likewise believe that you have *found* the truth. But we have found *different* things, because we differently *interpret* the same passages of Scripture. Here then is belief against belief ; conscience against conscience ; sincerity against sincerity. Why then (concludes the separatist) should I be charged with *sin* any more than yourself ?"—“ For *this* reason,” replies the advocate of the Church of Rome, “ your interpretation of the passages, which you allege as the *grounds* of separation, is at variance with the interpretation of the *Church*. But the Church, as I have told you, *cannot* err. Your interpretation, therefore, *must* be wrong. Consequently, you can have no excuse whatever for your separation from the Church : your plea of conscience and sincerity is urged *in vain* : for it is urged in opposition to a Church which is *infallible*.”

Answers of this kind to the objections of a separatist are very consistent, when they proceed from the members of a Church which claims the gift of infallibility. But they are answers which no *Protestant* can consistently give : for there is no Protestant Church which *pretends* to be infallible. No Protestant can consistently say to

another, who differs from him in religious opinions, that he has no right to urge the plea of conscience, or the plea of sincerity. The duty of searching for the truth being a duty *equally* incumbent on *both*, and *neither* of them pretending to infallibility, a difference in their conclusions cannot warrant *either* of them to charge the other with *sin*. It is a case, in which each party will believe that he *does not* err: but neither of them maintains the opinion, that he *cannot* err. One party may have the benefit of belonging to a Church which is *established* by the State, while the other may belong to a party which is only *tolerated* by the State. But when a Church, though established, does not pretend to be infallible, the doctrines of that Church, however *true* they may be, cannot be urged as an argument that a dissent from them is *sin*. Here, perhaps, I shall be interrupted by the question, Though you deny that your Church is infallible, and argue from that denial, will you allow that in any one instance your Church actually *does* err? Certainly not: for I am persuaded that its doctrines are in *all* respects conformable with Scripture. Since then (as may be further objected) you as resolutely contend, when put to the test, that your Church is the *true* Church, as any Romanist can do of the Church of Rome, are not your distinctions rather nominal than real? If separation from the Church of England is in your opinion separation from the

true Church, must not you form the same judgment of those who secede from it, as a Romanist forms of those who secede from the Church, which in *his* opinion is the true Church? To this question I answer, that, in order to preserve Protestant *consistency*, I must form a *different* judgment. For though I maintain, in point of fact, that the Church of England *does not* err, I do not entertain the opinion that it *can not* err. And however trifling the difference may appear between “*does not*” and “*can not*,” they lead to very different results. If a Church *cannot* err, separation from it *must* be wrong: there exists not even the *possibility* of justifying such separation. But if we merely assert that a Church *does not* err, we must allow at least the *possibility* of its falling into error. And, if we allow that we ourselves *may* err, we cannot conclude that they who differ from us *must* err. And if even *error* is not a consequence, which follows of necessity, much less is *sin*. The only inference, therefore, which we can consistently draw with respect to those who dissent from the Church of England, is this: As we believe that the doctrines of our Church are *true*, we cannot do otherwise than believe that doctrines, which are at variance with them, are *false*. Such must be our belief in regard to the doctrines themselves. But we are not therefore warranted to believe, that they who profess such doctrines are guilty of *sin*, even though that profession detaches them

from the established Church. Whereas a Romanist therefore would contend that separation from the Church *must* be sinful, a member of the Church of England cannot consistently go further than to assert, that separation from the Church *may* be sinful. But if it only *may* be sinful, there must be some criterion which determines when it *is* sinful. And what better criterion can we have, than that which was proposed in the Comparative View?

That divisions of every kind are *injurious* to the body in which they take place, is a general proposition, which will be admitted by *all* parties. Every society, whether civil or religious, must join in the wish of St. Paul, ἵνα μὴ ᾖ σχίσμα ἐν τῷ σώματι. At the same time it will be acknowledged, that what is evil *in itself*, is sometimes productive of *good*; and that cases may occur in which the good outweighs the evil. But though all parties will agree in this general proposition, they will differ in the application of it to particular cases. The members of our own Church, while they admit that the divisions occasioned by the Reformation were evils in *themselves*, must assert, on the other hand, that those evils bore no proportion, either in duration or in magnitude, to the *good* which was produced. A Romanist, on the other hand, will contend that *no* compensation was made for the evils produced by divisions in the Catholic Church, since the effect of the Reformation was the production of *error*. In lik

manner the separation, which has taken place from the Church of *England*, will be differently viewed by the different parties; each party believing that it is in possession of the truth. If we seek, therefore, a criterion in the *truth* of religion, we shall never find one in which all parties will agree. But unless contending parties consent to try their differences by some *common rule*, it is impossible to bring the contest to an issue. Now the members of the Church of Rome, though they will not admit that our Reformers had truth on their side, cannot possibly deny that they could urge the plea of *conscience* in support of their separation. For they sacrificed their *lives* in support of it. And, though it is possible that a man should sacrifice himself for a false doctrine, no man would do so for a doctrine which he *believed* to be false. But if we contend that the Romanists have no right to represent our separation from *their* Church as sinful, because they *themselves* must admit that our Reformers had the plea of *conscience* to urge in their defence, we cannot consistently impute sin to those who dissent from *our* Church on the same plea of conscience. Here, methinks, I hear some one exclaim, “Will you compare separation from the Church of *England* with separation from the Church of *Rome*; separation from the *true* Church with separation from a *false* one?” Now that our Church is the *true* Church, is a position which I cannot question. But if I make

it the basis of an argument, in which either Romanists or Protestant Dissenters are concerned, I shall be stopped at the very onset. The Romanist will say that we have *departed* from the true Church, while the Protestant Dissenter will assert, that we have not departed *far enough* to arrive at the true Church. Where then is the use of arguing upon ground upon which we must previously know that we can never come to an issue? But where the plea of *conscience* can be established, we have a criterion, which admits of no dispute. I can discover, then, no other criterion, which is applicable to the intended purpose, and is at the same time a criterion which can be consistently used by a *Protestant* Church. Though I believe that the doctrines of our Church are *true*, and consequently *must* believe that they who dissent from it have fallen into *error*, yet to go further, and to maintain that every Dissenter from the established Church is guilty of *sin*, would be an inference equally monstrous and uncharitable. On the other hand, I do not deny, that separation from an established Church *may* be sinful: and I must allow it, according to the proposed criterion. For if men separate themselves from the established Church, and have *not* the plea of conscience to urge in their defence; if they neither object to its doctrines nor its discipline, and yet withdraw from its communion, they are answerable for the evils which arise from *divisions* in the

Church, which are uncompensated by any good to themselves. Such men are guilty of a *sinful* separation from the Church, for which they are amenable to their Maker, though not to a human tribunal.

Let us now return to the word "*schism*," and consider in what manner the difficulties attending the use of that term may be removed by the preceding observations. Having considered what is *sinful separation*, we can more easily determine, from the analogy of the terms, what is *sinful schism*. But then we must previously settle what that analogy *is*. The Greek word *σχίσμα* implies nothing *more* than separation: whereas *schisma* in the Latin Vulgate, as understood by the Church of *Rome*, is a term, in which the notion of separation is accompanied with the notion of sin. Hence the word *schismaticus*, as used in the Romish systems of Theology, always signifies a *sinful* separatist: it being supposed that separation from an infallible Church *must* be sinful. When a Romanist therefore employs the English word "*schism*," he will likewise understand the term, as associating the notion of sin with the notion of separation. And if a Protestant writer understands it in the same sense, he will argue in the same manner. If we set out with the definition, that the term *schism* means something sinful, we cannot doubt, that there is at all times *sin* in *schism*. And if two parties can previously agree to use the term in

that sense, they can never dispute about the *sin* of schism. But the misfortune is, that men argue about schism, without *explaining* their meaning; they attach to it the notion of sin in their *own minds*, but never think of *defining* the term, before they begin to dispute about it. They attempt therefore to *prove* that a thing is sinful, to which sin of necessity attaches according to their *original conception* of it, and according to which no proof can be *wanted*. It appears then, that all disputes about the sin of schism, have been mere disputes about the *meaning of a word*: disputes, which would have been wholly avoided, if they, who contend that schism *must* be sinful, had only explained themselves, and declared, that they *meant* something sinful. Their opponents could then have answered, “Though we use the *same term* we are really arguing about *different things*. The term schism, according to the notion which you attach to it, conveys in *itself* the idea of sin; the term therefore, as you employ it, *denotes* something sinful. But according to the notion which we attach to the term schism, it denotes what is denoted by the Greek σχίσμα, and therefore the idea of sin *may* accompany the idea of separation, or it may *not*.”

If it be urged, that schism *ought* to be defined in such a manner, as necessarily to include the notion of sin, I answer, that it undoubtedly ought to be so defined, according to the principles of the Church of Rome. But if *Protest-*

ants assert, that separation from an established Church *must* be sinful, they join the Romanists in condemning the Reformation. For though our Reformers brought us back to the true Church, they certainly *separated* from the Church which was then established. On the other hand, if we make a distinction between separation in one case and separation in another, and employing the term “schism” exclusively for *sinful* separation, we argue that one separation may be justifiable, while another is schismatical, we involve ourselves in another difficulty, which is not easily overcome. For if the contending parties can agree about this *definition* of the term, and can previously come to an understanding that the term schism means “a sinful separation,” they will be instantly at a stand, when they begin to *apply* the term. If we argue about schism with a Romanist, we shall certainly not allow, that the term, as *now* defined, is applicable to ourselves; while the Romanist will contend, that it applies to us for the very reason, which we assign for its non-application. If we argue about schism with a Protestant Dissenter, he will certainly not allow that *his* separation from the Church of England is a sinful separation. He will deny therefore that *schism*, as now defined, attaches more to *his* separation than to our own. Who then shall *determine* where schism attaches, and where it does not? It seems reasonable, that the parties,

whose consciences are immediately concerned, should be allowed to judge for *themselves*: and on this principle all Protestants acted at the Reformation. Dissenters from the Church of England claim likewise the privilege of judging for themselves: nor can we consistently deny it, especially as our Church does not pretend to be infallible. But if the persons who *separate* from an established Church determine the question of schism, *no* separation from an established Church will be deemed schismatical. On the other hand, if the determination lies with the *Church* from which the separation is made, then *every* separation will be deemed schismatical, our own Reformation not excepted. If in order to bring the matter to a crisis, we say, that schism, as now defined, is a departure from the *true* Church, the contending parties will be immediately stopped by the question, What is the true Church? For *every* Church believes itself to be the *true* Church; whether it be the Syrian Church, or the Armenian Church, or the Greek Church, or the Church of Rome, or the Church of England, or the Church of Scotland, or the Lutheran Church, or any other congregation of Christians, by whatever appellation it may be distinguished. If then we define schism as “a departure from the *true* Church,” who shall determine the previous question among the contending parties? We ourselves believe, and according to my firm conviction very *justly* be-

lieve, that our Church (in the words of art. xix.) “is a congregation of faithful men, in which the pure word of God is preached, and the sacraments be duly administered according to Christ’s ordinance.” But as every *other* congregation of Christians believes also, that it teaches the pure word of God, it is easy to foresee the result of a controversy about the sin of schism, according to the present definition. Each party will claim the honour of being a *society of Christ’s forming*, a society therefore *jure divino*; each party will contend that opposition to a *divine institution* must be sinful; each party will contend, that what is sinful at one time, must be sinful at another. *Each* party therefore will conclude, that the members of all *other* parties are involved in the sin of schism. Such are the consequences of considering schism as something *necessarily* sinful. But if we consider it as something that *may* or *may not* be sinful according to circumstances, and adopt the criterion proposed in the Comparative View, the question of schism may be brought to an issue. For where dissent is *really* conscientious, the plea of conscience admits of a proof, which must be acknowledged by *all* parties.

Lastly, it is urged, that whatever difficulties may attend the application of the term schism, as defined in the preceding paragraph, it is the sense in which it was applied by our Reformers, who have taught us to *pray* against schism,

which they would not have done, if they had not considered it as *sinful*. Now it so happens, that throughout the Liturgy, the word “schism” occurs in only two places, and that in *neither* of those places did it proceed from our *Reformers*. Indeed our Reformers rather *avoided* the use of the term schism; for at the commencement of the Reformation they *themselves* were the persons, to whom the term “schismatics” was especially applied. While they themselves were separatists from the Church of Rome, there neither were nor *could* be, separatists from the Church of England. It was necessary that the Church of England should be formed and established, before a question could arise about a *separation* from it. Hence the word schism never occurs in our *articles*. But when the *canons* were composed in the time of James I., a separation from the established Church *had* taken place, occasioned chiefly by those who had learnt their theology at Geneva, and who at length *overturned* the established Church. Hence the titles of the 9th, 10th, and 11th canons are, “Authors of *schism* in the Church of England censured—Maintainers of *schismatics* in the Church of England censured—Maintainers of *Conventicles* censured.” But it is remarkable, that though the terms “schism” and “schismatic” occur in some of the *titles*, they do not occur in the *text*, of the canons. With respect to the Liturgy, the only places, in which either

of these terms occurs, are in the Litany, and the service for the king's accession to the throne. In this latter service, the collect used before the epistles contains the following passage, "Let not heresies and false doctrines disturb the peace of the Church, nor schisms and causeless divisions weaken it." Here the expression "causeless divisions" appears to have been added for the purpose of *explaining* the word "schisms." And it is an explanation, which is very consistent with the criterion adopted in the Comparative View ; for they who withdraw themselves from the established Church, and have no plea of *conscience* to urge in their defence, undoubtedly make *causeless* divisions in the Church. The passage of the Litany, in which the word "schism" is now used, stood thus in the time of Charles I. "From all sedition, and privy conspiracy ; from all false doctrine, and heresy ; from hardness of heart, and contempt of thy word and commandment." But in the review of the Liturgy after the restoration of Charles II., the words REBELLION and SCHISM were added to this passage ; and they were added, as Wheatley justly remarks, "to deprecate in future the like subversion of Church and State to what they had then so lately felt." The terms REBELLION and SCHISM being added therefore to deprecate the subversion both of the *State* and of the *Church* in the time of Charles I., the persons who added those words. must have had in

contemplation the *religion* of those, who had caused the *rebellion*. The schism therefore, which is *there* meant, is the schism of the *Calvinists*. Now whether their schism was *sinful* schism, or only *erroneous* schism, is a question, which I shall not undertake to examine. For in *whatever* sense we use the term schism, we have abundant reason for praying to God, that He would be pleased to *deliver* us from schism. Indeed there never was a period, when we had more reason to pray fervently, in the words of St. Paul, ἵνα μὴ ᾖ ΣΧΙΣΜΑ ἐν τῷ σώματι.

Note D.

When the extensive authority, which is claimed by the Church of Rome in controversies of faith was defended by an appeal to our Saviour's declaration, that St. Peter was a rock, on which his Church should be founded¹, the Romish writers employed an argument, in which the premises and the inference had so little connexion, that we may justly wonder at the embarrassment, which it occasioned both to the Lutheran and to the Calvinist divines. For though the Church at large was "built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner stone²;" and though St. Peter *in*

¹ Matt. xvi. 18.

² Ephes. ii. 20.

particular may be regarded as a rock, on which the primitive Church, as formed at Jerusalem, was originally founded³; yet between these premises and the inference, that the Church of *Rome* is the supreme Church, some intermediate positions are required, which are either frivolous or false. As the primitive Church at Jerusalem was the mother of all Churches, so all particular Churches or the universal Church, may be justly said to be included in our Saviour's prophecy⁴. But then the Church of Rome will be included only *in common* with other Churches: and can have no claim to be considered as meant *especially* by our Saviour. And with respect to the position, that the Church of Rome *itself* was founded by St. Peter, it is wholly destitute of truth. If St. Paul was *ever* at Rome, it is manifest both from

³ St. Peter laid the foundation for the Church of Jerusalem on the very day on which the Apostles received the gifts of the Holy Ghost. See Acts ii. 14—41. 47. Bishop Pearson in his Exposition of the Creed, art. ix., says of the Church, "It will be necessary to take notice, that our Saviour, first speaking of it, mentioned it, as that which then was not, but afterwards was to be, as when He said unto the great Apostle, *Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church*. But when He ascended into heaven, and the Holy Ghost came down, when *Peter* had converted *three thousand souls*, which were added to the hundred and twenty disciples, then was there a *Church*, and that built upon *Peter*, according to our Saviour's promise."

⁴ Bishop Pearson, in his Exposition of the Creed, art. ix., says also, "If then we reflect upon the *first Church* again, which we found constituted in the *Acts*, and to which *all others* since have been in a manner added and conjoined," &c.

the Acts of the Apostles, and the Epistles of St. Paul, that St. Paul must have arrived there before him. And the Epistle to the Romans proves incontestably, that the Church of Rome was not *founded* by St. Peter. But even if it *was*, the Church of Rome was no more entitled to supremacy on that account, than the Church of Jerusalem. Nor was it more entitled, than the Churches of Ephesus, Thessalonica, and other Churches founded by St. *Paul*, whose authority was not inferior to that of St. Peter. Still less was it entitled to this supremacy from the mere circumstance, that St. Peter *presided* over the Church of Rome : for the same argument would give supremacy to every *other* Church, over which either St. Peter or St. Paul presided.

But though it was so easy to confute the arguments of the Romish writers on this subject, both the Lutheran and the Calvinist divines, from the very commencement of the Reformation, had recourse to the uncritical expedient of torturing the words of our Saviour to a meaning, which they cannot convey. These learned divines could not divest themselves of the notion, that St. Peter was a sort of tutelary saint, because he was claimed by the Church of Rome ; and therefore in the same proportion as the Church of Rome endeavoured to *raise* the importance of St. Peter, in the same proportion did the followers both of Luther and of Calvin, endeavour to *lower* it. And as the words of

the Latin Vulgate, *Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram œdificabo Ecclesiam meam*, were so interpreted by the Romish writers, as if *that* Church were the *only* Church to which the words applied, the Lutheran and Calvinist divines saw no other expedient of confuting their adversaries, than by asserting that the latter part of the passage applied not to St. Peter *at all*. But how could this position be established? Our Saviour certainly *began* the conversation by addressing himself to St. Peter in particular. In answer to the question, what opinion the Apostles had formed of our Saviour, St. Peter had said (Matt. xvi. 16.) “Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God.” To these words our Saviour replied, “Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona: for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven.” And then, in the words of our Greek Gospel, He immediately proceeded, Κἀγὼ δέ ΣΟΙ λέγω, ὅτι σὺ εἶ ΠΕΤΡΟΣ, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ ΠΕΤΡΑΙ οἰκοδομήσω μου τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. Now if we argued merely from the *Greek* words, yet as ΠΕΤΡΟΣ and ΠΕΤΡΑ differ only in their *terminations*, the former being necessarily masculine, when used as a *proper* name, we should conclude that our Saviour alluded to the *meaning* of that name, which He himself had given to that Apostle, and certainly not without a *motive*. The original name of the Apostle was *Simon*; but our Saviour,

whose language was Syriac, gave him the name of *Cepha*, that is ܚܦܐ or as the word is written in the old Syriac Version ܚܦܐ which signifies both a *stone* and a *rock*⁵. In Greek letters it was written Κηφᾶς, with the addition of a sigma, to make the termination accord with that language. Hence St. John relates, (ch. i. 43.) that when our Saviour first saw Simon, He said to him, Σὺ εἶ Σίμων ὁ υἱὸς Ἰωνᾶ σὺ κληθήσῃ Κηφᾶς. And then St. John himself subjoins the explanation, ὁ ἐρμηνεύεται Πέτρος. A comparison of this passage with the former is sufficient to show, that when our Saviour spake of the *Rock*, on which He would build his Church, He alluded to the meaning of that very name, which He himself had given to Simon. But, if we should draw this inference merely in arguing from the *Greek* words, how much more so, in arguing from the *Syriac* words, or the words which were employed by our Saviour *himself*, when the declaration was made? For in Syriac the same word, with the same termination, and moreover with the same punctuation, is the name of the *Apostle*, and the name for a *rock*⁶.

⁵ See Castelli Lexicon Heptaglotton, p. 1719, where ܚܦܐ is explained by *petra*, as well as by *lapis*.

⁶ The Syriac version has in both instances ܚܦܐ^o_x. That the Olaph makes this word of the feminine gender, when it is used as an *appellative*, cannot destroy its applicability to the

Under these circumstances, it seems a desperate undertaking to prove, that our Saviour alluded to any other person than to St. Peter: for the *words* of the passage can indicate no one else. But both the Lutheran and the Calvinist divines had recourse to the gratuitous supposition, that our Saviour explained by his *gestures* what He did not explain by his *words*. They ventured at least to *conjecture*, that when our Saviour said to St. Peter, Σὺ εἶ Πέτρος, He extended his hand and *pointed* to St. Peter; but that He immediately turned his hand, and pointed to *himself*, when He said ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ.—Such a gesticulation *must* be supposed, if our Saviour meant to speak of *himself*: or the Apostles with whom He was conversing could not possibly have understood Him. But it is evident, that the supposition is *merely* gratuitous, and made for no other purpose than to find a pretext for a meaning previously assumed, and assumed without foundation. Nor must we forget, that such interpreters make our Saviour argue without object or end. If our Saviour intended to say, that He *himself* was the Rock on which He should build his Church, for what possible pur-

Apostle: for it was so applied, and so applied by Christ himself. Thus *Pierre* in French signifies *Peter*, though the word, when used as an *appellative*, is of the feminine gender. Indeed nothing can better illustrate the Syriac words employed by our Saviour, than the French translation; “Tu es Pierre, et sur cette pierre,” &c.

pose could He preface the assertion by saying, “*Thou art Peter?*” St. Peter could not want to be told either who he was, or what was his name. But if we suppose that the name of *Cepha*, or Πέτρος, was introduced with a view to a particular *application* of the name, the whole passage is clear and rational. We then perceive the *reason* why the name of *Cepha*, or Πέτρος, was introduced : we perceive that it was introduced as a prelude to the observation, that the *name* of the Apostle corresponded with the *office* of the Apostle, or the *services* which our Saviour foresaw he would render to the Church. Hence also we may learn our Saviour’s *motive*, when He gave to Simon the name of *ῥοκ*, or Rock ; we may conclude, that He perceived a *firmness* in the character of Simon which fitted him for the task to which he was destined. Nor must we overlook the *parallelism* between our Saviour’s reply to St. Peter, and the answer which St. Peter had just given to our Saviour. St. Peter had answered, Σὺ εἶ ὁ Χριστὸς, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ζῶντος : and our Saviour replied, Σὺ εἶ Πέτρος, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ οἰκοδομήσω μου τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. The whole, therefore, is clear and consistent, if we suppose that our Saviour had St. Peter in contemplation *throughout* : but we deprive the passage both of consistency and of reason, by making our Saviour turn abruptly from St. Peter to himself. Consequently He could not have so *meant* the passage. Yet, in

most of the German systems of divinity, from the time of the Reformation till the middle of the eighteenth century, including the last edition of *Gerardi Loci theologici*, the passage is so explained. It has been supposed, that the difference of the Greek *terminations*, in the words Πέτρος and Πέτρα, was sufficient to prevent an inference from the one to the other. When Πέτρος is used as an *appellative*, it signifies a *stone*; whereas Πέτρα signifies a *rock*, as well as a stone. And this distinction in the usage of the *Greek* language has been employed as an argument that our Saviour could not have alluded to St. Peter. Even Wolf, in his *Curæ Philologicæ*, is inclined to this opinion. And among the divines of the Reformed Church, (as it is called in opposition to the Lutheran,) Isaac Casaubon, in his *Exercitationes ad Annales Baronii*, p. 285, and Frederic Spanheim, in his note to the passage, have argued in the same manner. But I make no scruple to repeat what I asserted in the “Comparative View,” chap. x. note ⁷, p. 339, that it is an argument “*unworthy of a critic*.” For it is surely uncritical, in the highest possible degree, to argue from a distinction in the *Greek terminations* ος and α, when our Saviour spake *Syriac*, and employed a word which in both cases has the *same termination*⁷.

⁷ I must observe, however, in justice to Casaubon, that though in the heat of controversy with Baronius, he argued strenuously against the opinion that our Saviour alluded to

And even if our Saviour had spoken *Greek*, He could not have used Πέτρα as the proper name of a *man*. It was, then, a matter of *necessity* that the masculine termination should be used. To argue, therefore, from a difference in the terminations, as if the difference were voluntary and designed, as if the difference were *intended* to distinguish the man Πέτρος from the rock Πέτρα, is certainly not very accurate reasoning. Nor does it show much critical acumen to confound Πέτρος as a *proper* name with Πέτρος as an *appellative*. Bengelius, in his *Gnomon Novi Testamenti*, very justly observes: Πέτρος alias denotat lapidem; sed in Simone Petram: enimvero talem virum non conveniebat appellitari Petram fœmininâ terminatione. Vicissim Matthæus libenter scripsisset ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ πέτρῳ, si sermonis ratio tulisset. Quare hæc duo Πέτρα et Πέτρος stant *pro uno nomine*, sicut unum utrinque nomen *Kepha* legitur in Syriaco. Bengelius was a *critic*, and here he argued accordingly. So was Michaelis, who contributed greatly to the rejection of that distinction which had been adopted by the early Lutheran divines from a mere ungrounded anxiety. It is rejected

St. Peter, his zeal against that opinion abated before his death. For in p. 82, of the *Casauboniana*, which were published from the papers he left, we find the following passage: Cyprianus et Hieronymus sæpe dicunt, super *Petrum* fundari Ecclesiam. Baronius, I. 170. *omnes fere Patres* hâc locutione usos esse, collatis eorum verbis, docet.

also by Dr. Rosenmüller, in his *Scholia* to the New Testament, and by almost every other German commentator of the present age. It was rejected also by Grotius, by Le Clerc, and by L'Enfant. Nor has it met with approbation among our *English* commentators. That it was rejected by Bishop Pearson, appears from a passage which has been already quoted. Dr. Hammond, in his note to Matth. xvi. 18, explains the word *Rock*, not of Christ, but of St. Peter. He says the very name of Πέτρος is “applicable to the person of St. Peter in respect of the *Church*.” Dr. Whitby has argued at considerable length in favour of the same opinion. Poole also applies the word *Rock* to *St. Peter*, though, with some other divines, he makes a distinction between the *person* of St. Peter and the *confession* of St. Peter, namely, his confession that Jesus was the Christ. Indeed, this refinement is not of modern invention: for Casaubon, in his *Exercitationes ad Annales Baronii*, p. 280, has collected various examples from the Greek and Latin fathers to the same purport. For instance, Chrysostom having quoted the words ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ, adds, τουτέστι, τῇ πίστει τῆς ὉΜΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ. Augustine also explains ‘super hanc *petram*’ by ‘super hanc *fidem*.’ Also Basilus Seleucensis says, Ταύτην τὴν ὉΜΟΛΟΓΙΑΝ πέτραν καλέσας ὁ Χριστὸς ΠΕΤΡΟΝ ὀνομάζει. Now whatever distinction be made between the *person* of St. Peter and the *confession* of St.

Peter, such explanations still refer the expression ἐπὶ τῇ πέτρᾳ to St. Peter, and not to Christ. But Dr. Clarke, in his note to this passage, says, "That the *Rock* here mentioned is not the *confession*, but the *person*, of Peter, seems plain from the construction of the words." Dr. Doddridge, having quoted the opinion of Dr. Clarke, adds, that, "it seems to suit best with the *connexion*." Dr. Wells has paraphrased our Saviour's address in the following manner: "Thou art *Peter*, i. e. a *Rock*, so named by me as foreseeing that by thy *constancy* in this confession after my resurrection and ascension, thou shalt eminently *be* what thy *name imports*, viz. a firm and immoveable professor of the truth. And as upon the foundation of my Apostles in general, so upon *thee, this Rock*, in a special manner, namely, as the first and most eminent part of the foundation, I will *build my Church*." Dr. Macknight, in his "Harmony," again applies the word to St. Peter. He says, "In allusion to his surname of Peter, which signifies a *Rock*, Jesus promised that he should have a principal hand in establishing his kingdom. The Christian Church was to be erected on his labours, as a solid foundation, so that it should never be destroyed." Dr. Campbell translates the passage, "Thou art named *Rock*, and upon this *Rock* I will build my Church." This translation, independently of Dr. Campbell's note, sufficiently shows in what sense he understood

it. Bishop Pearce explains the passage in a manner peculiar to himself: but he still applies the word πέτρα to St. Peter. As πέτρος signifies a *stone*, and πέτρα signifies both a *rock* and a *stone*, he accommodates the latter to the former, and translates ἐπὶ τῇ πέτρᾳ “upon this *stone*.” In this manner ἐπὶ τῇ πέτρᾳ is made to harmonize with the *name of the Apostle*, even when πέτρος is used as a Greek *appellative*. It is true that the building of a Church upon a *stone* is a thing not very intelligible; and Bishop Pearce felt himself reduced to the necessity of seeking a *figurative* sense for the word *stone*, in which he was not very successful. But the very *attempt* to procure the same meaning for πέτρος and πέτρα, shows, that in the opinion of Bishop Pearce the expression ἐπὶ τῇ πέτρᾳ refers not to Christ, but to St. Peter. To the *Commentaries* on Matt. xvi. 18, might be added several *Sermons* on this text. But it will be sufficient to quote a sermon by Bishop Beveridge (vol. i. serm. vii.), and another by Bishop Hurd (vol. iii. serm. xix.), in both of which the word “Rock” is referred *not* to Christ, but to St. Peter. In short, that expression has been so generally referred to St. Peter by English divines, that when I translated the Introduction of Michaelis, I had never heard of an exception. I omitted therefore, the translation of a note in which Michaelis had argued for the opinion that the word Rock in Matt. xvi. 18, applied to St. Peter;

and I assigned as a reason for the omission, (vol. i. p. 383,) that "I have never heard of any *English* divine that doubted it."

The preceding remarks on the celebrated passage, Matt. xvi. 18, will serve, I hope, as a sufficient apology for my having reprinted, without alteration, the note to chap. x. p. 339, of the "Comparative View." And *without* such an apology I could not have ventured to reprint it, as it has been severely censured by a prelate of great learning, and great importance. The *place* where it has been subjected to this censure is not indeed exactly the place where readers in general would expect to find it: for it is contained in the following publication: "A Letter to the Honourable and Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Durham, on the origin of the *Pelasgi*, and on the original name and pronounciation of the *Æolic Digamma*, in answer to Professor Marsh's *Horæ Pelasgicæ*. By the Bishop of St. David's." The objections which the Bishop of St. David's has made to the *Horæ Pelasgicæ* will be noticed in due season. At present I am concerned only with his objections to my explanation of Matt. xvi. 18, which form both the *beginning* and the *end* of his remarks on the *Pelasgi*. I have asserted, and *still* assert, that our Saviour alluded to *St. Peter*, and not to *himself*, when He spake of the Rock on which the Church should be founded. I have asserted, and *still* assert, that the true import of the words

Σὺ εἶ Πέτρος, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ κ.τ.λ. was this: "Thou art Rock in *name*, and shalt be Rock in *deed*, for on thee, &c." But as hundreds and thousands have asserted that Christ, and *not* St. Peter, was the Rock to which allusion was made, I have certainly no reason either to wonder or to complain that the Bishop of St. David's should prefer the party which I oppose to the party which I espouse. It is a subject on which every man has a right to entertain his *own* opinion. But I sincerely lament that his lordship, instead of making his objections with the calmness of a critic, has urged them with all the feelings of personal asperity. He considers the note in question as a kind of insult to his lordship's opinion *in particular*, though I neither mentioned the name of his lordship, nor said any thing by which he could be particularly distinguished. Why, then, should his lordship be so offended at my opposing an opinion which is so far from being *peculiar* to him, that he has merely repeated what almost every Lutheran and Calvinist divine had asserted from the time of the Reformation to the middle of the last century? Yet one should suppose from his lordship's language, as well as from his feelings, that the opinion was his own invention. He even *begins* his pamphlet with these words: "The Protestant sense which *I* have given to the passage in St. Matthew's Gospel, concerning the Rock of the Christian Church, &c." His

lordship should rather have said, "The sense which *I*, in common with hundreds of commentators, &c." And with respect to his lordship *in particular*, I can assure him, that his pamphlet entitled "Christ, and not St. Peter, the Rock of the Christian Church," never came within my notice, till it was reprinted in the second volume of the "Churchman Armed," and in the same year (1814) in which the "Comparative View" was printed. Which of the two publications first left the press I cannot say; but this I can safely say, that my own book was published before I had either *seen* the other, or *knew* any thing of the other. My copy of the "Churchman Armed" was sent to me as a present, by a much respected friend, who well knows that he sent it some months after the appearance of the "Comparative View." I might consider, therefore, the publication of his lordship's pamphlet in the "Churchman Armed" as a personal attack upon *me*, with as much reason as his lordship considers the note in question as a personal attack upon *him*. But let us suppose that I had both seen and read the pamphlet for which his lordship feels so much tenderness: to what, even in *that* case, would the offence amount of which he complains? Simply to this: that whereas his lordship had joined the ranks of *one* numerous party, I had ventured to join the ranks of *another* numerous party, and believing that the former party had argued very

uncritically, I took the liberty to *say* so. And since every new examination of the subject serves only to *confirm* me in that opinion, I cannot possibly renounce it, though I at present *know* his lordship's dislike to it. However "*uncourteous*" his lordship may consider a dissent from his opinion, I cannot subscribe to a doctrine which in my conscience I believe to be false. *If*, indeed, his lordship will supply me with arguments sufficient to confute my *present* opinion, I will *endeavour* to renounce it: for he well knows that endeavours of that sort are not always successful. But then he must furnish me with other arguments than those which he has given in his late publication: for they are such as have been repeatedly urged, and repeatedly answered. He contends that πέτρα cannot refer to Πέτρος, the name of the Apostle, because πέτρος, as an appellative, signifies a *stone*, whereas πέτρα signifies a *rock*. And though in Syriac the same word, with the same termination, is used in both places, yet even here, says his lordship, there is a distinction: for Cepha, when used as an appellative, is *feminine*; whereas Cepha, when used for the name of a man, is *masculine*. But as it is unnecessary to dwell any longer on *such* arguments, I will proceed to the last passage of his Postscript, where he has given a *summary* of the evidence against me.

“The professor’s interpretation of our Saviour’s words is inadmissible on many accounts, *Fact and history* are against it. The Church of Christ was not built on St. Peter. The *Greek text* is against it. The *Syriac version* is against it. And beside Chrysostom and Augustine, some of the highest critical authorities since the Reformation are against it. Casaubon in his *Exercitationes Baronianæ* ; Schmidius in his *Notes on the New Testament* ; Spanheim in his *Opera Theologica*, vol. iii.; and Bishop Horsley in his *Sermons*, vol. i.”

Here, indeed, is a *host* of evidence against the opinion that our Saviour alluded to Πέτρος, when He used the expression ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ. But when this evidence is weighed in the balance, it will be found miserably *wanting*. In the first place, fact and history are *not* against it : for the *primitive* Church, the Church of Jerusalem, was founded by *St. Peter*, as I have shown already. Secondly, the Greek text is *not* against it : for the difference between Πέτρος and Πέτρα, when Πέτρος is a *proper* name, is no argument against the reference from one to the other. Thirdly, the Syriac text is decidedly in its *favour*, as every one must know who is acquainted with that language. Fourthly, Chrysostom and Augustine are so far from referring the words ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ to *our Saviour*, that they refer them expressly to *St. Peter*, as I have shown

already⁸. In respect to Casaubon and Spanheim, his lordship is *not* mistaken; and these are the only two examples in which he is right. Though he might have found a *hundred* examples among the old German divines, who assert with his lordship, that “Christ, and *not* St. Peter,” was the Rock to which allusion was made, he

⁸ In the passage above quoted from Chrysostom, as well as in the passage quoted from Augustine, ἐπὶ τῇ πέτρᾳ is referred to *St. Peter*, though a distinction is made in *those* passages between the *person* of St. Peter and the *faith* of St. Peter. But I have lately examined the works of Chrysostom with a view to this very text, and have found various passages in which Chrysostom speaks *generally* of St. Peter, as the rock or foundation of the Christian Church. For instance, in the Benedictine edition, tom. ii. p. 300, he says: ΠΕΤΡΟΝ δὲ ὅταν λέγω, τὴν ΠΕΤΡΑΝ λέγω τὴν ἀρραγῇ, τὴν ΚΡΗΠΙΔΑ τὴν ἀσάλευτον. In tom. vi. p. 124, he calls St. Peter again ἡ ΚΡΗΠΙΣ τῆς ἐκκλησίας: and in p. 282, ὁ ΘΕΜΕΛΙΟΣ τῆς ἐκκλησίας. In tom. ix. p. 790, he again says that St. Peter was ἡ ΚΡΗΠΙΣ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ὁ ΟΝΤΩΣ Πέτρος, καὶ τῷ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΙ καὶ τῷ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙ. Montfaucon, indeed, is of opinion, that the Homily in which this *last* passage is contained was not written by Chrysostom. But Saville has published the same Homily in his edition of Chrysostom, tom. vi. p. 927, without expressing any such suspicion. And the word Κρηπὶς, which Chrysostom has on other occasions applied to St. Peter, is rather an argument in favour of the passage. But whether Chrysostom was the author of *this* passage or not, the first three are sufficient to show his opinion. And *whoever* was the author of the words Πέτρος, καὶ τῷ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΙ καὶ τῷ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙ, their agreement with my explanation, “Thou art Rock in *name*, and shall be Rock in *deed*,” is worthy of notice.

has unfortunately selected an example which forms an *exception* to the rule. For Schmidius expressly refers ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ to *St. Peter*, though, like some other divines, he distinguishes between the *confession* of St. Peter and the *person* of St. Peter. He even *argues* from πέτρα to Πέτρος, and calls it *Allusio παρονομαστική*. But his lordship's attempt to enlist *Bishop Horsley* into his service (the only *English* divine whom he has mentioned) is still more extraordinary. For Bishop Horsley is so far from asserting with his lordship, that "Christ, and *not* St. Peter," was the Rock to which allusion was made, that in the very volume to which his lordship refers the reader, Bishop Horsley has taken great pains to show that the words ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ *must* apply to St. Peter. Surely, therefore, his lordship can have read only Bishop Horsley's *text*; for if he had read the *Sermon*, he would have hardly ventured to support his own opinion by a reference to an author whose works were both accessible and intelligible to every reader. Bishop Horsley's text in vol. i. Sermon 13, is the passage in question: and his object is to prove, that our Saviour not only alluded to *St. Peter*, but to St. Peter *exclusively*. He complains in p. 275, that "among the divines of the reformed Churches, especially the *Calvinists*, it hath been a favourite notion, that *St. Peter himself* had no particular interest in the promises

which seem in this passage to be made to him.” But, says Bishop Horsley, in p. 279, “ I would ask, in what way any one person of a numerous company can be *more pointedly addressed*, in what way can a discourse be more expressly confined and limited *in exclusion of the rest*, than by calling that one person by his proper name, adding to his proper name his patronymic, and subjoining to that distinct compellation these express words, ‘ I say unto thee ? ’ ” Again, says Bishop Horsley in p. 282, “ When Simon, son of Jonah, first became a follower of our Lord, our Lord gave him the name of *Cephas*, or the *Rock*, which passed into the equivalent word of the Greek language, *Petros*.” Here we see that Bishop Horsley does not confound Πέτρος as a *proper name* with Πέτρος as an *appellative*, but allows that Πέτρος as the name of the Apostle is *equivalent* to the Syriac term Cepha. But the passage which most distinctly marks Bishop Horsley’s opinion is in p. 289 : “ The first part of the promise that the Church should be built upon a *Rock*, is contained in these words of our Lord to *St. Peter*, ‘ I say unto thee, that thou art Peter, and upon *this Rock*,’ or, as the words might be better rendered, ‘ on *this self-same Rock*, I will build my Church ;’ which may be thus paraphrased : ‘ Thou hast now shown the *propriety* of the name which I have given thee, taken from a *rock* : for thou

hast about thee that which hath in it the *likeness* of a rock ; and upon this *self-same* rocky thing will I build my Church.'” Bishop Horsley, therefore, argues from Πέτρα to Πέτρος, and considers it as a reason why St. Peter was *exclusively* meant. He takes care, indeed, to explain the *figurative* use of the word Rock on this occasion ; and no one will contend, that St. Peter was a rock in the *literal* acceptation of the word. Hence he afterwards distinguishes (as some other divines had done before) the *person* of St. Peter from St. Peter’s *confession of faith*. But this does not prevent the application from being made to *St. Peter*, and to *St. Peter alone*. In whatever way the application be *explained*, the application *itself* remains unaltered. At all events, it is an explanation into which I did not enter, and therefore it contains nothing contradictory to my note. I considered the reference as explaining *itself*. The immediate allusion was to the *name* of the Apostle : from the name our Saviour argued to the *meaning* of the name ; and the meaning of the name was applied to designate the future *services* of the Apostle, as services *corresponding* with the name. I do not see, therefore, any ground for a distinction between the *person* of the Apostle and the *faith* of the Apostle ; for both the one and the other were employed in the performance of the task which was committed

to his care. His faith operated through his person.

But whatever be my own opinion about the passage in question, I have no desire to interfere with the opinion entertained by the Bishop of St. David's. I must only request his lordship to abstain from mixing theological reproaches with philological researches, and from endeavouring to excite a prejudice against the *person* of his adversary, before he examines the *arguments* of his adversary. The very first words of his Letter to the Bishop of Durham are: "The *Protestant* sense which I have given to the passage in St. Matthew's Gospel, concerning the rock of the Christian Church, &c." And in the next page he says again: "I am anxious that the *Protestant* cause, which I conceive to be *deeply interested* in the right acceptation of our Saviour's words, &c." He thus very clearly insinuates, that his adversary, though author of the *Comparative View*, explains the Scriptures in a *popish* sense. But this is not the first time that his lordship has taken these unwarranted liberties. In the Charge delivered to the Clergy of his diocese in September 1813, and printed at their request, he informed them, that I maintained a principle of an "*anti-Protestant complexion*;"

⁹ See p. 23. In this page he does not mention me by *name*, though no one could doubt whom he meant. But lest a doubt should remain, he took care to introduce my name in a subsequent note.

and this merely because I had published "An Inquiry into the Consequences of neglecting to give the Prayer Book with the Bible." But his lordship should have been *thankful* for a publication which greatly contributed to promote the distribution of the Prayer Book, at a period when there was imminent danger of its being neglected, from the *false application* of the maxim, that the Bible, and the Bible only, is the religion of the Protestant. That insinuations of popery were urged in the heat of controversy, or in the vehemence of auxiliary declamations, affords less matter of surprise; but that a grave and learned *Bishop* should deliberately inform his Clergy, that a Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge entertained principles of an "*anti-Protestant complexion*," because he argued for the distribution of that book which *distinguishes* the Churchman, must really excite astonishment. Do we cease to be *Protestants* because we are *Churchmen*? And can we distinguish Protestant *Churchmen* from Protestant *Dissenters* by any other means than by using and distributing *both* Bible and Prayer Book? Shall we confound the *authority* of the Bible with the *distribution* of the Bible, and argue that because the Bible is the sole *authority* in matters of faith, the Bible only shall be *used and distributed* by the faithful? I understand that his lordship *himself* has published a

pamphlet, entitled “The Bible, and nothing but the Bible, the religion of the Church of England.” I have never seen the pamphlet, and therefore do not pretend to judge of it ; but the *title* is certainly a very injudicious one : for it contains a proposition, which is not only false in one sense, though true in another, but is false in *that* sense in which it is most likely to be understood and applied. The proposition is true in reference to the *authority* of the Bible : for the Church of England founds its *Articles of Faith* on the “Bible, and nothing but the Bible,” whereas the Church of Rome founds its Articles of Faith on the *Bible and Tradition*. But the proposition is *not* true, when it is understood with reference to the *use and distribution* of the Bible. The religion of the *Church of England* is promoted by the use and distribution of both Bible and Prayer Book. Take away the Prayer Book, and, though we remain Protestants, we become *Dissenters*. Surely a *Bishop* should not forget, that the rejection of the *Prayer Book* in the time of Charles I. was the very thing which *overturned* the Church. But the proposition is very useful for the advocates of the British and Foreign Bible Society ; a subject which his lordship could not refrain from introducing in his Letter to the Bishop of Durham on the *Pelasgi and Æolic Digamma*. I have long ceased to argue about that Society ; but his lordship’s

remark is so deserving of attention, that I cannot disregard it. He speaks in p. 3, of “the Bible Society, for whose *general principle* of universally distributing the Scriptures, and the *general measure* of uniting all denominations of Christians, or not Christians, in this Christian-like duty, I am an humble advocate.” The words here printed in italics are so printed by his lordship; he must, therefore, intend to limit his approbation of the Society to its *general principle* of distributing the Scriptures. But the excellence of this *general principle* no one has ever disputed. It is a principle which *this* Bible Society has in common with the *other* Bible Society, or the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge; and therefore the objection to the former applies not to the *principle itself*, but to things which are *connected* with that principle in the former Society, but not in the latter. And from the stress which his lordship lays on the term *general principle*, it is evident that he does not undertake to defend every thing in the *detail* of the Society. And if his lordship really *has* discovered any thing wrong in the detail of the Society; if he *has* discovered any thing suspicious in the views of any of its members, it is a pity that his lordship did not make the discovery before the Methodists and Dissenters had acquired such *power*, and acquired it by the *aid* of that Society. The *true* policy of Churchmen :

would have been a general association of Churchmen with Churchmen, for the purpose of promoting the use and distribution of both Bible and Prayer Book. *Such* an association would have been a *protection* for the Church, and consequently a protection for the *purest form of Christianity*. At the same time, it might have abstained from interfering in the faith and worship of *other* Christians; it might have abstained from all bitterness and evil speaking against those whose religious opinions are different from our own. Yet, notwithstanding this exercise of Christian charity, it would have given no *encouragement* to those who dissent from us; it would not have increased the *power* of those whose views, in their very nature, are and *must* be hostile to the Establishment. Unfortunately for the Church of England, a *contrary* policy has been adopted; and it is now, I fear, too late to retrace our steps. It is, at all events, too late to repair the evil already done. But I will not pursue any further a subject already exhausted. I will only observe, that though I could easily have confuted his lordship's accusation, I purposely abstained from it, as I thought that there was already dissension enough in the Church. The Bishop of St. David's may argue as much as he pleases about the Pelasgi and the Æolic Digamma. Our controversies on *that* subject can do no harm to the Church. But it is not a

matter of indifference to the Church, when two writers who are equally attached to it, and equally zealous for its welfare, are opposed to each other in the concerns of the Church. I wished, therefore, to *avoid* a controversy with the Bishop of St. David's on theological subjects. But *forbearance* has been mistaken by his lordship for *imbecility*; and he has *renewed* his accusation, because it was not answered at first. With respect, however, to the charge of popery, as applied to the explanation of the passage in question, I am contented to share it in company with the most distinguished among the English divines who have commented on this passage. For if it is popery to explain of St. Peter the Rock on which our Saviour declared that He would build his Church, the charge of popery attaches to Bishop Pearson, to Bishop Beveridge, to Bishop Pearce, to Bishop Hurd, and to Bishop Horsley: it attaches to Dr. Hammond, to Dr. Whitby, to Dr. Clarke, and to Dr. Wells: it attaches to Dr. Doddridge, Dr. Campbell, and Dr. Macknight.

I will now close this Appendix with the earnest request, that Churchmen would seriously attend not to *one* only, but to *all* the dangers which threaten the Established Church. It is necessary to guard against the encroachments of the Church of Rome: and for that reason I wrote the "Comparative View." But while

we guard against encroachments from the Church of Rome, let us not overlook the consequences of encroachments from *other quarters*.

THE END.

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